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 “When a society is rich, its people don't need to work with their 
hands; they can devote themselves to activities of the spirit. We 
have more and more universities and more and more students. If 
students are going to earn degrees, they've got to come up with 
dissertation topics. And since dissertations can be written about 
everything under the sun, the number of topics is infinite. Sheets of 
paper covered with words pile up in archives sadder than 
cemeteries, because no one ever visits them, not even on All Souls' 
Day. Culture is perishing in overproduction, in an avalanche of 
words, in the madness of quantity. That's why one banned book in 
your former country means infinitely more than the billions of 
words spewed out by our universities.” 
Milan Kundera: The Unbearable Lightness of Being, New York 
1991, Harper-Perennial, p. 105. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Subject of research 
The international scenario has suffered many substantive changes in the last twenty-five 
years. Almost a generation is born since the end of the Cold War. More precisely, the 
implosion of the Soviet Union in August 1991 has drastically changed our legal, 
political and economic priorities and aspirations1. Despite the relative level of 
integration of the so-called international society, essentially promoted by 
intergovernmental international organisations, we might admit that this integration is 
still initial and partial, with the meaningful exception of the European Union (EU). At 
the same time, we witness the multiplication of actors of all kinds in the international 
arena, and their increasing influence due to globalisation: churches, lobbies and all kind 
of companies with their diverse interests. Globalisation extends beyond the economy 
and affects labour relations (global competition between workers, their international 
mobility and delocalisation), communications (the expansion of the World Wide Web 
and the Internet), health global crisis (due to Ebola, AIDS/HIV, H5N5 virus, to cite only 
a few recent diseases), and security problems (all forms of transnational terrorism), 
creating a variety of “borderless threats”2. We face a wider range of actors which, 
sometimes, seem to relegate States, who historically were self-sufficient and superiorem 
non recognoscens in the classic terminology, while the former dominance of “high-
politics” and the bipolar geopolitical configuration have lost prominence. 
On the other hand, in legal terms and according to that traditional viewpoint, only States 
and International Organisations can be considered subjects of International Law (IL) 
without any doubt; however, nowadays’ world places us in an interesting crossroad: the 
presence and strength of some actors, like transnational companies (TNCs), has eroded 
the pre-eminence of States and Organizations on the international stage. 
Simultaneously, the international agenda has also significantly changed, with the rise of 
new concerns: mainly, human rights, sustainable development and the environment, in 
                                                          
1
 It has been a far-reaching change in mentalities, on which an indispensable, in-depth and visionary 
analysis is the one made by the Spanish master teacher of international law, Prof. Truyol y Serra, who 
died in 2003. A. TRUYOL SERRA: La Sociedad Internacional, Madrid 1993, Alianza Ed., pp. 128-171. 
2
 A very recent state of the art: S. HAMEIRI and L. JONES: Governing Borderless Threats: Non-
Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation, Cambridge 2015, Cambridge University 
Press.  
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an increasingly multilateral world. Social concerns have necessarily become 
international: development and human rights have emerged as strong items on the 
international agenda, solidly intertwined, repeatedly calling upon private actors’ 
complementary role in their advancement, as confirmed by the new UN Sustainable 
Development Goals for 2030 (SDGs), adopted in September 20153. 
The development of international human rights law (IHRL) is, without any doubt, one 
of the very few good things left by the 20th Century. Economic globalisation and the 
increasing interdependency and integration of the international system give rise to a 
double challenge: to make globalisation and human rights reconcilable, with a view to 
minimising the adverse effects of the intense transnational economic and financial 
flows. This challenge expresses itself through a particular, and usually controversial, 
interaction between human rights’ enjoyment and the daily activities or operations of 
transnational companies (TNCs). It is in this context that Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and related notions have been born: its aim is to solve this 
problem through a complex set of ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’ instruments, which are 
inspired on other classic normative components of IL and IHRL.  
In this context, the concrete subject of study of this research is an analysis of the 
contribution made by international organisations in promoting CSR and how their role 
has changed. This consists of providing an answer to the following problematics, inter 
alia: what organisations have led the way in shaping CSR; how CSR has evolved and 
what are its characteristics and definition; why the role of international organisations is 
crucial; what has been the EU’s role, how is it different from other IOs (both 
institutionally and substantively); and if purely economic organisations got something 
to say (the World Bank Group, the World Trade Organisation). In sum, what are the 
open possibilities for the promotion of human rights in relation to the activities of TNCs 
from an institutional perspective? We also question how CSR can be integrated within 
the general regime of international protection of human rights, which ultimately leads us 
to wonder if victims of corporate-related human rights’ breaches have access to justice 
and under what circumstances. 
                                                          
3
 The new SDGs, at the end of the day, “seek to realize the human rights of all”. In this development 
agenda, it is acknowledged that the “[p]rivate business activity, investment and innovation are major 
drivers of productivity, inclusive economic growth and job creations” so that the UN “call[s] upon all 
businesses to apply their creativity and innovation to solving sustainable development challenges”.  UN 
(General Assembly): Resolution “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development”, 25 September 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, preamble and para. 67 (citations). 
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Even at the risk of being a little descriptive at times, there is a lateral and instrumental 
objective, but not less important: to bring order to the ever-growing documentation and 
initiatives (issued by a plethora of intergovernmental and non-governmental 
international organisations), so as to show, with all due caution, their relative coherence, 
direction and potential. The need to bring some order is even more important in the EU, 
were we face dispersed and many times apparently disconnected initiatives that start to 
go beyond mere voluntariness, so usually associated to CSR. To ‘bring order’ does not 
consist of repeating and summarising one more time the existing CSR standards4; it is 
rather a research of common points and threads to infer eventual patterns and directions. 
Of course, this study corresponds to the larger category of what could be called 
“business and human rights studies”, while having a more limited scope. 
At the root of our subject-matter, thus outlined, we come across three theoretical 
problems that will subsequently determine our methodological approach. First of all, we 
face the above-mentioned interrelation between traditional subjects of International Law 
and the whole range of transnational “actors”. There is nothing to add for the moment 
apart from recalling that its origin lies in globalisation and that it is not an insuperable 
challenge for IL –we address it in detail in the first chapter so we avoid developing it 
here. 
Secondly, the sectorialisation of IL does not help us either, since it sometimes seems 
that commercial or investment matters are separate from the rest of IL regimes. These 
regimes have an apparently autonomous development, even with their own tribunals, 
and tend to self-sufficiency, ultimately implying a risk of fragmentation. Businesses 
would operate in a field while human rights would correspond to a different and 
detached universe. The International Law Commission has explained that, unlike 
internal orders, International Law has not clear-cut normative hierarchies but “this has 
never meant that one could not, in particular cases, decide on an order of precedence 
                                                          
4
 This work has been done by many commentators. We recommend the following states of the art and a 
very recent dictionary: S.M. IDOWU, N. CAPALDI, M. FIFKA, L. ZU, R. SCHMIDPETER (Eds): 
Dictionary of Corporate Social Responsibility. CSR, Sustainability, Ethics and Governance, Swtizerland 
2015, Springer Ed; D. TÜRKER, H. TOKER and C. ALTUNTAS (Eds.): Contemporary issues in 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Plymouth (UK) – New York (USA) 2014, Lexington Books; B. 
HORRIGAN: Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century. Debates, Models and Practices Across 
Government, Law and Business, United Kingdom 2010, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd –the latter covers 
only until 2009 but is useful for some initial comments and to study the first initiatives.  
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among conflicting rules”5, which “cannot be determined abstractly” and needs a case-
based and “pragmatic” stance6. 
The third problem is ‘ideologisation’: ideological needs or ‘blinkers’ only push us to 
disillusionment and undermines the scientific value of any study. Many human rights 
activists expressed their shock in delusional and grandiloquent discourses, for example, 
when the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) finally 
approved the presence of crucifixes at public schools in Italy, to the disappointment of 
many. The Court very rightly explained that, for the time being, there was “no European 
consensus” 7 in this regard so it could fall under the margin of appreciation of member-
States. Activists were presumably delighted, however, when the UN Committee on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) impeded a French claimant, Mr Wackenheim, who 
suffers from dwarfism, to freely work in circus numbers including “dwarf tossing” 
(wearing a suitable protective gear), because the local authorities had banned it alleging 
a breach of human dignity, to the detriment of the primary livelihood of Mr. 
Wackenheim. He exhausted the French domestic remedies and unsuccessfully claimed 
to the UN-CCPR8 that this ban had deprived him of his right to work and that he had 
freely decided to have that work and didn’t feel his dignity violated –if we are allowed 
to add it, our televisions continuously show spectacles in which to ridicule (consenting) 
people is common place and human dignity and non-discrimination are more than 
discussable. Of course, we only propose these examples in a thought-provoking manner, 
to warn against ‘ideologisation’. Moving from anecdotes to categories, activists and a 
good part of the public opinion incur in a twofold misunderstanding that leads to 
delusion: they defend ideological expectations over legal limitations and they expect 
international tribunals to act as constitutional courts to overcome that problem9. This is 
                                                          
5
 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (ILC): Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 325 (at pp. 166-167).  
6
 “This reflected the pragmatic sense that some criteria are, in particular contexts, more important than 
others”. Ibíd.  
7
 “The Court concludes in the present case that the decision whether crucifixes should be present in State-
school classrooms is, in principle, a matter falling within the margin of appreciation of the respondent 
State. Moreover, the fact that there is no European consensus on the question of the presence of religious 
symbols in State schools speaks in favour of that approach”. ECtHR (Grand Chamber): Lautsi and Other 
vs. Italy, Judgement of 18 March 2011, Application No. 30814/06, para. 70.  
8
 UN-CCPR: Manuel Wackenheim vs. France, Decision of 15 July 2002, Communication No. 854/1999, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002). 
9
 In this connection, Prof. Pascual Vives concludes that the above-cited case of Lautsi should not 
disappoint international lawyers: “en el caso Lautsi y otros c. Italia, analizada desde el DI Público, no 
debe concebirse con desazón, como una laguna en la jurisprudencia del TEDH […] Todo lo contrario, 
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why we have shunned ideological requirements and any kind of activism (corporate 
neo-liberalism just as much as pro-human rights purism). In relation to ideological 
stances, we shall add political interferences, on which it must be highlighted that –when 
dealing with human rights– we always need a certain amount of political will, without 
which we cannot make them work. But a purist and doctrinal study of human rights can 
compromise their practical effectiveness and unduly neglect open opportunities for the 
introduction of human rights’ concerns within business activities, as it will be shown. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology adopted stems from the observation of the above-mentioned problems 
(international subjectivity, risk of fragmentation of IL and widespread ideologisation). 
This has forced us to adopt a consensual approach to offset the problematic 
ideologization and to explain the foundation and development of International Law, 
since CSR is an area under development. We have further adopted an integrative stance 
to overcome undesirable risks of fragmentation of IL, which is the pathology of the 
unavoidable sectorialisation of IL. And a human rights-based approach is finally 
needed to clarify and correctly focus CSR. 
Our consensual approach is guided by pragmatism, in the already-cited words of the 
ILC, when dealing with the risks of fragmentation of IL, so we give a great importance 
to the gradual construction of agreements in an area, like CSR, that is clearly in its 
infancy. Even though it shows promising developments, methodologically speaking, we 
will keep in mind public international law principles and, in particular, how difficult but 
necessary it is to reach a certain level of consensus within the international society (also 
within the EU)10. Of course, the path of consensus is not necessarily easy and we do not 
idealise it. It is advisable to keep being realistic and critic. Power and economic 
differences between States are obvious in the world, and between States and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
constituye un resultado ajustado a la naturaleza internacional del Tribunal de Estrasburgo y coherente 
con el papel que desarrolla la noción de consenso, entendida desde una perspectiva material, en 
ordenamiento jurídico internacional”. (Emphasis added). F. PASCUAL VIVES: “El margen de 
apreciación nacional en los tribunales regionales de derechos humanos: una aproximación 
consensualista”, in Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional, Vol. 29 (2013), pp. 217-262, at p. 257.  
10
 See, generally: J. FERRER LLORET: El consenso en el proceso de formación institucional de normas 
en el Derecho internacional, Barcelona 2006, Atelier Ed., passim.  
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Companies, even within the European Union11. IHRL tries to prevent actions, which 
could, not so long ago, be acceptable. The nineteenth century industrialisation would 
now be disapproved from a human rights point of view, that is, international standards 
change and evolve. For example, the abolition of slavery is, from a historical 
perspective, to some extent a recent development –no need to recall the difficulties 
experienced before an international consensus was reached in this regard –the US 
needed a civil war. So, it will take some time to consolidate the current initiatives given 
the huge and non-easily reconcilable interests at stake12. Here lies the fundamental role 
of consensus in the formation of IL13. 
To work towards reaching a favourable climate of opinion is an indispensable step in 
the progressive development of IL. This process will determine the future of CSR: the 
customary path, based on the construction of that consensus, means that all States do 
not need to absolutely and unanimously agree on every single point, but still is there a 
common sense of agreement to the extent States do not wish either to hinder the 
development of CSR just by forcing excessively detailed negotiations, which would be 
inescapable when unanimity is required or a vote is asked14. 
Still on methodology, we adopt an integrative position for two reasons. First of all, our 
integrative perspective is aimed at resituating CSR within the framework of IHRL, 
which is its natural field according to our research. At the same time, an integrative 
                                                          
11
 To give a recent example, Swedish Social Democrats had promoted –when in opposition– a 
parliamentarian initiative to recognise Western Sahara independence. Morocco then blocked the opening 
of the first IKEA store (in Casablanca) scheduled for October 2015. Once in office, Social Democrats 
have finally changed their mind abandoning their initiative, as reported by the press. See: A. TAYLOR: 
Ikea may have stumbled into one of North Africa’s most intractable land disputes”, in Washington Post, 
29 September 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/29/ikea-
may-have-stumbled-into-one-of-north-africas-most-intractable-land-disputes/ (last accessed date: 24 
October 2015). Also refer to the recent decision adopted by Sweden at the Spanish journal El País as 
reported by Reuters: “Suecia renuncia a reconocer al Sáhara tras el bloqueo marroquí a Ikea”, El País, 18 
January 2016, available at: 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/01/18/actualidad/1453119823_900989.html -last 
accessed date 19 January 2016). 
12
 As it is eloquently said in a theatrical work by Jacinto Benavente (1866-1954), a Spanish writer very 
critical of the bourgeoisie –his own social class: “we’ve created many bonds of interest, and it’s in 
everyone interest to rescue us”. To put it crudely, it can be said that it is in the interest of capitalism to 
find out how business and human rights can be compatible and to develop an international agreement in 
that direction. A bilingual (English-Spanish) edition of this theatrical work: J. BENAVENTE: The Bonds 
of Interest – Los intereses creados (Edited and translated by Stanley Appelbaum), New York 2004, Dover 
Publications, p. 75 (quote). 
13
 C. JIMENEZ PIERNAS : “El derecho internacional contemporáneo: una aproximación consensualista”, 
XXXVII Curso de Derecho Internacional, Washington 2011, Organización de Estados Americanos, 64 
pp., at pp. 27-31. 
14
 A. CASSESE: “Consensus and some of its pitfalls”, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Internazionale, No. 58 
(1975), pp. 754-761, at p. 755. 
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stance is needed to recall that international economic law, IHRL, and any other sector, 
all are within general international law and do not function in a vacuum. Just as we 
resituate CSR within human rights law, we resituate international economic law within 
general international law. 
This integrative perspective therefore insists on the risks of fragmentation of IL, on 
which we now shall add a few words. For instance, we have already stated, against 
fragmentation, that there are not watertight law-fields excluding each other. 
Sectorialisation is the necessary result of the specialisation of diverse legal fields due to 
the complexity of international activities, in line with globalisation trends, being also a 
result of regionalisation15. Fragmentation is the undesirable consequence of 
sectorialisation. According to the ILC, it is difficult and problematic to establish an 
aprioristic and abstract hierarchy within IL, but as said before, this does not mean it is a 
totum revolutum. Nor does it mean that there are absolutely self-contained regimes. IL 
has a “relational character”: “[i]f lawyers feel unable to deal with this complexity, this 
is not a reflection of problems in their ‘tool-box’ but in their imagination about how to 
use it”16. More concretely, the fact of being a lex specialis is not a passe-partout to 
disregard other specific regimes (human rights) or general international law, provided 
the specific case requires it and that it is done accordingly with the general principles of 
IL (for example, in good faith). Imagination is needed besides reasonable and 
technically-feasible goals, therefore rejecting maximalist stances and wishful thinking 
that, in fact, reflect ideological exigencies. 
Of course there are superior interests of the ‘international society’, sometimes 
recognised through treaties and, in general, as a decanting process based on an 
international consensus that has to be the result of combining a extensive and consistent 
praxis with an opinio iuris –which in turn can be global or only regional. However, it 
seems to us too optimistic to say that all human rights have reached the status of erga 
omnes obligations; perhaps a limited range of its core elements have (like slavery or, 
less probably, torture), but insufficient to address the problematic interaction between 
                                                          
15
 S. SALINAS ALCEGA and C. TIRADO ROBLES: Adaptabilidad y fragmentación del derecho 
internacional: la crisis de la sectorialización, Zaragoza 1999, Real Instituto Elcano Ed., pp. 215-228.  
16
 ILC: Fragmentation of International Law…, op. cit., UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 222 (at pp. 114-
115).  
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business and human rights, which is much wider in its casuistry17. Again, pragmatism is 
advisable to overcome the fact that “idealist hopes are as exaggerated as the fears of 
realists”18.  
We therefore stick to the relational character of international norms and to the 
widespread idea that fragmentation and strict ‘self-contained regimes’ are not in line 
with IL principles19. This explains the reasoning in two steps that gives substance to 
many of our conclusions when studying the dialectic between business and human 
rights: we first investigate what role might general international law play and, at a 
second stage, what role human rights can reasonably play. This is particularly important 
in the area of international trade and investments. 
Leaving aside our consensual and integrative methodological approach, in more general 
terms, we must be aware of the gap between norms and reality, which is not only an IL 
problem since it happens at an internal level as well. In this sense, a mere formal 
analysis of the existing norms, with their different value, would constitute a deductive 
exercise of idealism, which seems to be out of touch with the material dimensions of a 
frequently problematic reality. A formal vision tends to forget the interests at stake, both 
social and political, which have also an influence on the gradual creation of any 
normative framework (like CSR).  
This is why, in summary, we also propose an interdisciplinary approach, a method able 
to cover, as Weber says, what it “ought to be” and “what it is”, to the degree legal 
processes are also socio-historical phenomena20. This research has an underlying 
Weberian foundation; even in what Weber himself was reluctant to explicitly accept 
                                                          
17
 For some authors, it is not unreasonable to place human rights obligations somewhere hierarchically 
superior in the international legal order. In our view, this rather reflects wishful thinking than a reality 
rebus sic stantibus. See, generally: E. De WET and J. VIDMAR (Eds.): Hierarchy in International Law: 
the Place of Human Rights, Oxford 2012, Oxford University Press. 
18
 C.J. TAMS: Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, Cambridge 2007, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 309. 
19
 For a good state of the art and the basic bibliography therein, see: M.A. YOUNG: Regime Interaction 
in International Law. Facing Fragmentation, Cambridge 2012, Cambridge University Press. 
20
 An example of this idea is provided by Prof. Skouteris, from the American University in Cairo: “In 
trying to assess legal relationships the jurist cannot avoid the methodological conundrums of 
contemporary history. The fact that the object of study is ‘law’ does not mean that legal technique alone 
can provide an answer. […] Knowledge of state intent is intertwined with various other parameters, such 
as security and power, that cannot be dissected from the question of intent”. T. SKOUTERIS: “Engaging 
History in International Law”, in J.M. BENEYTO, D. KENNEDY (Eds.) and J. CORTI VARELA, J. 
HASKELL (Assistant Eds.): New Approaches to International Law. The European and the American 
Experiences, The Hague 2012, Springer Ed., pp. 99-121, at pp. 114-115.  
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such as the relationship between politics and science, which we tangentially address 
when dealing with technical requirements and the ‘expertisation’ of policies (in areas 
like new technologies, food security, pharmaceutical regulation, etc.). According to the 
sensible comments of Raymond Aron, the more Max Weber insisted on the 
incompatibility between politics and science, the more he made clear his awareness of 
the tight links between both areas21. The same thing happens in the link between law 
and politics, given the strength of the concept of legitimacy in this thinker. We fully 
share the idea that legitimations, whatever they may be, are the glue that makes States 
work and self-sustain in time, based on a legal power characterised by its ordinary and 
impersonal character22. 
The interdisciplinarity of this research forces us to make various references to 
transversal problems like development or governance (weak regimes, poverty, etc.), 
together with occasional incursions into other fields of knowledge (from the philosophy 
of language to company law or criminal and civil law23). This interdisciplinary 
perspective arises from the belief that there is a need to connect and relate problems 
rather than isolate questions, in order to link ideas and include social as well as political, 
legal and economic aspects when facing a problem. This reveals to be indispensable as 
far as the most striking global troubles are a result of an increasingly complex mixture 
of factors and causes. 
The international system is more and more complex and ‘complete’ in its daily 
attributes and manifestations; the international system itself is in search of legitimations 
to sustain the power relations upon which it is built. In this vein, if future developments 
confirm that –as it seems so far– the legal formation of CSR is based on an ever-
growing consensus, this fact will provide it with a source of legitimacy in the future 
accordingly to a sociological approach to IL. As Norberto Bobbio remarked in his 
comments on Weber, a “pattern of legality” is not “self-sufficient” and needs an 
                                                          
21
 “Repitió continuamente que las virtudes del político son incompatibles con las del hombre de ciencia; 
pero su preocupación por separar ambas actividades no era más aguda que su conciencia del vínculo que 
entre ellas existe”. Introduction of Raymond Aron to the Spanish edition of M. WEBER: El político y el 
científico, Madrid 1967, Alianza Ed., p. 10. 
22
 This construction led to the famous definition of the “legitimate monopoly over the use of violence 
within a recognized and bounded territory”. M. WEBER: Economy and Society, Vol. 2 (Edited by 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), Berkeley 1978, University of California Press, pp. 904-905.  
23
 In those cases we usually make reference to a problematic that opens the door to a different law-field, 
but we refrain from adopting a stance or providing any answer. Nevertheless, we have considered it 
interesting to leave some open questions in neighbouring law-fields. 
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“ulterior criterion”, for example, consensus, which is a potent source of legitimacy 
(among other possibilities)24. 
Norms sometimes derive from international practice, following an empirical and 
inductive path according to the sociological grounds of law; but in other occasions, it is 
also possible that some established practices are the product of and obey some previous 
normative ideals, in a deductive way. All in all, the vertical axis operates in both 
directions in the international order, combining empirical-inductive and logical-
deductive processes25. This applies to CSR: in certain occasions, it will respond to pre-
existing ideal requirements and, most of the time, it will be a reaction to the continued 
experience in the field and ‘societal expectations’. Law is frequently one step behind 
social developments and we are therefore closer to a sociological formation of 
International Law. This research is peppered with cases involving TNCs and human 
rights violations, whose objective is precisely to keep in touch with reality, the material 
dimension of law, which alternatively challenges or confirms norms. 
There are always logical imperfections in any legal order we examine; also internal 
legal orders are far from perfect in terms of compliance and enforcement. Imperfections 
are everywhere and the international society does not escape criticism (or even attracts 
it more than States). Internationally speaking, we live in a societas full of contrasting 
interests, perhaps with some traits of a very imperfect communitas. It is first of all for 
practical reasons that we use the term “international society”, which is in our view the 
most appropriate description of the current status of world politics26. In the view of 
Vitoria (1483-1546) a community should have a vocation to perfection and be 
teleological and morally based, but as pointed out in the following century by Suárez 
(1548-1617), this is –in modern words– similar to a mathematical function or curve that 
tends toward a point without never fully reaching it; not even States themselves really 
achieve a perfect level of integration based on the common good27. Without entering 
                                                          
24
 “Weber muestra claramente que no considera autosuficiente la pauta de la legalidad y, por tanto, estima 
necesario recurrir a un criterio ulterior, el cual puede ser el acuerdo entre intereses (el criterio del 
consenso […]”, N. BOBBIO: Teoría general de la política, Madrid 2003, Ed. Trotta (Edition by 
Michelangelo Bovero; translation by A. de Cabo and G. Pisarello), p. 171. 
25
 C. JIMENEZ PIERNAS: Introducción al derecho internacional público. Práctica de España y de la 
Unión Europea, Madrid 2011, Tecnos Ed., pp. 50 and 65-66. 
26
 It is an international society, “in its way” to become a community, in the words of Prof. del Arenal: C. 
del ARENAL: Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales, Madrid 2007, Tecnos Ed., p. 414. 
27
  “Lo que califica, pues, a una sociedad política como completa o perfecta es su “sibi sufficientia”, esto 
es contar con los medios materiales, institucionales y organizativos precisos para lograr el conjunto de 
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into the full debate on to what extent there are shared values and its degree of 
integration, we rather think that we are still far away from living in an ‘international 
community’ in terms of shared objectives and ethics28. 
This is a merely practical decision as far as we understand that, in terms of the 
international normative structure, most of our work will remain in the field of 
international organisations at an institutional level, also when dealing with States’ 
practice. This thesis has a primarily institutional perspective because we put the 
institutional dimension of norms and practice first, sometimes before analysing its 
substantive aspects, since this is the most adequate way to proceed in the field of 
international organisations and when analysing their normative production29. 
International organisations (IOs) have mainly institutionalised international cooperation, 
which is a non-negligible role, while being an important channel through which IL has 
undergone substantive changes30. CSR is just another example that shows an open path, 
in which we further analyse the dialectic between treaty law and customary law in the 
development of IL. 
 
Sources 
In line with the previous methodological considerations, the main sources are logically 
the practice of the different international organisations at a global level, with a strong 
emphasis on the European Union at a regional level, without isolating them from each 
other so as to allow a rigorous and complete investigation. As said before, this 
comprises the practice of some EU member-States that have put in place proper CSR 
policies and, au-fur-et-à-mesure, we include lateral comments on the most prominent 
                                                                                                                                                                          
condiciones sociales que permitan y favorezcan al pleno desarrollo de las personas, en que consiste el 
bien común. Ahora bien, como observa clarividentemente Suárez, tal auto-suficiencia nunca fue absoluta, 
ni siquiera en su época, en el momento de eclosión del Estado moderno […]”. F. SÁNCHEZ-
APELLANIZ VALDERRAMA: “Naturaleza y caracteres de la soberanía permanente sobre los recursos 
naturales”, in VVAA: Liber Amicorum. Colección de estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Prof. Dr. D. José 
Pérez Montero, Vol. III, Oviedo 1988, Universidad de Oviedo, pp. 1305-1328, at p. 1320. 
28
 In line with our arguments, the following pages summarise this debate: E. BARBÉ: Relaciones 
Internacionales, Madrid 2011, Tecnos Ed., pp. 131-135. 
29
 “En este ámbito del Derecho Internacional prima la dimensión institucional de las normas y de la 
práctica antes que la sustantiva”, O. CASANOVAS and A.J. RODRIGO: Compendio de Derecho 
Internacional Público, Madrid 2015, Tecnos Ed., p. 170.  
30
 J.A. PASTOR RIDRUEJO: Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones 
Internacionales, Madrid 2011, Tecnos Ed., p. 659. 
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private-led initiatives born under the auspices of IOs (the Equator Principles, the Global 
Compact, the Global Reporting Initiatives, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, ISO 
26000, etc.). 
This international and institutional focus does not mean that States’ practice is less 
important. On the contrary, States’ practice is a crucial source of International Law, but 
our institutional perspective is precisely justified to the extent international institutions 
are functioning as chemical accelerators of States’ initiatives. Nevertheless, in the 
particular context of the European Union, we will also analyse the most prominent 
national action plans together with some cutting-edge legislative changes in order to 
further comment on the importance of their mere existence with regard to the customary 
path –even regardless of the effectiveness of their contents. 
Besides the multiplication of institutional initiatives, literature on CSR is vast and 
disparate. We lack of systematic studies that clarify the current statu quo and the future 
possibilities from a scientific and neutral perspective. Most of the initial information at 
an academic level is found in specialised reviews rather than monographies, excluding 
some prominent examples, due to the fact that we focus on quite recent developments. 
For good or bad, a 2013-monography can be obsolete by 2015. For this reason, and due 
to the ever-growing number of commentators, codes, leaflets, essays, press news, etc., 
we have had to be mercilessly selective with the bibliography and include only the most 
representative authors and schools of thought.  
We intersperse the practice of IOs and States (official documents, legislation and soft 
instruments) with the incipient jurisprudence in this area, particularly advanced in the 
US, the UK and Netherlands. Selected cases of national and international courts have a 
double value: its typical interest as an application of IL, but also a potential recognition 
of incipient customary practices. It goes without saying that doctrine will serve to 
compare CSR to other law-fields and to contextualise it within general international law 
and within EU Law. Some studies de lege ferenda will also be useful, but more rarely 
used since we wish, above all, to conduct a realistic research. Everything together can 
help us see the wood, not just the trees. We are not the ones to predict the future of 
CSR, yet everything suggests that it came to stay. 
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Plan of work 
The key actors in the origin and development of CSR are international organisations 
(IOs): mainly, the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO). At a regional 
level, the European Union quickly took over and is now leading the way. Therefore, our 
first chapter is focused on the UN initiatives, aimed at systematising them rather than 
repeating their contents. Some core CSR debates are addressed en passant: the 
differential characteristics of CSR, its related concepts (due diligence, legal personality, 
grievance mechanisms), its legal composition (hard and soft law), the legal options to 
operationalise it (a new treaty, the customary path or what we call the Europeans’ third 
way), and the policy options to support it (national actions plans alongside the 
institutional context). 
At the end of the first chapter, we propose a definition of Corporate Social 
Responsibility based on the international practice surveyed. The definition proposed is 
supported throughout our research in view of IOs and States’ practice. On this basis, 
Chapter II is consecrated to the assessment of the existing possibilities to mainstream 
human rights into trade and investment issues, while arguing that IOs start to go all in 
the same direction, in line with an increasing institutional coordination that already 
delivers some substantive results. 
The second part of this research focuses on the European contribution to global CSR. 
Chapter III is aimed at bringing order into widely dispersed initiatives within the EU; 
this reveals to be absolutely necessary because the available scientific literature usually 
forgets to look at the same time at various law-fields (public procurement, corporate 
governance, the environment, etc.). In this sense, one of the difficulties of CSR in the 
EU is that, more than a separate policy, it has a strong crosscutting character. On the 
whole, it shows the “predilection of the European Union to receive international norms 
with open arms”, introduce substantive improvements and then “upload EU law and 
legal policy preferences into the international legal development process”31. This will 
help us analyse in the last chapter the potential contribution of the EU to global CSR. 
 
                                                          
31
 N. SINGH GHALEIGH: “Iterative Engagements. The European Union and International Normativity”, 
in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, Vol. 104 (March 24-27 
2010), pp. 572-576, at p. 575.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility at a global level 
 
1.1  Globalisation and Human Rights 
‘Business and human rights’ studies owe their growth to a double development, 
accentuated in the second half of the 20th Century: the parallel expansion of 
globalisation and human rights. 
Without a doubt, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is one of the best legacies of 
the last century. This even more so, since it has not been a particularly enthusing or 
inspiring period. Moreover, human rights have managed to evolve and overcome their 
inherent original sin, according to Hannah Arendt’s critique: its paradoxical origin 
linked to nationalisms in the end of the 18th Century and the 19th Century, when the 
recognition of such rights was based on the exclusion of non-citizens32. Political rights 
and human rights were firmly united until the latter emancipated themselves. 
Interestingly, only later, the socially marginalised and politically excluded became the 
priority of human rights, their raison d’être. 
This positive evolution has continued with the proliferation of multilateral human rights 
treaties, ranging from general issues (civil and political rights, economic and social 
ones, both of 1966), to very specific subjects such as racial discrimination (1966), the 
rights of the child (1989) or Apartheid in sports (1985), under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN). The most recent multilateral human rights treaty dates 2006 on the rights 
of persons with disabilities. There has been a similar progress at a regional level, with 
instruments like the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).  
The human rights language has clearly penetrated the social tissue and media, 
sometimes giving rise to misperceptions under which it seems that there are more and 
                                                          
32
 “The whole question of human rights, therefore, was quickly and inextricably blended with the question 
of national emancipation”. H. ARENDT: The Origins of Totalitarianism (Part II: Imperialism), New 
York 1968 (Vol. II), Harcourt Ed., p. 171. 
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more rights. In our view, the multiplication of international instruments should not be 
read in terms of more rights, but as a progressive specification of these. The basic 
misunderstanding lies in the fact that procedural aspects are mistaken for the rights at 
stake: for example, the protection of cultural heritage, which has an increasing number 
of specific treaties under the umbrella of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), has not leaded to new rights; it has detailed the contents of 
the right to culture and the means to achieve it under an already existing human right –
article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). The separation between cultural heritage and cultural rights under the 
ICESCR is simply incorrect: its specificity might justify the existence of particular 
treaties, the UN agency and specialised monitoring bodies, keeping however in mind 
that cultural heritage is only a tool. Cultural heritage could be defined as “cultural 
resources”33 without which we would deprive “the right to take part in cultural life” of 
content. Similarly, the so-called ‘gay rights’ do not exist: they are only a desirable 
aspect to be added to the general prohibition of discrimination. We could think of many 
other examples. It seems to us to be legal common sense not to deprive the ICESCR of 
content just because of the new challenges caused by globalisation and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). If we accept artificial separations between different human rights 
sectors, we would just contribute to slide down the slippery slope to a fragmentation of 
IL, against which we warned in the introduction34. 
In other words, we face the increasing complexity of different human rights’ 
dimensions, not new rights disconnected from the general regime set out in IHRL, 
which has to provide us with the contextualisation of any problematic, in our case, the 
interaction between transnational companies (TNCs) and human rights. It is therefore 
important to note that we do not defend the existence of new rights and responsibilities, 
and we even see it risky to adopt such stance; we rather defend the full implementation 
of already existing instruments and, if necessary, procedural advances and a progressive 
but realistic interpretation to facilitate their effectiveness. This is connected to the on-
                                                          
33
 M. BIDAULT: La protection internationale des droits culturels, Louvain 2009, Université Catholique 
de Louvain - Ed. Bruylant, pp. 431-435. Also F. Francioni, from the Florence European University 
Institute, has supported interpretations in the light of general principles of international law when he 
considered the UNESCO Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage, in relation to 
other human rights instruments: F. FRANCIONI: “La protección del patrimonio cultural a la luz de los 
principios de derecho internacional público”, in VA: La protección jurídico internacional del Patrimonio 
Cultural, Especial referencia a España, Madrid 2009, Colex Ed., p. 32. 
34
 On the risks of fragmentation against the so-called ‘self-contained regimes’ in International Law, also 
refer to: C. JIMENEZ PIERNAS: op. cit., pp. 56-58. 
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going debate on the need for adopting a new international instrument on business and 
human rights, which we will study in our assessment of soft international law and the 
effectiveness and usefulness of the current human rights’ regime dependent on 
international treaties35. Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter CSR) was born out 
of this intersection between business and human rights.  
Of course, many voices still critically rise that we are dealing with the eternal problem 
of legal moralism, within the framework of H.L.A. Hart’s polemic triangle constituted 
by law, liberty and morality: delegalize morals or demoralize law?36 Transposing this 
analysis to the international arena, social morality takes the form of an international 
ordre public, in which we place human rights principles. In any case, moral 
responsibilities and political responsibilities are more and more “inextricable” in a 
global age37. Notwithstanding the fact that human rights clearly entail some sort of 
ethics (and it would be cynical not to admit it38), some critiques also seem exaggerated 
as far as there is a margin of appreciation to comply with the treaties so as to adapt their 
requirements to a variety of cultural, economic and political particularities, not to 
mention the concept of ‘progressive realization’ studied in the following section on 
ESCR. 
To continue with our previous examples: article 15 ICESCR on the right to culture does 
not imply at all that access to culture shall be free, but available and accessible; it 
happens the same with article 12 ICESCR on the right to health –these services do not 
necessarily need to be delivered by the State through public institutions without any 
cost, even though it should be available and accessible regardless of its ownership and 
management39; nor the principle of non-discrimination obliges any State to adopt 
legislation allowing “gay marriage” –provided there is no unlawful discrimination with 
respect to LGTB people. 
                                                          
35
 See below Chapter II, Section 3. 
36
 M. A. RAMIRO: “A vueltas con el moralismo legal” (Prologue) in H.L.A. HART: Derecho, libertad y 
moralidad (translation of M. A. RAMIRO), Madrid 2006, Dykinson Ed., pp. 9-88, passim.  
37
 “[D]ebates in international relations between those advocating for international morality and those 
denying it have become theoretically sterile”, R. BEARDSWORTH: “From Moral to Political 
Responsibility in a Globalised Age”, in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 29 No. 1, 2015, pp. 71-92, 
at p. 74.  
38
 As Amartya Sen pronounced: “human rights are quintessentially ethical articulations”, primarily an 
“ethical demand” that, later on, can have algo secondary legal articulations. A. SEN: “Elements of a 
Theory of Human Rights”, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 32 No. 4, 2004, pp. 315-356, at p. 321. 
39
 OHCHR: Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet No. 33, 
Geneva 2008, United Nations, p. 20.  
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Behind the critics’ reasoning we find the usual allegations of Western paternalism and 
imperialism through human rights. If we accept the thesis of continuity according to 
which there were no significant changes despite the fall of the Berlin Wall, we might be 
tempted to maintain a bipolar discourse, converted into a North-South dialectic that 
many authors support since the 1990s to keep up a “tale of two worlds: core and 
periphery”40 –in economic terms. Nothing substantial would have changed and human 
rights would have become a new ‘soft power’ strategy to keep on subjugating less 
developed countries, following Nye’s terminology. Of course, the North-South narrative 
might be partly true; also, some current international conflicts can perfectly be studied 
under the continuity thesis (the recent crisis in Ukraine or US-Russia opposing views on 
Siria’s war). However, the maintenance –with its adaptations– of a binary discourse 
seems to oversimplify some important changes and many other factors that have to be 
added since the end of the Cold War in a rather multipolar scenario, far from the ‘end of 
history’ in the famous Fukuyama’s expression. This discussion only reflects our 
difficulty to “introduce discontinuities into history” in increasingly complex scenarios 
with a good amount of “chaos”41. 
Accusations of imperialism against human rights also seem exaggerated taking into 
account, for example, the widely disseminated Millennium Development Goals42, an 
agenda aimed at increasing human rights respect and economic development, with eight 
objectives that should have been accomplished before 2015: eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower 
women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS malaria 
and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and promote global partnerships 
                                                          
40
 Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Block, a part of the academia supported the maintenance of 
a bipolar discourse, changed into a North-South dichotomy, allowed a partial salvation of political realism 
within less developed countries: “We thus tell the tale of two worlds of international politics in the post-
cold war era. In the core, economic interdependence, political democracy […] In the periphery, however, 
[…] interdependence between peripheral States is subordinate to dependence on core States. […] 
structural realism is inadequate to explain the behaviour of states in the core but is relevant for 
understanding regional security systems in the periphery”. J. M. GOLDGEIER and M. McFAUL: “A 
Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era”, in International Organization, Vol. 
46 No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 467-491, at pp. 469-470. 
41
 J. L. GADDIS: “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War”, in International 
Security, Vol. 17 No. 3 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 5-58, at p. 52. Also see: J.E. CRONIN: The World the 
Cold War Made: Order, Chaos and the Return of History, New York 1996, Routledge Ed., passim. 
(xii+332pp)  
42
 Following to two Resolutions of the General Assembly in 2000: UNITED NATIONS: United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted on 8th September 2000 (8th plenary meeting), New-York, 
18th September 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, and the Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, 
UN Doc. A/RES/55/162. 
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for development. These objectives, which don’t seem particularly imperialistic, have 
been partially achieved, apparently with good “reason[s] to celebrate”43, since extreme 
poverty and the proportion of under-nourished people have both been reduced by half, 
net enrolment rates in primary education have significantly increased in developing 
countries and gaps between women and men steadily narrow, among other encouraging 
signs. In this sense, we shall note that the mixture between human rights and economic 
development generated the concept of sustainable human development upon which is 
built the UN strategy. It must be underlined to what extent the new millennium has 
inaugurated an utterly useful and unprecedented approach: that link between human 
rights and economic development, very distant from previous morally-idealistic western 
defences of human rights –which where precisely an easy target for criticism.  
In sum, we dare say that most societies embrace human rights as a natural and desirable 
development, despite the eventual critiques and political nuances. The adoption of the 
human rights’ language includes almost all transnational actors; for example, the 
Catholic Church, with 1200 million believers, has revived its “social doctrine” at the 
end of the 20th Century –born at the end of the 19th Cent. with the Encyclical Letter 
Rerum Novarum (Pope Leo XIII). Even H.H. Pope John Paul II expressed that a “type 
of development which did not respect and promote human rights –personal and social, 
economic and political, including the rights of nations and of peoples –would not be 
really worthy of man”44. H. H. Pope Francis now includes explicit human rights’ 
concerns in very modern terms, as recently expressed with regard to the environment 
and the “right to water”45 or, in more general terms, when it is acknowledged that “[i]n 
the present condition of global society, where injustices abound and growing numbers 
of people are deprived of basic human rights and considered expendable, the principle 
of the common good immediately becomes, logically and inevitably, a summons to 
solidarity and a preferential option for the poorest of our brothers and sisters”46. In any 
case, one cannot but acknowledge that States’ obligations are gradually tougher in this 
regard, with mixed results, and that societies have generally accepted this as a positive 
evolution. 
                                                          
43
 UNITED NATIONS: The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015, New York 2015, p. 4.  
44
 Encyclical Letter, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (30 December 1987), 33: AAS 80 (1988), 557.  
45
 “Yet access to safe drinkable water is a basic and universal human right, since it is essential to human 
survival and, as such, is a condition for the exercise of other human rights”, advancing in their 
interdependence. Encyclical Letter, Laudato si –On Care of our Common Home (14 May 2015), para. 30 
(p.23).  
46
 Ibíd., para. 158 (p. 117). 
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In 2000, when the UN launched the 2015’ development agenda, it already recognised 
the importance of partnerships to foster human rights and involve all actors of society 
by giving “greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organisations 
and civil society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization’s goals 
and programmes”47. This is the international reflection of a wider process: State-centric 
approaches are less self-sufficient than expected in a theoretically Westphalian system, 
and it is more and more necessary to see the links between the State and society, which 
could be regarded as two systems within a “metasystem”48, still relatively autonomous 
but more and more intertwined, also at an international level. It should be noted by the 
way that threats to the above-mentioned State-centric Westphalian system are numerous 
and do not only derive from TNCs’ activities and globalisation: also international 
human rights law has meant nothing more and nothing less than the gradual recognition 
of a partial legal subjectivity of individuals in the international scenario. International 
human rights law has also contributed to limit States’ sovereignty: internal violations of 
human rights can no longer be considered as merely internal affairs within the domestic 
jurisdiction49. 
Parallel to the development of human rights, globalisation50 has rapidly consolidated to 
further weaken the traditional concept of States’ sovereignty. This was already a central 
problem of scientific literature in 194951: 
“This ‘global’ era has made every region sensitive to the developments of far-
distant lands; moreover its ‘popular’ base has changed the decisive forces in 
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 S. NEUMANN: “The International Civil War”, in World Politics, Vol. 1 No. 3 (April 1949), pp. 333-
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the conduct of international affairs. The time-honored concept, since Ranke’s 
day, of the ‘primacy of foreign affairs’ defining the internal natural and needs 
of the nations, has been increasingly replaced […] The frontiers between 
internal affairs and world politics –despite neat differentiations by the 
academicians– are irreparably blurred. This change calls for a new 
‘international relations’, the outer contours of which are only dimly recognised. 
All fundamental concepts such as nationalism, sovereignty, intervention must be 
redefined”. 
 
In the dawn of the new millennium, the UN General Assembly explicitly considered the 
interdependence between human rights, development and globalisation. International 
Organisations and its Member States had to be more proactive leaving room to the 
“private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society in general […] to 
offset the negative economic and social consequences of globalisation”52. This 
statement marks the official recognition that global capitalism is not an ever-progressing 
and zero-sum phenomenon: there are advantages and opportunities alongside shortfalls 
and negative side-effects that need to be addressed53. This process has deepened the 
imbalances and tensions between States’ power, markets’ influence and societal 
expectations, while increasing their interdependency and the unavoidability of 
multilateral approaches to tackle the adverse impacts of globalisation. CSR can 
contribute to alleviate these tensions as a complementary tool; the following diagram 
shows, by the way, that societal expectations do not only create tensions in relation to 
the markets, but also in relation to States’ power54, forming an isosceles triangle.  
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Diagram No. 1: The place of CSR in relation to the tensions of globalisation 
 
A few figures can illustrate the current situation. The four major Chinese banks top the 
famous Forbes 2000 list, but they are under public control. As a properly private 
company, the biggest one in the world is an investment services enterprise founded in 
1955 under the control of CEO Warren Buffet: Berkshire Hathaway, with $ 19’9 billion 
in profits, exceeding the GDP of 85 countries in the world (individually taken, not 
aggregated)55. We find it more enlightening to look at profits, instead of assets 
(sometimes difficult to liquid), sales (before costs, taxes, etc.) or market value 
(generally variable), in order to get a better idea of the power and influence of TNCs. To 
take another source, Fortune also publishes the Global 500 list, according to which 
Apple is the biggest company in terms of profits, amounting to $ 39’51 billion in 
201456, over the GDP of 103 countries the same year. Walmart is also an off-cited 
example: it has 2,200,000 employees, only a little less than the population of the 
metropolitan area of Las Vegas (2,293,610 inhabitants), and more than the population of 
the metropolitan areas of European capitals like Prague (1,910,396) or Stockholm 
(2.018208)57. 
TNCs’ impact on society is undiscussable, sometimes dramatically as we periodically 
witness corporate scandals: the environmental and human disaster in Bhopal by Union 
Carbide (1984), the ecological tragedy of Exxon Valdez in Alaska (1989), the labour 
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scandal in Nike’s subcontractors in Vietnam and Indonesia –including child labour– 
since it was revealed in 1996-97; the French biggest oil company corruption case (Elf 
Aquitaine, 1994); the financial frauds of Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002), Lehman 
Brothers (2008); Tyco in 2002-2003 when a former CEO had stolen more than $100 
million leading to a class action of defrauded shareholders; the $14 billion black-hole in 
the Italian milk-processing company Parmalat, discovered in 2003 (the so-called 
“Europe’s Enron”); also in 2003, the Dutch retailer company Ahold –number three in 
the world– admitted to have inflated the benefits; Pfizer’s allegedly illegal drug trials in 
Nigeria (1996) that led to John Le Carré’s novel (and subsequent film) The Constant 
Gardener; and BP’s oil spill in the gulf of Mexico back in 2010, to quote only a few 
examples with great media impact. The latest scandal occurs as we write these words: 
the alleged fraud in diesel motors’ emissions within the German Volkswagen Group 
(2015). 
In spite of all, globalisation should not be the scapegoat for all the international deficits 
in the area of human rights and development. The opportunities that TNCs can create in 
developing countries are equally undeniable, in particular, when the exploitation of 
resources depends on the availability of heavy investments. Of course, the pros and 
cons of TNCs and global capitalism seem to generate an unstable or precarious 
equilibrium. The UN ESCR Committee has pointed out that, even though recent 
developments are not necessarily a threat to the provisions of the Covenant, it is equally 
true that, taken together and without the complement of appropriate policies, 
globalisation carries risks that need to be tackled in order to maintain the prevalence of 
human rights and avoid a regression in their indivisibility and interdependency58. 
By their nature, markets are simply amoral. Again, the Cold War created a sort of 
competitive dynamic between the two blocks; Western countries came up with the 
brilliant idea of the ‘social market economy’. We can speculate as to what extent the 
presence of the soviet system served to maintain a healthy tension within capitalist 
countries to continually demonstrate that they were better than communists, something 
that became unnecessary after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Capitalism had no competition 
anymore. Corporate practices and standards slackened. In our view, this constitutes a 
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crucial factor to explain the current problems –of course, together with other concurring 
causes. Even George Soros (not at all a dangerous communist) warns on the amorality 
of markets while societies cannot work “without some distinctions between right and 
wrong”59. Nobel Prize Joseph Stiglitz also thinks that it is possible to “make 
globalization work”: even though there are no ‘one-size fits-all solutions’, a teleological 
interpretation of the current regulatory scenario might help. Particularly shocking is the 
abuse of “limited responsibility” when it comes to make TNCs accountable: this figure 
was actually created to allow and promote investments, without which “modern 
capitalism” wouldn’t have grown as we know it, so that its purpose was not to release 
director and managers from any liability for business operations60. But Stiglitz finally 
states that “[o]ne thing that makes [him] hopeful is the corporate social responsibility 
movement”61. This influence of TNCs is strong, being more an economic reality than a 
clear-cut legal entity62, and a new balance needs to be found within the international 
society.  
In sum, the problematic is clear: to make globalisation and human rights compatible and 
the contribution of CSR in this dialectic. Our first conclusion (and premise) is that we 
do not believe there is any ontological incompatibility between globalisation and human 
rights. In fact, implicit and dogmatic ontological incompatibilities are, in our view, 
behind many conflictual misunderstandings in international relations: suffice the Arab 
Spring to demonstrate that Islam and democracy are not necessarily antagonistic 
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concepts. A dogmatic and monocultural understanding of democracy is, of course, 
incompatible with a dogmatic and monocultural understanding of Islam, as it would 
probably happen with any pair of abstract notions. A concept is a unity of knowledge 
useful to describe complex ideas and, if possible, improve the world around us. A too 
stringent, unidirectional and short-sighted interpretation of terms like democracy, 
human rights, development, or globalisation can give the erroneous perception that they 
are incompatible with each other. In this vein, to make compatible globalisation and 
human rights means to “narrow and ultimately bridge the [governance] gaps […] 
created by globalisation”63, following the wording of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) John Ruggie. 
 
1.2 The particular problematic of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
1.2.1. Context and legal evolution 
Transnational companies’ activities mostly affect Economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCR) rather than civil and political ones (CPR), with the exception of the problems 
derived from private security, freedom of expression and, very importantly, access to 
justice64. But civil and political rights’ violations in cases involving TNCs are almost 
always related to concomitant economic and social rights. ESCR have faced a number 
of challenges that have marked their legal evolution up to date, when they have 
managed to be consolidated in the corpus of international human rights law. This 
process deserves to be evaluated to the extent it illustrates the frame difficulties of 
ESCR and shall be kept in mind when we deal afterwards with more specific business-
related issues. Suffice the following considerations to point out that, in our view, the 
main responsibilities remain with States, either to promote the effectiveness of human 
rights treaties, either to prosecute third party violations.  
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The human rights division in three generations, a very extended and divulgated idea, 
was proposed by the French lawyer Karel Vasak in 197765. This division helped those 
interested in marginalising ESCR to “decaffeinate” them, in which cultural rights were 
clearly the Cinderella of the party66. Such a generational division is controversial and 
very problematic as it suggests a hierarchy or, at least, an underlying order of 
precedence67. The alleged second generation, ESCR, was largely considered as a group 
of rights manly conducive to positive obligations even though, later, it has been verified 
that both civil and political rights and ESCR entail positive and negative obligations for 
States. The conflict between the Western bloc and the Soviet system during the Cold 
War led, in sum, to the redaction in 1966 of two different and separated International 
Covenants, what generated some confusion tending to forget that this distinction had its 
origin in the political equilibria of that time without legal basis to be maintained later 
on, as it has been reflected in a good part of the academia since the 1990’s68. The most 
important juridical consequence was the discrimination between civil and political 
rights and ESCR in their respective legal protection, both internally and internationally: 
while CPR had a protection mechanism including individual complaints (first Optional 
Protocol of the 1966 CPR Covenant), the same mechanism hasn’t been achieved for 
ESCR until 2013.  
This line of argument was confirmed in 1993 on the occasion of the World Conference 
on Human Rights celebrated in Vienna, where was established the “universality, 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelation” of all human rights69. The indivisibility 
and interdependence became fundamental principles of international human rights law, 
added to older ones such as the inherent dignity of human being, participation and 
equality, and non-discrimination.  
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It should be recalled that the consolidation in Vienna of the doctrine of the indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights was not a spontaneous occurrence, but the 
synthesis of several antecedents, in particular two previous texts. First of all, the Tehran 
Declaration (1968), following to the first World Conference on Human Rights, already 
expressed in quite modern words: “Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights is impossible” 70.  
Secondly, a decade after, the same idea was reinforced with a General Assembly 
resolution: “a) All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political, and economic, 
social and cultural rights; b)the full realization of civil and political rights without the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible; the achievement of 
lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and 
effective national and international policies of economic and social development” 71.  
In the eighties, the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) continued in the 
same direction and, finally, the already cited Vienna Conference in 1993 definitively 
consolidated the indivisibility and interdependency of human rights, only when the 
dissolution of the Soviet bloc had finished.  
When the former Human Rights Commission was replaced by the Human Rights 
Council, in place since March 2006, the United Nations insisted again in the 
universality of all human rights, including the right to development and confirming a 
wider level of consensus generali in this regard72.  
This said, the international society, and especially developed States, continue to give a 
preferential treatment to CPR despite the fact that the right to life has little sense if it is 
not through, among other rights, the right to health, to adequate food or to adequate 
housing.  
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The core challenge is to convince developed States that both CPR and ESCR and the 
right to development imply negative and positive obligations so that there aren’t 
cheaper or more expensive rights and, in particular, that ESCR aren’t always more 
expensive than CPR.  
In the post-cold war era, globalisation, the growth of a deregulating capitalism, together 
with privatisation enthusiasms, are the current challenges for ESCR, which continue to 
lack of sufficient support, as it is the case of the United States Senate whose ratification 
of the ESCR Covenant is still pending. The proliferation of non-State international 
actors, such as transnational companies, that usually have a bigger factual power than 
many States, is a proof of the new challenges for ESCR as stated in the previous 
section.  
In effect, though the progression has been notable, ESCR still suffer some historical 
delay derived from their initial marginalisation within the family of human rights.  
It is plausible to consider that the second major milestone since the Vienna Conference 
came twenty years later when, the 5th of February 2013, Uruguay became the tenth 
country to ratify the Optional Protocol of the ESCR Covenant, following the example of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mongolia, Portugal, 
Slovakia and Spain73. The entrance into force of the Optional Protocol, beyond its 
symbolic importance, opens the possibility to advance in the justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights as it allows individual complaints and ex officio investigations 
by the ESCR Committee.  
Another factor that has influenced the delay of ESCR is vagueness and the voluntarism 
or programmatic character of many texts dealing with this category of rights, in which 
we often find a mixture of references to socio-economic development and to its 
progressive nature. A standard critique is that we move, in this sense, somewhere 
between rights and politics. 
Within the framework of the 1997 discussions on the reform of the United Nations, the 
second Interagency Workshop was convoked for 2003. With the title: “Statement on a 
Common Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development 
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Cooperation”, the so-called Stamford Principles74 were born, intending to react to old 
critiques by ESCR sceptics and simplify its framework. It was decided that some 
principles had to be clear and two wordings had an instant success: the human rights-
based approach and human rights mainstreaming, which are both extremely useful to 
study the role of international organisations to promote human rights amongst private 
companies.  
Those principles included the synthesis of half a century of work and, again, insisted on 
the progress made in Vienna: universality, inalienability, indivisibility, interdependency 
and interrelation between all human rights; together with the principles of non-
discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, and the accountability in the 
context of the rule of law.  
This evolution of ESCR has founded the approach to development programs and good 
practices among public and private entities, also in relation to the Millennium 
Development Goals. It consists of a linguistic and conceptual shift75 in the initiatives 
undertaken, above all aimed at implementing effectively the Vienna Conference, 
promoting the coherence of the huge variety of specialised organisms within the UN 
decentralised system, and inspiring other international organisations. For instance, there 
are improvements to be noted in the development of ESCR, persisting some delay in 
their justiciability, yet many States still consider there is more room for their margin of 
appreciation with ESCR than with CPR76, what can hold back the States demands to 
transnational companies. 
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1.2.2. Levels of States’ obligations 
In line with article 103 of the United Nations Charter, we consider the pre-eminence of 
this organisation at an international level is clear, reason why we give this relative 
importance to the UN practice in terms of human rights. In parallel with their legal 
evolution and recognition, ESCR have generated levels of State obligation that we take 
as a benchmark. 
In view of the historical delay in the field of ESCR, it is only since the eighties of the 
last century that a significant clarification of State obligations starts. All scientific 
literature agrees with the importance of three crucial moments: Limburg Principles of 
1986, the General Comment No. 3 of the ESCR Committee on the nature of State 
parties obligations (1990) and the Maastricht Guidelines (1997).  
The experts meeting in the University of Limburg in 1986 insisted again on the benefits 
of the indivisibility doctrine at a moment when the international system was still divided 
into two blocs, so that they took the precaution to explain that “[t]here is no single road 
to their full realization. Successes and failures have been registered in both market and 
non-market economies, in both centralised and decentralised political structures”.77 
The most important conclusion is the proposal of an interpretation of articles 2 to 5 and 
8 of the ESCR Covenant, aimed at clarifying their programmatic and progressive 
character without giving carte blanche to exempt States from their obligations. It was 
recalled that, in any case, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
establishes that provisions contained in a treaty have to be interpreted in good faith in 
line with the object and purpose of the treaty (checking, if necessary, the preparatory 
work of the treaty).78  
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Part of the wording of the ESCR Covenant can be problematic or vague. The merit of 
the Limburg Principles was to finally adjust its interpretation to real basic objectives: 79 
- - Progressive realization could not justify inaction or disengagement from the State to 
postpone sine die the satisfaction of a right included in the Covenant;  
- - The efforts to the “maximum extent of available resources” should be understood as 
including international cooperation, justifying assignments of resources in the most 
efficient way to comply with “minimum obligations” and provide with “essential 
services”; 
- - “non discrimination” should be effective in order to avoid any case of indirect 
discrimination; the adoption of measures “by all appropriate means” is understood for 
this group of experts in a broader sense going beyond legislative initiatives.  
The Limburg principles were extremely useful for the ESCR Committee during the 
preparation of the General Comment No. 3 to delimitate State obligations, that is, the 
problem of art. 2.1 of the Covenant, that didn’t give any tip on how the Committee 
should decide whether if a State had allocated or not enough resources to ESCR, that is 
to say, if ESCR budget was efficient and sufficient. This delicate work crystallised in 
1990 with the adoption of General Comment No. 3, reflecting four years later the 
experts’ conclusions in Limburg.  
The obligation to adopt measures by all appropriate means includes any kind of 
initiative, not only legislative. According to the terminology of the International Law 
Commission, it implies obligations of result and obligations of conduct or behaviour.  
Among the legislative measures, a classical example is the free choice of the State to 
decide if the Covenant is transposed in the internal legal order or if it is not following a 
monist perspective, regardless of the fact that specific regulations can be adopted for 
particular rights. Nothing forces the States to prefer a way or another in the application 
of Covenant and both options can lead to the satisfaction or to the violation of the 
treaty80. Whether the Covenant is transposed or not, it does not determine the likelihood 
of compliance, as it happens with almost any other measures at non-legislative levels. 
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All measures under art. 2.1 are subject to a certain margin of appreciation of States, as 
admitted by the Committee81, to determine the most adequate measures to face its 
specific circumstances.  
This being so, the real obligation is to prove an active commitment in every field 
(legislative, budgetary and political) in a way that leads to effective measures, in a 
reasonability framework, to generate the expected and desirable results according to the 
object and purpose of the Covenant. Guidelines on social corporate responsibility are 
part of the policy makers’ effort to comply with the State obligation to promote the full 
realisation of human rights; the Committee recurrently emphasizes in a number of 
Country reports that the adoption of legislation at an internal level isn’t either sufficient 
for the full realisation of ESCR. 
To evaluate the design and adoption of such measures we encounter two problematic 
concepts, as we have said above: the progressive realisation and the maximum available 
resources. The gradual achievement of ESCR shows, in summary, the wish of the State 
to comply with its obligation of results.  
The ESCR Committee has recognised that the progressive approach reflects the 
acknowledgement of a diverse material reality and of important inequalities in practice 
within the international society. This shouldn’t be interpreted in the wrong direction; its 
only purpose is to have a necessary flexibility device available for the variety of 
difficulties that a State can experience to ensure the full effectivity of ESCR82.  
To disentangle if progressivity is correctly applied in a concrete case according to the 
terms of the Covenant we have two limits: on one side, inaction or disengagement of the 
State, which does not need any further explanation and cannot be justified under 
progressivity criteria. On the other side, eventual regressive measures aren’t either 
acceptable. In fact, the ESCR Committee has very clearly established that regressive 
measures constitute prima facie a violation of the Covenant and only have a justification 
if a close and sound analysis of all best alternatives has been undertaken.83 
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The evaluation of the alternatives brings us back to the problem of “all available 
resources”. The Committee has avoided complex economic and financial debates. To 
avoid the fact that budgetary restrictions became a licence to violate the Covenant (by 
an act or omission –with regressive measures, for example), the ESCR Committee 
stipulated that the maximum available resources had to be read in a broader sense 
including the potential benefits of international cooperation84.  
The Committee believes that States cannot allege in any case lack of resources to 
undermine two kinds of inevitable commitments: 1) basic minimum obligations or 
“minimum essential levels of each right enshrined in the Covenant” 85; and “immediate 
obligations”, among which non-discrimination, the adoption of measures (regardless of 
their nature), and refrain from interfering or impeding the enjoyment of these rights86.  
If we recapitulate the practice of the ESCR Committee, the evaluation of adequate 
measures remains in a triangle whose apexes are: a) all available resources including 
international cooperation; b) basic minimum obligations; and c) immediate obligations. 
This did not discourage the Committee, on very few occasions, to comparing allocated 
resources within a budget, regretting the usual disproportion between the financial 
resources of military expenses and health or education87.  
Politically speaking, the bad use or abuse of resources may seem evident; however, to 
demonstrate this fact is an extremely difficult and delicate task from a legal point of 
view. The Committee adopts in this regard all possible precautions as far as it is the 
primarily entrusted body with the task of clarifying the provisions of the Covenant. 
Corruption and hypertrophic military budgets are common, especially in countries 
where transnational companies face most of their problems. Some help is provided in 
the 2007 Declaration on the assessment of available resources when the Committee for 
example did not include generalised corruption cases despite the opportunity to do so88.  
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The control of ESCR has also been improved through indicators, an effort undertaken in 
conjunction with different organisations: the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) and other decentralised organisms of the UN system: 
UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNESCO, etc., indicators than can give an effective idea of the 
situation in a country.  
In 1991 the Special Rapporteur Danilo Türk for the realisation of economic social and 
cultural rights, appointed by the former Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, presented eight principles derived from the 
Limburg ones and inspired in the General Comment No. 3. Danilo Türk’s report89 
encouraged to pay close attention to the use of all available resources to attain the full 
realisation of human rights. He equally stated that States have the obligation to 
guarantee the respect of minimum core obligations, irrespective of any budgetary 
constraint. As for our debate on business and human rights, it is interesting from his 
report that the State’s commitment should not stagnate at an international level, but 
permeate into society, through public institutions from top to bottom including national 
and local entities and private organisms.  
A new improvement towards the clarification of State’s obligations came in 1997 
with a second experts meeting in Maastricht, which culminated in the Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where we already find mentions to 
the new challenges in the post-Cold War era. Obligations of result and conduct were 
included, as well as violations through acts and omissions, the margin of appreciation, 
the minimum core obligations and non-discrimination. The ESCR has so far written 
General Comments to clarify immediate effects and core obligations with respect to 
every right of the Covenant.  
After Maastricht’s experts meeting, we have to highlight the tripartite organisation 
of States’ obligations, as if they were three components that help us measure the level of 
compliance of the Covenant. The final terms of this tripartite division of State duties 
followed Eide’s proposal, who used the verbs “to respect, protect and fulfil” (or satisfy). 
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a) The respect means a distant attitude from the State,  refraining from obstructing 
or interfering in the enjoyment of the rights, narrowly linked to the freedom of action 
and the immediate obligations analysed above (such as non-discrimination). 
b) The obligation to protect attaches a more active role to the State to guarantee the 
enjoyment of the rights, in front of eventual acts or activities that might threaten them, 
accomplished by individuals, non-State actors like companies or agents under the public 
authority. This protection operates through the implementation of policies, legislation, 
regulatory frameworks and effective legal protection with inspections and all pertinent 
implementation mechanisms. If a States fails to protect human rights in front of 
transnational companies operations in its territory, from contracts and investments up to 
the concrete activities in the field, it might also constitute a violation of the Covenant 
according to this evolution of UN practice.  
c) The third level usually eclipses the previous ones: “to fulfil” consists of adopting 
all necessary measures for the full realisation of ESCR and, in particular, for those 
persons who are not able to achieve it by their own means. This fulfilment has, in turn, 
another three phases: to facilitate, to promote and to provide, even though it has been 
wrongly interpreted in a maximalist conception. Far from obliging States to provide all 
goods and services free of charge, in reality, it rather implies that obligation only when 
individual lack of resources or during a crisis, as in general terms in would only oblige 
to comply with minimum core obligations, to make them accessible and affordable 
towards their progressive realisation.  
Finally, the three general level of State obligations (to respect, protect and fulfil), as 
well as the minimum core obligations and the immediate effects of the Covenant are all 
dependent upon fundamental and transversal characteristics that help us finish this 
general picture on the levels of State obligation. As we observe the evolving practice of 
UN human rights bodies we have assisted to the authorised explanation of the 
Committee, who has drawn an analytical framework for each right. The Committee 
started with the right to housing, as for which some assessment factor were established 
such as habitability, bearable costs, legal certainty and an adequate place90.  
In 1999 this process was accelerated thanks to the important work of the Special 
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, more politically flexible compared to the 
treaty bodies (the Committees) or to the secretariat itself (the OHCHR). The Special 
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Rapporteur on the right to education at that time, Katarina Tomasevski, particularly 
helped in the generalisation of these factors, which gained accuracy calling them 
“fundamental characteristics” 91. 
This work went on in the same direction with the right to food, adding some 
specificities of that mandate as adequacy, for example, intended to include its nutritional 
richness, and the concept of sustainability was added92.  
Back to the ESCR Committee, in 1999 these fundamental interrelated characteristics 
were defined and, as we have said for the work of the Special Procedures, it was also 
working on the right to education that the terminology was cleaned up and the 
interrelated and essential features93 were extended to any right covered by the Covenant.  
As for accessibility, two different aspects were separated: its physical dimension 
and the economic one (called “affordability”). The essential contribution was that the 
interrelated essential characteristics of all rights of the Covenant illustrated the 
minimum core obligations of each right, the adoption of measures, the levels of respect, 
protection and fulfilment.  
The “4-A scheme” suffered some slight variations depending on the subject, but 
could be summarised as follows: 
-cultural acceptability, for example, drinking water might be healthy but has to be 
culturally acceptable (colour or smell); 
-adequacy, referring to its quality according to the needs of society; 
-accessibility is, therefore, physical (available without discrimination); and 
economical (affordability, as the Covenant does not oblige to provide rights free of 
charge). Accessibility also means access to information94, to the decision making 
process and access to justice and remedies, what is particularly important in cases 
involving transnational companies.  
-adaptability and sustainability, to make compatible economic development and 
social rights. 
On a global scale, the work of the UN human rights system has, in the last twenty 
years, clarified the different levels of state obligations in terms of ESCR, in general and 
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specifically for each right. In the light of the practice of the United Nations, we have 
analysed a terminology that has finally been accepted95 as authorised criteria to establish 
State obligations in ESCR. The general levels of State obligations have to illustrate and 
intersperse our study of the interaction between human rights and transnational 
companies. 
 
1.3 The United Nations: shaping CSR 
Corporate Social Responsibility is an interdisciplinary area under development and the 
current research will be far from constituting the last word. Our study is not aimed 
either at repeating and summarising the diverse instruments issued by international 
organisations96; instead, we would like to bring some order into a widely dispersed 
documentation, starting with the UN framework and principles, the definition of CSR 
and the systematisation of its contents. Some historical studies show that, under diverse 
labels, CSR has somehow existed for a longer time than expected: precedents can be 
traced back to the early 20th Century97. Politically speaking, the debate is evident as to 
the role of social concerns within the diverse understandings of a ‘free market 
economy’. From a legal perspective, the debate is further complicated by some blocking 
dichotomies, mainly: hard law vs. soft law (and in connection to this, mandatory or 
voluntary schemes), rights vs. duties, and the issue of objects vs. subjects of 
International Law. Depending on the approach to these opposing terms, the word 
‘responsibility’ will acquire a different meaning. 
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It comes as no surprise that the definition itself is controversial and there are a lot of 
expressions that approximately refer to the same concept: corporate social performance, 
social value creation or shared social value, corporate philanthropy, business ethics, 
corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, best practices, responsible business 
conduct, etc. Definitions have been proposed by both public and privates actors. In 2001 
the European Commission (EC) considered it was the “concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”98; ten years later, the EC 
proclaimed it had simply become the “responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society”99, which seems stricter than the precedent definition. The OECD speaks of the 
“private efforts to define and implement responsible business conduct”100; for the 
OECD, responsible business conduct “entails above all complying with laws, such as 
those on human rights, environmental protection, labour relations and financial 
accountability, even where these are poorly enforced […] [and] responding to societal 
expectations communicated by channels other than the law, e.g. inter-governmental 
organisations, within the workplace, by local communities and trade unions, or via the 
press”101. The OECD further clarifies that “[p]rivate voluntary initiatives addressing 
this latter aspect of R[esponsible] B[usiness] C[onduct] are often referred to as 
corporate social responsibility”102. For the UN CSR is just defined as “the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights”103. The diversity of definitions is clearly the first 
difficulty for one who approaches CSR without previous information. 
There are also a number of business initiatives with their own definitions. At an early 
stage, a group of leading TNCs created the Business Leaders Initiative on Human 
Rights104, which functioned between 2003 and 2009 and already incorporated a human 
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rights’ perspective that, as we will argue, came to stay. But, at the beginning, most 
private initiatives tended to avoid a strong human rights’ language. For example, the 
private-led World Business Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR as “the 
continuing commitment […] to behave ethically and contribute to economic 
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as 
well as of the local community and society at large”105. The Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), also private106, tends to focus on sustainability and economic development.  
Non-profit and non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), like Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, early emphasised the need to analyse “corporate behaviour 
through human rights lens”107, correctly putting the accent on the human rights 
dimension of CSR. For Transparency International, there is a “missing link” with anti-
corruption and it should include, beyond “the management of economic, social and 
environmental impacts”, also the “relationships within the workplace and marketplace, 
along the supply chain, in communities and among policymakers”108. But for different 
reasons, none of these definitions seems completely satisfactory, as it will be explained 
below. The proliferation of definitions and the constellation of lateral circumlocutions, 
alongside the mixture of private and public initiatives, greatly contribute to confusion, 
sometimes intently109.  
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Having said this, the most famous initiative so far is the UN Global Compact110: a 
private led institution but with mixed public-private participants, which also includes 
soft monitoring (annual reports called “Communications on Progress”). The UN Global 
Compact incorporates 8,041 business participants (among which the 25% of Fortune 
Global 500 Companies) and 4,449 non-business participants111, together with local 
networks and the UN sponsorship. The Global Compact importantly combines 
sustainability with explicit human rights criteria (principles 1 and 2 of the Compact), 
revealing the UN input or influence when it was launched (it was Kofi Annan who came 
up with the idea in 1999112) and the UN continuous support ever since. Despite its 
private foundation and financing, the Global Compact has received the official 
recognition of the UN General Assembly113 for its work and for the coordination 
opportunities it creates between the public and private sectors in the area of business 
and human rights114. 
In this context, the G7 leaders gathered in Germany (June 2015) “strongly support[ed] 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and welcome[d] the efforts 
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2 (2014), pp. 179-191, passim.   
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to set up substantive National Action Plans” and “urge[d] the private sector 
implementation of human rights due diligence”115. On companies’ side, we cannot turn 
a blind eye to the multiplication of private initiatives; suffice it to add two last 
examples: the creation of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) in 1999, and the 
Equator Principles, launched in 2003, to assess environmental and social risks among 
financial institutions (mainly private, but also public ones). How did we get to this 
expansion and status of CSR? Undoubtedly, it has emerged as a permanent item on the 
international agenda, to a large extent determined by the UN commitment in the area of 
‘business and human rights’. 
This section will first assess the role of the UN in reviving and setting the global CSR 
agenda, the UN initial leadership, to discuss afterwards the surrounding controversies. 
We end up proposing a definition of CSR. 
 
1.3.1 CSR and the United Nations: a new momentum 
If we leave aside the initial OECD approach (the 1970s first version of the Guidelines 
on Multinational Enterprises), the UN has played a prominent role in reviving, 
consolidating and clarifying CSR.  
The well-known human rights’ primacy in the UN Charter (article 1, purpose No. 3 of 
the Organisation) has recently been blended with the pursuit of “higher standards of 
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development”, in the exact wording of article 55 of the same Charter. The UN 
contribution can be divided into two periods; before and after 2005/2006. There are 
both institutional and substantive reasons to make such a separation that year. In 2006, 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) is constituted by the General Assembly116 to replace 
the former Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, it coincides with the then 
Commission’s request to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
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enterprises for “an initial period of two years”117. The then Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan finally appointed John Ruggie118 (28 July 2005), a Harvard Professor that had 
already served him as Assistant and Senior Adviser for strategic planning between 1997 
and 2001. He had also participated in the creation of the above-mentioned UN Global 
Compact and in the elaboration of the MDGs. We therefore distinguish two periods in 
this section, before and after 2005/2006. 
It must be said that related issues had already been addressed by different organs of the 
UN since the late 1990s, very prominently by the Security Council. For example, with 
regard to Irak in 2003, it affected some TNCs to ensure humanitarian relief through the 
prioritisation of basic goods and the renegotiation of some contracts119. In the case of 
Sierra Leone (and later, other countries), the Security Council dealt with illegal trade in 
diamonds120 and, finally, even “welcomed” and “strongly support[ed]” the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme121, by which the relevant companies and governments 
adopted a mixed self- and co-regulatory scheme to avoid fuelling armed conflicts and 
connected human rights’ violations. The Kimberley Process is an exceptional milestone 
to the extent the Security Council explicitly considered and upheld a “voluntary system 
of industry self-regulation”122. 
Back in 1998, the then Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights established a Working Group (WG) on TNCs123, whose mandate was extended 
until 2004. This first WG was asked to study the activities of TNCs and the way IHRL 
could address that problematic. It was clear that the previous initiatives of the 1970s, the 
OECD Guidelines on MNEs and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (first edited in 1977), both had 
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obvious deficits, since they lacked of enforcement tools and had “toothless dispute 
resolution procedures”124. 
Against this background, the then Sub-Commission wanted to go a step further towards 
a systematic approach instead of contingent, soft and case-by-case actions125. The work 
of the WG materialised in the famous Draft UN Norms126, which aroused the 
enthusiasm of NGOs and activists whereas Member States and TNCs remained very 
critic. The areas covered were non-discrimination, the right to security of persons, 
workers’ rights and the environment, while institutionalising ‘stakeholders’ 
participation. The phrasing recurred to many undetermined legal concepts, which 
contrasted with the eventually hard implementation measures127.  
Indeed, the Norms directly addressed TNCs and placed on them direct obligations, so 
that it could be interpreted as a quite revolutionary “restatement of human rights 
law”128, since IHRL is founded on States’ direct responsibility –at least in vigilando 
when it comes to violations caused by third-parties / private actors, who might only be 
bound indirectly, via domestic law. Ten years later, the feeling is still widespread that 
the Norms “were ahead of their time”129. Despite the lively debate (diplomat-speak for 
‘lack of consensus’), the Sub-Commission considered the draft Norms to “reflect most 
of the current trends in the field of International Law, and particularly international 
human rights law”, and approved them in the form of a draft resolution130. At the upper 
level of the Commission, however, the text was thrown back and blocked. The 
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Commission on Human Rights strongly rejected the Norms and felt compelled to clarify 
that the draft had “not been requested by the Commission” and had “no legal 
standing”131. In fact, John Ruggie’s first interim report in 2006 stated that the draft 
Norms were “engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses” and included “exaggerated legal 
claims and conceptual ambiguities”132, in a “deliberately undiplomatic language”133 as 
Ruggie himself recognised in a book of reflections after his mandate. Later on, the very 
first sentence of one of the most important reports submitted in 2008 by John Ruggie 
more softly rebuked the former Sub-Commission insisting on the fact that the 
“international community is still in the early stages of adapting the human rights regime 
to provide more effective protection […] against corporate-related human rights 
harm”134. 
As mentioned earlier, a new momentum for CSR arrived with the appointment of John 
Ruggie and his significant contribution between 2005 and 2011135, when his mandate 
expired. The appointment of Prof. Ruggie might be related to the agitation in the after-
match of the Draft UN Norms, which ignited dormant controversies. We may argue the 
draft Norms were even counter-productive as a maximalist wish list that rearmed CSR 
detractors. Ruggie’s appointment somehow responded to the need to unblock the 
situation136 and reinstall a consensus-oriented negotiation. Within the UN human rights 
system, the mandate as SRSG on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises corresponds to the Special Procedures 
Branch (SPB) of the HRC, being in this case a thematic mandate137. In comparison to 
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Treaty Bodies and other UN mechanisms, the SPB constitute a more flexible and 
political tool, less legally straitjacketed and thus more adapted to the multifaceted 
challenges of CSR. 
The main outcome of Ruggie’s first mandate is the three-level framework “Protect, 
respect and remedy”138, by which States have the primary and more active duty to 
ensure human rights’ protection, to comply with their international obligations and 
make them permeate into their internal legal orders. In this sense, States’ duty shall be 
understood as a holistic commitment to re-examine existing and future legislation, 
international agreements and policy actions from a human rights perspective. It further 
encourages specific legislative and political initiatives to improve human rights respect 
among companies. Unlike the Draft UN Norms, Ruggie’s framework consequently 
restores the “bedrock role of States”139. Secondly, companies are expected to respect 
human rights, a “baseline responsibility”140, linked to the compliance of existing 
legislation and, if possible, moving beyond and adhering to international standards and 
codes of conduct. In our view, the emphasis lies on prevention, “independently of 
States’ duties”141 so that the enterprises operating in conflictive areas (because of armed 
conflicts or fragile and failed States) would show the same commitment regardless of 
weak governments or weak enforcement mechanisms. Finally, both States and 
Companies must cooperate to provide access to remedies (third level of the framework), 
without excluding –or even fostering– non-judicial and non-state-based grievance 
mechanisms –provided these comply with certain minimum criteria; in any case, we are 
rather unconvinced of the effectiveness of such mechanisms if state-based and purely 
judicial ones are not strengthened, available and reliable142. 
The complementarity of the three levels would help reduce the governance gaps 
generated by globalisation in the protection of human rights. Ruggie’s framework 
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summarised extensive consultations made between 2005 and 2008143 and complemented 
his preliminary report. The SRSG produced an utterly useful state of the art, especially 
interesting in relation to access to justice and the current possibilities to facilitate 
effective remedies for corporate-related human rights victims, but shows some 
weaknesses. In terms of access to justice, we have already noted that it wide opened the 
door to non-judicial and non-state grievance tools, someway oddly put on equal foot 
with traditional access to courts. It would have been more adequate to further develop 
the current –though scarce– possibilities for human rights victims to fil suits144. As for 
the second level on corporate respect, it seems to be built upon a profusion of 
undetermined legal concepts (“due diligence”145, “complicity” and “spheres of 
influence”). These notions do not provide a sufficiently solid ground to assign a 
responsibility in practice. John Ruggie tried to explain these concepts in separate 
reports146, in the form of goodist exercises lege ferenda without much success. 
At this stage, Ruggie’s success was fairly political and lied on his capacity to set 
himself up as an authoritative voice in this subject, acceptable for all relevant actors and 
subjects, in order to take away the bitter taste of the precedent UN attempt (the draft 
Norms) and renew the Organization’s efforts towards a “more systemic response with 
cumulative effects”147. As cited above, the HRC “welcomed” this three-level framework 
in Resolution 8/7 and extended until 2011 the SRSG’s mandate. 
The United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) were the final result of Ruggie’s 
mandate. Above and beyond criticisms and debates, it is important to support the 
change of mind-set confirmed with the UNGPs and already present in the three-level 
framework: the definitive priority was to detect practical “implications of existing 
standards”148 in lieu of creating new instruments or new obligations under IHRL. We 
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fully support this aspect of Ruggie’s approach in the present research: there are 
possibilities, already in place, to improve the dialectic between business and human 
rights (this idea is partly explored in the following chapter, when we track some of 
those current possibilities). It is also important to point out that, while recognising that 
CSR “morphed out of corporate philanthropy”149, Ruggie finally suggests that they are 
separate concepts by now: “Business enterprises may undertake other commitments or 
activities […] [b]ut this does not offset a failure to respect human rights throughout 
their operations [emphasis added]”150, introducing this way some kind of necessary 
connection with the impacts caused by the concrete activity of the enterprise at stake. 
This will be very important in the definition we propose later.  
At the same time, John Ruggie was also right to stress the vital role of States, which 
need to be more proactive in translating their international obligations into their 
domestic legal systems. Otherwise, without an active engagement at the State level, the 
UNGPs are not likely to have a positive impact in practice151, despite being in 
themselves a significant and substantive twist of IHRL in its interaction with global 
business. At the State level, Ruggie builds on the crucial difference between legislative 
initiatives and ‘policies’152, and the importance of ensuring the human rights 
compatibility of any existing/future and legal/policy action throughout all governmental 
departments153, including apparently unrelated fields such as company law, investment 
agreements and trade policies within international institutions154. 
Besides these essential aspects of the UNGPs, on which we absolutely agree with the 
SRSG, we shall recall that their basic goal was to ‘operationalise’ the three-level 
framework. There are, of course, some procedural good ideas, such as the general 
emphasis on prevention, the so-called ‘human rights impact assessments’, the 
importance of broad consultations alongside stakeholders, human rights experts and 
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‘auditors’, the usefulness of follow-up resorts, and internal capacity-building 
initiatives155. 
However, in the overall, the UNGPs don’t succeed in “clearly articulating this crucial 
distinction between decisions [policies] and processes of companies”156. In this 
connection, they constitute a failed opportunity to really clarify corporate “due 
diligence” and related concepts, as said before. Due diligence is a double-edged sword 
and can also benefit non-compliant companies to be easily discharged or absolved “if it 
can demonstrate and document a certain standard of precaution taken”157, no matter how 
limited it may be. The risk is there that companies end up “perceiving human rights as 
risks and due diligence as a ‘defence’ to ward off suits”158, and not as a minimum 
“precondition” for any business. We can give yet another turn of the screw to this 
problem, revealing the absolute “need of clarification”: on one hand, we have noted that 
due diligence can limit the risk of complicity liability but, on the other hand, it will not 
fully exempt companies from incurring in such liability so that, in some cases, 
companies may be tempted to avoid any policy of due diligence if this means to 
“acquire knowledge which could be held against it in the context of a complicity 
charge”159.  
In more general terms, continuing with the second level of Ruggie’s framework and 
guidelines, it can be asked if “can implies ought”. Ruggie’s book of reflections, 
published in 2013, contains a contradiction: it first states that “can implies ought”, but 
only partially because companies’ influence must be strong enough to imply some kind 
of duty: “it is one thing to ask companies to support human rights voluntarily where 
they have influence, as the Global Compact does; but attributing legal obligations to 
them on that basis for meeting the full range of human rights duties is quite another”160. 
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Interestingly, later in his book, he explains that “a social norm expresses a collective 
sense of ‘oughtness’ with regard to the expected conduct”161 of companies. This is 
probably an inadequate and confusing normative foundation to operationalise the 
second level of the UN guidelines, essentially for the reason that social expectations are 
the less important –eventual– source of normativity (if they might even have that 
status), the forgotten source is simply IHRL and its permeation into the internal legal 
order, by which it should affect the behaviour of non-State actors162. 
Also related to the second level (on companies’ respect), “spheres of influence” –
connected to due diligence– are an even fuzzier notion, a “metaphor” by which the 
SRSG refers to suppliers and ‘related companies’ (subsidiaries, branches, etc.), up to 
almost any stakeholder. It would have been interesting to have a closer look at company 
law and taxation law. Within complex transnational corporate groups, international 
company law and taxation law can provide inspiration on how to determine more 
accurately the actual corporate relationships (hence responsibilities), starting with the 
assessment of ‘corporate veils’ and ‘frauds’, and related issues that might legitimately 
be extrapolated to human rights cases163, provided some obvious differences. 
Many other problems already signalled before remain equally unsolved. In an interview 
after the end of his mandate, the former SRSG tried to hide behind the then on-going 
Kiobel judgement (US Supreme Court) to keep on justifying his approach concerning 
access to justice. Kiobel was surely problematic for human rights activists and lawyers, 
but it is also probably exaggerated to conclude, as John Ruggie quickly did, that “we are 
not even sure anymore whether it is possible to hold companies [… accountable for] 
crimes against humanity under the US Alien Tort Statute”164. It can perfectly be argued 
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that the Supreme Court left the “door open”165. Notwithstanding the in-depth 
development of this issue later in this research, we have for instance the impression that 
the SRSG somehow disregarded or underestimated some current and actual possibilities 
to access courts, albeit imperfect and limited ones. 
Further questions include, for example, the problem of companies “owned or controlled 
by the State, or that receive substantial support and services from State agencies”166, 
which would have an additional burden with regard to human rights. The phrasing 
allows important loopholes: would it be enough a minority shareholding by the State to 
create additional CSR duties in the company? The mere participation by the State is 
enough or does it mean that, under the UNGPs, States are compelled to foster a 
company’s CSR only if they have more than 50% of shares? What is meant by “control” 
and “substantive support”?  
We shall finish wondering whether a voluntary code of conduct might have any 
contractual value once adopted by a TNC, given that it should be “approved at most 
senior level”, affect all operations and be public and available. There are other pending 
questions, minor ambiguities and imprecisions, which perhaps explain why the UNGPs 
reached an unprecedented consensus in this subject. Surya Deva speaks of “consensus 
rhetoric” only because of the obsession to get the guidelines adopted without a vote, by 
consensus in the HRC: this author considers that John Ruggie “lightly” played with 
human rights terminology (“violation becomes impact”167) and that the UNGPs generate 
confusion on eventual corporate obligations under International Law168. This is perhaps 
too harsh despite the legitimate criticism on the shortfalls of the UNGPs. Is it necessary 
to recall that human rights language was simply and completely absent in the corporate 
world not so long ago? In fact, we feel more comfortable expressing that, though clearly 
improvable, the UN initiatives made an important contribution reviving, consolidating 
and exploring (if not, limitedly clarifying) CSR. As Surya Deva himself says, “existing 
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(primarily) state-focal international institutions should be utilized for what they could 
possibly deliver”169, even more so since it is an on-going process.  
On balance, we consider it important to underline the positive factors of the three-level 
framework and the UNGPs, above any logical criticism. The UNGPs may inspire more 
questions than answers, but they provide a few fundamental answers, which have 
characterised CSR thereafter: 1) the human rights based approach to CSR; 2) the 
general emphasis on prevention; 3)  the crucial role of States and international 
institutions (they cannot elude responsibility just because it is ‘corporate-related’’); 4) 
the holistic vocation (comprising any legal and policy aspects or field), and 5) the non-
negligible effort to put some order in the debate. From there on, it is impossible to 
convince everyone on every aspect. As Prof. Ruggie recognised, the expiration of his 
mandate was only “the end of the beginning”170. 
After the UNGPs, most disapproval came from NGOs171: they considered that it 
confirmed the current statu quo and the definitive abandonment of the project of a 
binding instrument, since it is said that the WG that succeeded the SRSG after 2011172 
does not have enough powers to go any step further173. Indeed, apart from focusing on 
national action plans174 alongside its new capacity to conduct country visits175 and 
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convoke the annual forum in Geneva headquarters, it seems that there isn’t much 
advancement in this field or, at least, not anymore at the same speed as between 2005 
and 2011.  
In the meanwhile, the Government of Ecuador and its Permanent Representation in 
Geneva were particularly active in promoting binding formulas, ideally a proper treaty 
on business and human rights. This brings us back to the debate between mandatory or 
voluntary schemes, discussed in the following section. We note for instance that, by 
virtue of Resolution 26/9 of the HRC, an open-ended intergovernmental working group 
was established to work on an eventual treaty176. This intergovernmental initiative 
overlaps with the independent experts of the other WG on the same issue, which might 
generate tensions au-fur-et-à-mesure they start submitting parallel reports to the HRC 
and the General Assembly. For the moment, the first session of the intergovernmental 
working group was held in July 2015 and its potential effects are still unforeseeable. In 
sum, during the first decade of the 21st Century, the UN has certainly played a central 
role in reviving, consolidating and clarifying CSR, even though its leadership seems to 
have recently decayed. 
 
1.3.2 The controversial definition of CSR 
Before we conclude with a definition of CSR, it is necessary to assess a few 
surrounding controversies, some of which have already been mentioned, reactivated by 
the UN framework and guidelines. We take as a starting point the invitation to abandon 
“unduly dichotomous ways of thinking”177, together with the obvious need to resituate 
CSR in the broader context of human rights. For us, the fact that this field primarily 
addresses “corporate activity” and not only States, is not enough to say that CSR and 
human rights are absolutely “distinct concepts”178: almost any ‘specialised’ human 
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rights treaty179 addresses indirectly (but quite substantively) third party activities (other 
than States) and relationships between private parties, regardless of a monist or a dualist 
implementation. Similarly to our approach on general human rights issues, we consider 
that too clear-cut distinctions between different human rights contribute to an 
undesirable legal fragmentation undermining the universality, indivisibility and 
interdependency of all human rights. We therefore consider CSR an additional aspect 
under the human rights umbrella. It becomes clear from this research that the separation 
between CSR and the debate on “business and human rights” is precisely a biased 
viewpoint180: they are not separate things and we fully support an integrated approach. 
And last but not least, the oppositions between –mainly– mandatory or voluntary 
initiatives, and subjects vs. objects of IL, are not insuperable. 
But the very first debate is neither a legal nor an economic issue: it is political. Liberal 
schools of thought are generally contrary to CSR or any related concept. Its most 
relevant spokesman was Milton Friedman and his famous New York Times’ article 
back in 1970. His hard-hitting remarks defined CSR as a “suicidal impulse” of some 
businessmen, an improper and informal (thus unlawful) social tax. Liberal detractors 
have more modern expressions181; in essence, they put forward black and white 
arguments, according to which shareholders’ interests, owner’s value and profit 
maximisation are the only legitimate goals of a company. Any problem would have its 
origin in the fact that we are not in a perfectly free market economy. 
At the source of this reasoning there are a few misunderstandings182: first of all, CSR 
would have no sense in a socialist system; it has precisely consolidated in a post-cold-
war and capitalist context, giving less credibility to excessive fears in this regard. 
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Moreover, it would not exist if companies always behaved perfectly and ethically and, 
in some way, it benefits the market as a whole against the rapid exhaustion of resources 
and in favour of the sustainability of capitalism itself –thinking of the problem in 
entirely selfish terms. On another hand, the definite opposition between shareholders 
and stakeholders is also quite mystifying: unless they have a bipolar syndrome or a 
multiple personality disorder, the most probable scenario is where shareholders are also 
stakeholders: shareholders can be persons of different religions, with disabilities, 
women, members of a variety of NGOs and CSOs, etc. Besides, this “stockholders first” 
discourse struggles with the multiplication of corporate scandals, frauds and the 
increasingly problematic separation between owners and managers in modern TNCs. 
Nor is there any absolute separation between private and public spheres nowadays183: as 
it has been argued in the first section of this chapter, even International Organizations 
(members-driven institutions par excellence) have accepted the necessary cooperation 
between public and private actors to accomplish common objectives in relation to 
human rights and development. 
Finally, Friedman claims that CSR is seriously undemocratic and has to be seen as an 
illegitimate and illegal shortcut to face social problems: “to attain by undemocratic 
procedures what they cannot attain by democratic procedures” because “problems are 
too urgent to wait on the slow course of political processes, [so] that the exercise of 
social responsibility by businessmen is a quicker and surer way to solve pressing current 
problems”184. This view is deeply American and finds its roots in the revolutionary 
slogan ‘no taxation without representation’, which links the foundation of democracy to 
taxes and the decisions on their allocation. This political argument is one of the trickiest 
and most thought-provoking ones, because it alleges to be based on democratic values 
that almost anyone would support.  
Companies would act as unelected decision makers with regard to the allocation of 
resources for social purposes. Does it mean that Friedman and his school of thought 
would support a significant increase of proper taxes? We do not think so. Then, in our 
view, CSR seems to be something different from mere charity: it starts to be clear that it 
must have a connection with the actual activities and operations of the company. The 
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word “responsibility” is, primarily, a concrete exercise related to those activities and 
their impact; it is not an arbitrary social investment, unrelated to the activities of the 
company (only in that case it could be said that the company is undemocratically 
deciding on the prioritisation of some social purposes at the expense of other goals). 
If we go one step further, philosophically speaking, we face the dialectic between 
liberty and responsibility. Liberals treat these concepts, of Hayekian roots, radically and 
purely. A radical, individualistic and pure understanding of “freedom” and 
“responsibility” would allow wrongdoers and disregard prevention (conflicting with 
liberty), with the only purpose to reinforce the ideal of “responsibility” (read: 
punishment): “the freedom of action that is the condition of moral merit includes the 
freedom to act wrongly: we praise or blame only when a person has the opportunity to 
choose […]”185. This does not seem acceptable to us: eventual victims would prefer a 
less strong ideal of freedom and responsibility if their harm is more likely to be avoided 
or prevented. In other words, this reasoning ignores the real-life tolls we have to pay 
when a moral concept becomes a legal articulation, though being a difficult equilibrium.  
Friedman’s only concession to regulation was his recognition of “the rules of the 
game”: time goes by and these rules have changed186. Interestingly enough, leaving 
aside liberal schools of thought, black and white arguments can be found against CSR 
by authors who would only trust strict State regulation187, according to whom CSR 
would mean to leave the vessel adrift, by divinising self-regulation. As it will be argued 
throughout this research, CSR cannot be reduced to self-regulation, which is only a 
restricted aspect of it. 
An attempt to overcome the political controversy is the so-called “business case” 
theory, which insists on the profitability of CSR for enterprises, economically speaking. 
This strategy tries to convince managers and owners of adopting a CSR policy because 
it is said to have a positive impact on benefits. Initially, it was a good point since it 
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began to question previous assumptions and prejudices in this respect, such as the 
“symbiotic relationship between repressive governance and foreign capital”188. It is 
evident that companies do not necessarily and always feel at home in authoritarian or 
repressive States, but “rhetoric ha[d] exceeded empirical research”189. Many authors 
enthusiastically started to conduct quantitative research and generate mathematical 
models to investigate eventual CSR returns on benefits190. In the banking sector, CSR is 
widely seen as a “strategic value for its ability to optimize the bank quality loan 
portfolio through pricing policies”191, the origin of “ethic ratings” –increasingly applied 
by Ernst & Young or Standard & Poors and many other rating agencies and consultancy 
firms in their daily advisory tasks and business. For better or worse, business finds its 
way through. 
Among other results, theories of “shared value”192 emerged to point out that CSR could 
create value for both companies and stakeholders, being measurable in terms of ‘social 
performance’. This leads to a merely instrumentalist or utilitarian perspective under 
which it can contribute to reduce ‘business risks’ and, even, increase benefits by 
creating value for both the enterprise and society. From that point of view, CSR and 
human rights respect become a simple management issue of “goodwill-nomics”193: 
violations would be read as risks but, sometimes, this approach can treat violations as 
unavoidable costs of production, while the word ‘stakeholders’ would hide victims. This 
cost-effective way of thinking has an additional problem as far as it would “allow 
corporations to prioritise some human rights”194 (those more costly). All these 
quantitative manias may reflect a certain “dissemination of the corporate form of 
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thinking”195. CSR is only partially quantifiable, in part not to end up pricing human 
rights, in so far it erroneously “mimics the logic of market transactions”196. CSR will 
not always be fully profitable, nor fully damaging in economic terms. We therefore 
don’t think the ‘business case’ to be the solution to the political debate; nor is it useful 
to clarify the concept of CSR, its contents and essential characteristics. 
In any case, as a matter of fact, the expansion of CSR seems to generate an increasingly 
wide social applause and political agreement, which looks largely irreversible. CSR has 
consolidated its position in the international agenda and overcome these ideological 
disputes, while some legal questions arise.  
 
Objects and subjects in International Law 
Once the UN revived CSR, a parallel debate opposing subjects and objects in IL has 
emerged, or perhaps re-emerged, causing rivers of ink. Is it possible for individuals and 
corporations to have any kind of international legal personality? In this subject, 
individuals and corporations constitute the two sides of the same coin. This is not a 
neutral academic debate: its hidden purpose is to determine whether TNCs are bearers 
of rights and duties under IL and to what extent. 
It must be said, for instance, that IHRL would be seriously undermined if it is said to 
affect exclusively the activities directly carried out by States, since they would be the 
only subjects of IL. Dualist or monist, an international treaty implies the permeation of 
its provisions into the internal order of the Contracting Parties and, in this sense, it 
indirectly impacts third parties and private actors’ rights and duties. The dichotomy 
objects vs. subjects would block the advancement of CSR, but is relatively out of date 
and overtaken by reality. 
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More specifically, individuals have become partial legal subjects of contemporary IL, 
most decisively thanks to the development of IHRL197. This is particularly evident in 
some regional sub-systems where individuals can fil suits in international human rights 
courts after exhausting domestic remedies. As a matter of fact, this is not only the case 
with IHRL; consular law also “creates individual rights which […] may be invoked in 
this Court by the national State of the detained person”, as settled by the International 
Court of Justice in LaGrand198, where it was proved that the United States of America 
“breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand 
brothers” –a violation not only towards Germany, as a State, but also towards two 
German detainees who were not timely informed of their right to consular protection199. 
Individuals further have legal personality in international criminal law, starting with the 
use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (and Rwanda), later consolidated under the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court. Tadic was a paradigmatic case because it 
definitely safeguarded the legal foundations and guarantees of such tribunals as well as 
their legitimacy ratione personae and ratione materiae. An especially inspiring 
sentence in Tadic states that “[i]t would be a travesty of law and betrayal of the 
universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be 
raised successfully against human rights”200. In sum, individuals have rights and duties 
recognised under IL, most of the time indirectly through the duties imposed on States 
(and exceptionally, directly, as in international criminal law). 
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Concerning corporations, the ICJ early warned that the “corporate personality represents 
a development brought about by new expanding requirements in the economic field” in 
such a way that “[t]hese entities have rights and obligations peculiar to themselves”201. 
In Diallo, the ICJ conferred independent legal personality to a corporation only if the 
legal system of the State of nationality (or incorporation) does so and, in that case, this 
amounts to “granting it rights over its own property, right which it alone is capable of 
protecting”, and even “diplomatic protection” by the State of nationality against any 
wrongful act of a third State202. States usually take up a corporate interest and defend it 
before the WTO Appellate Body; it is far from unusual to see corporate lawyers or 
representatives among the members of a State delegation in such cases203. In a more 
direct way, corporations also acquire rights and duties under Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation, Bilateral Investment Treaties and other International 
Investment Agreements or international contracts between States and private actors, 
legal forms that generally include dispute resolution mechanisms under the 1965 
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (hereinafter, ICSID Convention)204. At the same time, 
enterprises have started to make their own some “human rights”, initially within the 
Council of Europe in the particular fields applicable to them, such as procedural aspects 
(mainly, the right to a fair trial205), right to property206, freedom of expression207 and 
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even the right to respect for private and family life208. The most recent and, probably, 
famous case was won by the oil company Yukos against Russia, an important judgement 
also because of the great deal of money involved209. The European Court of Human 
Rights condemned Russia for a violation of the right to property and the right to a fair 
trial210. For the moment, at a regional level (Council of Europe), it is not unreasonable 
to conclude that the European Court of Human Rights has recognised an incipient 
corporate locus standi on the international plane, as it undoubtedly happens with arbitral 
tribunals211. It can therefore be stated that, similarly to individuals, different fields of IL 
recognise, at least, a partial legal subjectivity of corporations and, again, most of the 
time indirectly –because of the States’ willingness to accept it. 
It goes without saying the remaining prominence of States, which are still “autonomous 
subjects” while individuals could be described as “passive subjects”212, a category that 
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might be extrapolated to the legal standing of TNCs213. These categories (autonomous 
and passive subjects) could be criticised as the “reappearance of the dichotomy in 
different clothes”214. Anyhow, it does not change the reality behind theorisations: States 
are still the enablers of the partial legal personality of both individuals (natural persons) 
and TNCs (legal persons) in the international system. At the end, indeed, this partial (or 
passive) subjectivity still depends on the States’ willingness to bind themselves through 
treaties and recognise it. No matter how “passive” they are, individuals are not only 
right bearers, they have certain obligations as well (as seen in international criminal 
law).  
Of course, this evolution has its origin in the Nuremberg trials; Clapham suggests that 
the development of IL will require, sooner or later, additional international duties of 
individuals, in particular, civil duties “if we do not want the development of 
International Law to stagnate”215. This links the problems objects vs. subjects with a 
subsidiary dichotomy, i.e., rights vs. duties. At first sight, we would disagree; however, 
the evolution described above in relation to international personality shows that the 
price individuals have had to pay (international criminal liability for gross violations) is 
rather cheap and exceptional compared to the benefits obtained (human rights). The 
apparently slower (though steady) development of the international personality of 
corporations might respond to the fact that they have a lot more to lose in comparison to 
individuals, or at least many TNCs think so. In order to offset corporate fears of 
advancing their partial legal personality, it must be recalled that, besides investment’s 
protection, we have signalled that corporations already enjoy human rights protection in 
the limited fields applicable to them –although this field is in its infancy, its greater 
development may promote a better balance between TNCs rights and duties. 
Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the ICJ between 2006 and 2009 (and first female 
judge in that institution), proposed an alternative nomenclature: the term “participants” 
would include “transnational corporations and natural persons –who engage in 
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international activity”216. Higgins term was quite successful in the literature and it has 
been considered a “valuable” framework to explain the increasingly prominent role of 
TNCs as “instigators” and highly “influential actors”, with limited rights and, why not, 
duties217. It is therefore unrealistic to state that individuals and TNCs are mere ‘objects’ 
of International Law and thus bypass the debate on their responsibilities. It is our 
understanding that the partial legal personality of both individuals and TNCs should be 
enough to facilitate and enable the “subjection of MNCs de facto sovereignty to global 
regulation with regard to human rights”218. This is certainly an on-going development 
but “the obstacles created by public international law are not insuperable”219. 
 
A new treaty? Rights, duties and the current regime 
As we can see, the controversies revived by the UN initial leadership have turned 
around a few blocking dichotomies (objects vs. subjects, rights and duties of non-State 
actors, direct or indirect obligations, mandatory or voluntary schemes220, etc.). It can all 
be condensed into a simpler question: is the treaty route worthy? The question is 
pending since 2003, after the failure of the UN Draft Norms, the first binding project to 
place direct duties on TNCs, to provide a closed list of rights and to include 
enforcement. Would it be better to reactivate that effort and work on a future treaty on 
business and human rights? After all, Resolution 26/9 of the HRC created an 
intergovernmental working group to start working on an eventual binding instrument. Is 
the customary way not ambitious enough? To what extent the progressive interpretation 
of existing instruments can be useful to improve corporate human rights respect? 
Even here, Res. 26/9 is keen to “stress that the obligations and primary responsibility to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the State, and that 
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States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
by third parties, including transnational corporations”221. Then, what’s new compared to 
the current and incipient development of indirect horizontal duties? Is it a good idea to 
promote a proper treaty just to be able to allocate direct duties instead of further 
developing and detailing horizontal duties indirectly, through States obligations? 
In this vein, a particularly enlightening article by John Knox systematises this universe 
of dichotomies. Eventual duties of private actors can be “converse duties” (“owed to the 
State”, mainly obey the law, pay taxes and comply with the civil or military service) or 
“correlative duties”, which are those between private actors derived from the respect of 
other’s rights.  Business and human rights issues correspond to “correlative duties”, 
which most of the time indirectly emanate from IL and are directly provided by national 
law222. Through a meticulous examination of the drafting process of the main human 
rights treaties, John Knox shows that the drafters debated on the appropriateness of 
listing duties, as opposed to human rights, but concluded that risks outweigh the 
benefits in regard to the spirit of human rights law, to the extent States could use such 
duties to limit their own commitment, but “[t]his approach did not result from the belief 
that international law could place duties only on States”. On the contrary, IHRL already 
comprises correlative private duties, but most of the time indirectly, through national 
legislation (implementing International Law). Knox draws a pyramid of correlative 
private duties to summarise this issue, which we represent below. In many ways, the 
treaty route (or similar instruments) is interested in moving private duties from the 
second to the third level of the pyramid below by creating direct duties; the current 
system implies a gradual evolution from the first to the second level of this pyramid. 
According to Knox, and we fully agree, the treaty route diverts attention from the 
fundamental problem in this field: the effective implementation of human rights law, 
which is not solved by just creating direct obligations. In this sense, “[p]roposals to 
move such duties directly to the third level are distractions from the real need, which is 
to give the [private correlative] duties greater specificity so that they might be more 
                                                          
221
 UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, recital 7 (at p. 2). 
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effectively implemented domestically”223. This is, in fact, the task of the UN Working 
Group of five independent experts, whose current priority is to expand national action 
plans in this field while consolidating a wider practice and consensus on indirect 
correlative duties upon TNCs. 
  Diagram No. 2: Pyramid of correlative private duties under IHRL* 
* Own elaboration based on J.H. KNOX: “Horizontal Human Rights Law”,  
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102 No. 1  
(January 2008), pp. 1-47, passim. 
In summary, International Law can allocate rights and duties to non-State actors, such 
as individuals and corporations, but most of the time indirectly, mediating the 
imposition of obligations to States and their permeation into the internal legal orders. 
We have cited examples in treaties and jurisprudence that show this partial legal 
subjectivity and a limited locus standi of non-State actors at the international level, in a 
variety of fields (IHRL, investment’s protection, diplomatic and consular law, 
international criminal law). Monist or dualist, the true problem is the specification and 
effectiveness of IHRL in domestic systems. 
At a political level, we also agree with John Knox on several points. The negotiation of 
a treaty is long, painful and uncertain. It should not be idealised. States can take 
advantage of it and block some current developments of existing instruments with the 
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diplomatic excuse that they do not want to interfere with the content and orientation of 
an open negotiation. We would equally have to wait for the ratification by a number of 
States for its eventual entry into force; let’s recall that the HRC’s resolution creating the 
open-ended intergovernmental working group on this issue was not adopted by 
consensus: a narrow vote of 20 to 14 with 13 abstentions. Furthermore, Japan, the USA 
and many European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and the UK) voted against, being the home-States of most TNCs. 
The proposal of direct obligations upon non-State actors is very problematic; we risk 
seeing States wash their hands in some cases alleging that it is TNCs’ responsibility, not 
admitting any public responsibility, not even in vigilando. Ruggie already warned about 
this risk224. Such a treaty could seriously slow down the current human rights regime 
and, in the long term, be less beneficial than desired or needed. We have further 
explained that most specialised human rights treaties (on racial discrimination, on 
women, on persons with disabilities, on the rights of the child, on apartheid in sports, 
etc.) already have, indirectly, quite significant repercussions inter privatos, in the form 
of horizontal obligations through the national implementation of IL, if correctly applied. 
In the field of anti-discrimination, it early became clear its horizontal vocation (besides 
the obvious vertical consequences for States and public administrations), and somehow 
constitutes the historic origins of indirect horizontal obligations under IHRL.  
Lest we forget, important indirect horizontal effects on non-State actors are also 
traceable in other fields, to name a few relevant examples: the 1992 Brussels 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage225; the 1997 OECD Convention 
on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions226; the same year Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change227; 1999 Protocol to the Basel Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Waste and 
Their Disposal (not yet into force228); the 2003 UN Convention on Corruption229; and, at 
the Council of Europe, we could cite the European Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment Through Criminal Law (1998, not yet into force230). 
Against the problematic proposal of direct obligations, the instruments cited above 
rather show the potential of indirect horizontal effects through the national 
implementation of IL. We shall stress that, whilst improving and deepening indirect 
horizontal obligations, some of the latter conventions have not entered into force yet 
revealing the remaining difficulties to convince States. A proper treaty on business and 
human rights would have to face two additional problems: whether to list rights or 
duties, and upon what terms, a process that might derive into a lowest common 
denominator agreement, who knows if slowing down the development of the current 
human rights regime. A decision would have to be made as to whether accompany the 
treaty with an additional or optional protocol to ensure the existence of an 
internationally binding mechanism to supervise its compliance. Otherwise, no matter 
how “hard law” it will be, at the end its practical impact could be questioned. To end 
this recap, we need not forget the sluggish speed of signatures and ratifications and the 
uncertainty of eventual reservations, as with any treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
November 1997 and entered into force on 15 February 1999. It has now 41 signatories among which all 
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We face a fluid and changing scenario. A good example is the recent Statement of H.E. 
Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United 
Nations and Specialized Agencies in Geneva, on the occasion of the 26th Session of the 
HRC, when the Resolution creating the intergovernmental WG on a binding instrument 
was finally adopted by a narrow vote. In this statement, he acknowledged that it is 
necessary a “smart mix of regulatory and policy approaches and incentives”, to 
conclude however that “only a binding instrument will be more effective in advancing 
this objective”231. As the saying goes, ‘the road to hell is paved with good intentions’: of 
course, a binding instrument seems prima facie the ideal solution, but only if, in the first 
place, we are aware of all the traps, risks and problems behind and, at a second stage, if 
we succeed in annulling those adverse side-effects. 
In the face of the difficulties of the treaty route, we consider it is preferable –for the 
time being– to go on developing and improving the two current open paths: the 
customary practice, with gradual efforts aimed at building a solid consensus in the long 
run
232; and the progressive interpretation of the existing instruments, as well as their 
effective implementation to ensure their indirect horizontal implications upon non-State 
actors (possibilities on which we further elaborate in the following chapter). Whatever 
the case may be in the future, it is evident that the “debate has now moved on –from 
‘why?’ be socially responsible to ‘how?’ ” 233. 
 
Characteristics and definition of CSR 
At this point, it is important to turn back to our understanding of the word 
‘responsibility’ so as to construct the differential characteristics of CSR. It does not 
consist of a chivalrous exercise of generosity. Far away from generosity, the term 
‘responsibility’ is closer to some kind of ‘duty’, in terms of due diligence –though 
undetermined, still a legal concept. Furthermore, we defend that the word “social”, 
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 As cited and commented by: V. CAMARERO SUÁREZ and F.J. ZAMORA CABOT: “Apuntes sobre 
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while having an origin centred on the environment and labour law, now entails in 
popular usage a variety of other concerns that turns it into a general human rights 
appeal. In this sense, even assuming the strict views of Friedman and Sternberg, we dare 
say that charity and corporate philanthropy are actually much more illegitimate (if not 
unlawful) than CSR, since they really constitute ‘arbitrary generous decisions’ 
disconnected from the type of business, its actual operations and its inherent 
‘responsibilities’. 
Let us provide some examples from different economic sectors. When a hotel decides to 
donate a certain amount of money for the protection of cultural heritage in its own city, 
this action is certainly praiseworthy and can also be in the hotel’s business interest. A 
second option would be to use more environmentally-friendly cleaning materials and to 
donate money for research and development (R&D) in this field. In our view, the latter 
option constitutes a “human rights based approach” with a clear connection with the 
type of business and its inherent operations and responsibilities: proper CSR. However, 
the first option (a donation for cultural heritage) would rather constitute an exercise of 
corporate philanthropy or, put otherwise, a “charitable approach” to CSR (for us, 
improper and unfocused). An educational institution (a university) may organise awards 
and prizes to recognise the work of local NGOs for their social action and, at the same 
time, offer free public lectures of Nobel prizes (to whom the University pays). Again, a 
different possibility would consist of an integral recycling plan (office equipment in 
educational institutions is one of the highest items), combined with its own programme 
of scholarships for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The difference is 
interesting: in the first case, it is a relatively charitable approach, which also benefits the 
public image of the university but has a rather loose connection with the impact of its 
proper operations; in the second case, in our view, it is a proper CSR initiative because 
the connection with the operations at stake is stronger and it also has a more solid 
human rights fundament. A third example could be a law firm (or any office): a 
charitable approach may provide free legal assistance to the victims of a recent natural 
disaster or fraud with great media impact, whereas a human rights approach would 
inspire putting in place more comprehensive work-family reconciliation measures for 
employees, especially women of childbearing age and to ensure the application of the 
principle ‘equal pay for equal work’, or even installing presence detectors to avoid 
excessive consumption of electricity (meeting rooms, corridors, etc.) and an automatic 
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mechanism to ensure that all computers are turned off at the end of the working day. 
Our fourth example is a big construction company: a philanthropic initiative would be 
to donate 0’5% of incomes to a local NGO to combat hunger; a proper CSR policy 
would ensure that all workers benefit from social security, to improve these social 
benefits together with the occupational risk prevention plan. Within the textile industry, 
major designers can organise after the terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) a 
charitable fashion show or parade; but  a proper CSR policy would address the usual 
problems of pollution caused by industrial inks in developing countries (down the 
supply chain) or workers’ rights. There are endless possibilities and examples; we shall 
finish mentioning the food industry. Following the charitable approach to CSR would 
lead to contribute to a local food bank. Contrariwise, a human rights and correct 
approach to CSR would prioritise other actions strictly connected to the actual impact of 
the company’s operations: for example, to refine the sell-by dates in order to avoid 
undue food wasting in large supermarkets, or to invest in R&D to improve the health 
standards of food products (and go beyond the minimum legal requirements). 
  Table No. 1: Characterising CSR: charity or human rights 
Examples of businesses Charitable Approach 
(corporate philanthropy) 
Human Rights Approach 
(proper CSR) 
Hotel (Tourist industry) Donation for the protection 
of cultural heritage 
Environmentally-friendly 
cleaning materials 
Educational Institutions (a 
University) 
Awards and Prizes. Free 
conferences. 
Recycling office equipment 
Scholarships 
Law firm (or any office) Free legal assistance to the 
victims of a disaster 
Family-work conciliation 
measures. Electricity 
consumption 
Construction company Periodic donations to a 
local NGO 
Improve social security of 
workers and the 
occupational risk 
prevention plan 
Textile industry Charitable fashion show Supply chain policies to 
tackle pollution and 
workers’ rights 
Food industry Contribution to a local 
food bank 
Address the problem of 
sell-by dates and health 
standards 
 
Agricultural sector 
 
 
Donate excesses of 
production 
 
 
Use of better sanitary and 
phytosanitary products 
(with higher environmental 
and health standards) 
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Both options (charitable and human rights approaches to CSR) can have a positive 
impact on public image and, perhaps, economic returns for the company, but in the case 
of proper CSR initiatives the difference is that it will not always and necessarily imply 
an economic saving or benefit234. Both can be praiseworthy. The objective is not to 
denigrate philanthropy; this is only aimed at clarifying concepts and initiatives. Each 
company has its own characteristics and our reaction to different corporate policies will 
vary depending on them; furthermore, the concrete activities and operations of the 
company will also be essential to determine our reaction and the way we assess the 
adequacy of a particular CSR initiative: “For example, should Levi Strauss fund a 
campaign to end racism? Should Ford contribute to finding a cure for AIDS?”235 Of 
course there might be counter-examples and cases in which the distinctions are not clear 
(no disappointment: it is a typical problem in social sciences). 
We propose that there are three characteristic elements of CSR, taken as categories that 
represent ideal types: 1) the close connection with the type of business and its inherent 
operations; 2) a sustainability criteria, i.e., to prioritise long-term effects in social or 
environmental issues leaving aside circumstantial and contingent approaches; 3) a solid 
vocation to respect human rights. The concurrence of all three characteristics will mark 
the likelihood of being closer to a truly CSR initiative, a human-rights-based one, 
annulling by the way the usual critique according to which it is only about marketing 
strategies and public image smokescreens. Unlike classical monetary approaches to 
CSR, which focus on profit maximisation, our approach is centred on “social 
preferences”, under which there are “mixed effects on profits” and, even sometimes, an 
eventual short-term reduction, within the context of stakeholders-shareholders overlaps 
and interactions236. 
Bearing in mind the preceding analysis, the current situation can be summarised in the 
following premises: 
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70 
 
a) International Human Rights Law (IHRL) has generally focused –and almost 
exclusively relied– on international treaties and traditional international 
mechanisms that imply vertical effects and States’ responsibilities. The 
progressive and positive evolution of IHRL must be acknowledged as a gradual 
and on-going development (as seen in the case of ESCR). 
b) Moreover, IHRL mostly consists of ex-post strategies aimed at remediation with 
recurrent difficulties in preventing eventual violations. Even when violations 
have already occurred, restrictions and problems arise when breaches involve 
non-State transnational actors while we face fragmented jurisdictions;  
c) The complexity of TNCs’ operations and the dynamics derived from 
globalisation have led to an increasing interdependency between subjects of IL 
and all kind of transnational actors in the international system, so that the 
Westphalian self-sufficiency of States is being questioned to protect human 
rights in their especially complex interaction with TNCs;  
d) When TNCs (co-)participate in human rights breaches, classic doctrines emerge 
to point out that, strictly speaking, only States and International Organisations 
are proper subjects of the international system, added to limited liability veils. 
Contrariwise, TNCs are clearly recognised as ‘right-bearers’ when it comes to 
investments protection and in other cases, suggesting at least some kind of 
international personality. In parallel, IHRL has introduced a partial legal 
subjectivity of individuals, now even in the area of ESCR with the entry into 
force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. 
In view of these premises, we propose the following definition of corporate social 
responsibility: a complementary strategy to increase the horizontal effects of 
internationally recognised human rights, mixing hard and soft law instruments, in their 
particular interaction with the activities of all kind of business enterprises, with a 
predominantly preventive vocation. 
The definition we propose condenses important nuances, starting with the necessary 
centrality of human rights within CSR, frequently forgotten or unfocused. Then, CSR’s 
predominantly preventive vocation does not prevent it from including remediation (ex 
post) procedures, but we understand that it is not its most developed facet for the time 
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being and, more significantly, it might also constitute one of its most interesting 
contributions to the current human rights regime since traditional instruments already 
focus on remediation and not so much on prevention. In other words, a predominantly 
preventive approach could complete some lacunae in the field of prevention in IHRL237, 
in order to increase ex-ante the actual effectiveness of human rights, provided that pre-
existing hard law mechanisms continue to develop. The objective is to improve the 
actual efficacy of existing instruments, rather than looking for new binding tools. In this 
connection, CSR constitutes a complementary way to reinforce the international 
protection of human rights, which should neither replace nor overrule treaty-based 
bodies and obligations. The mixture and interaction between hard and soft law 
instruments has already been seen in the context of the UN and will further be shown 
with regard to other international organisations and the EU. 
In conclusion, as it will also be argued in chapter II, the increasing practice of 
International Organisations in this subject suggests a growing consensus that might be a 
source of new customary obligations in the long term. It is in fact the practice of States 
and International Organisations (IOs) that would be the source of that eventual new 
international custom (the practice of private actors cannot be regarded as a source of any 
customary obligation: the expansion of CSR in the private sector is the echo of the 
growing concern at the level of States and IOs). This also justifies our primary 
institutional approach focused on IOs. To sum up, instead of new instruments, this 
research is based on the possibilities of: 1) building a wider international practice and 
consensus to push CSR potential effects among States and IOs; 2) in its interaction with 
treaty law, the effective implementation and, sometimes, the progressive 
interpretation238 and reinforcement239 of existing instruments. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
The role of international organisations: open windows 
 
 
2.1 Bringing orderliness in the work of international organisations 
At the G-7 meeting in Germany (June 2015), the world leaders’ declaration explicitly 
recognised the UN leadership and the UNGPs as the most authoritative framework to 
guide any effort in our subject, putting the emphasis on the expansion of national action 
plans (NAPs). Mention of NAPs and this political encouragement should not go 
unnoticed: in the end, it will be the greater or lesser extension of CSR at a national level 
the one able to build an international practice, apart from the primary inspiration or 
guidance that IOs can provide. In the second place, the G-7 also committed to foster the 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines and their correspondent National Contact 
Points (NCPs); the leaders “will ensure that our own NCPs are effective and lead by 
example”240. From this statement, of political value, we infer the increasing importance 
of this subject and how it has managed to emerge as a permanent item on the agenda, as 
said elsewhere in this work. We also deduce the unforgettable importance of States’ 
practice as a source of international norms and, apart from the UN, other international 
organisations have participated in the common effort to convince States to act in this 
subject matter. 
 
2.1.1. Common aspects and institutional coordination of international standards 
The prominence of the UN is, in reality, relatively recent taking into account that both 
the OECD and the ILO have CSR-related initiatives in the 1970s. The UN has certainly 
leaded the way, very significantly since the beginning of the 21st Century, but other 
international organisations have made non-negligible efforts to promote CSR. The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rights of the Child: J. CARDONA: “Los mecanismos institucionales para la protección de los derechos 
humanos como interés público global: el fortalecimiento del sistema de órganos de tratados de Naciones 
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proliferation of instruments from different sources might have both positive and 
negative effects. The outcome will depend on the degree of coordination and 
consistency: the latter being a substantive issue impossible to achieve without the first, 
we address first the institutional coordination. Coordination and consistency would 
generate together a desirable convergence, in the words of John Ruggie:  
“Convergence is desirable for two reasons. First, reducing the number of 
competing standards provides greater clarity and predictability for businesses 
and other stakeholders alike. Thus, it produces larger scale change and change 
that is more cumulative in its effects over time. Second, other major standard-
setting bodies active in this domain have implementation capacities the UN 
lacks”.241 
The variety of proposals coming from different IOs certainly poses problems of 
coherence. For example, we still find a number of global initiatives insisting on the so-
called ‘business case’, according to which CSR is expected to generate economic 
returns. The OECD seems reluctant to definitely abandon the ‘business case’ approach 
(CSR is seen as “both a business responsibility and a business opportunity”242), yet we 
have explained that CSR will not always have a positive impact on benefits. Where the 
‘business case’ is more visible is in the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO), a non-governmental institution composed of private national standard-setting 
associations. Among other motivations to buy the social responsibility standard of the 
ISO (ISO 26000, at the price of 198 Swiss francs for a 106-pages’ document), we find 
the possibility of gaining “competitive advantage, reputation, the ability to attract and 
retain workers or members, customers, clients and users, the maintenance of employee 
morale, commitment and productivity, [and] the perception of investors”243. In this line, 
ISO 26000 leaves room for managerial discretion in relation to ‘due diligence’, which is 
built on the basis of societal expectations and avoiding legal constructions, somehow 
more linked to sustainable development rather than to proper human rights concerns244.  
Of course, the ‘business case’ component, residually present in the OECD Guidelines 
and strongly embedded in ISO 26000, is far away from our approach to CSR. However, 
the OECD has recently aligned itself with the UN. Prof. Ruggie himself was invited to 
participate in the meetings previous to 2011’ update of the Guidelines, with a view to 
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coordinating discourses. In the current stage, coherence and consistency of global 
initiatives start to be indispensable for the future success of CSR. 
To start with, we wish to underline that, despite dispersion, the work of IOs –other than 
the UN– actually confirms the definition of CSR that we propose. Even ISO 26000, 
with all its limitations, has a strong point: its focus on prevention, which is essential in 
our understanding of CSR. And both the OECD Guidelines and ISO 26000, though very 
different, incorporate the necessary centrality of human rights as we propose. More in 
detail, the latest version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) 
includes a new chapter (No. IV), only on human rights, absent in the previous versions, 
which strictly follows the language and contents of the UNGPs: it highlights that the 
primary responsibility lies on States, that companies have to respect that framework, 
prevent and avoid adverse human rights impacts and “provide for or co-operate through 
legitimate processes in the[ir] remediation”245, thus implicitly including judicial and 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms. 
As far back as 2008 –before Ruggie’s work–, an unofficial ILO publication already 
stressed that CSR “should not be defined as only ‘beyond the Law’”, because it also 
includes “minimum regulatory standards” with a human rights approach246. Compliance 
with the existing legislation is seen as a baseline; only a portion of CSR consists of 
going “beyond the law”. Again, our definition also states that CSR mixes both hard and 
soft law, mandatory and voluntary components, as summarised in the following 
diagram: 
Diagram No. 3: Legal composition of CSR 
 
                                                          
245
 OECD Guidelines… (2011), p. 31.  
246
 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES / ILO: “Governance, International Law 
and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Research Series No. 116 (2008), pp. 107-113. 
75 
 
Finally, the OECD, the ILO and the ISO texts put the accent on risk assessments of 
adverse human rights impacts, confirming again what we defined as a “predominantly 
preventive vocation” of CSR. Unfortunately, none of the initiatives of IOs at a global 
level –not even the UN’s– can be said to be complete and fully satisfactory. Each 
definition incorporates some good points and presents some loopholes, a phenomenon 
that is perfectly understandable given the dispersion and disconnection of the diverse 
instruments at their source. Nevertheless, the fact of having found in the work of these 
organisations the diverse elements of our definition of CSR gives cause for some 
optimism (the human rights centrality, the predominantly preventive vocation and the 
mixture of hard and soft law). This indicates that the work of IOs at a global level seems 
to follow a similar direction. Undoubtedly, there is still pending work to systematise the 
overlapping initiatives from different international organisations, for which the 
institutional coordination is a prerequisite to deal with the almost infinite spheres of 
interaction between business and human rights. 
Also in this regard, we start to detect some progress in the form of policy transfers 
between IOs. In our view, both revisions of the OECD Guidelines are partly a response 
to the UN’s impulse of the global CSR agenda: the OECD Council revised the 
Guidelines in 2000 and created the National Contact Points (NCPs), with non-judicial 
grievance competencies, precisely when the Draft UN Norms had caused a vivid debate 
and revitalised CSR. And the following update of the Guidelines (2011) incorporated 
the above-cited new chapter on human rights. The establishment of the NCPs is 
obligatory for those countries adhered to the Guidelines (45 States at the time of 
writing247); the weak point is that most of them are established within a department of 
the Ministries of the Economy and their independence and usefulness is constantly 
under question, problems which are behind the amending purpose expressed by the G-
7248. It goes without saying that the OECD Guidelines constitute a soft-law instrument, 
a set of recommendations by governments to companies, the effectiveness of which can 
generate an endless debate. In the overall, we totally agree with Johnston’s assessment: 
“Initially skeptic about the effectiveness of soft law, I quickly became an 
advocate after my arrival as Secretary General of the OECD. When an attempt 
to adopt a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) foundered in 1998 […], 
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it became clear that proposed conventions and treaties are not only targets for 
dissident groups, they also take years to negotiate and implement […]. At the 
same time, it would be naïve to think that a meaningful system of global norms 
could exist without binding regulation and formal deterrence. […] Future 
international regulation in some areas could emerge from gradual convergence 
and coordination of national practices. […] I would caution, however, against 
exaggerating the degree to which formal law enforcement can or should solve 
all the world’s problems. Soft law, as through the Guidelines, has an 
increasingly important role to play”.249 
By the same token, one should ask ‘treaty advocates’ if the current 189 ILO 
Conventions have proved to be the best way to promote labour rights. Of course, this 
was somehow an expectable development given that labour relations have a stronger 
historical inclination to hard norms (at least outside the US). This historical inclination 
of labour relations to hard law has also a sound reason behind: the balancing of 
employer’s power with the generally less power of workers, giving rise to principles 
such as “in dubio pro operario” (similarly to the adagio ‘in dubio pro reo’ of criminal 
law). 
Notwithstanding this, the ILO is no stranger to soft law and CSR. The ILO has 
produced two basic texts: the Tripartite Declaration on MNEs and Social Policy (1977) 
and the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). As we have 
said, CSR is a mix of hard and soft law (the ILO early pointed in that direction), so 
these guidelines and recommendations need to be read jointly with the eight ‘core’ ILO 
Conventions250. In fact, both declarations have the underlying objective of coordinating 
diverse ILO conventions to foster their joint CSR-effect through soft-law guidance.  
Besides, the International Labour Conference also approved the Annex of 1998’ 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which establishes a unique 
follow-up mechanism in a soft norm. The follow-up looks forward to promoting the 
ratification of the eight fundamental Conventions, via State-by-State annual reports and 
a global report, both reviewed by the Governing Body, so as to facilitate technical 
cooperation and the gradual achievement of concrete goals. On their side, the successive 
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revisions of the Tripartite Declaration on MNEs and Social Policy have included 
mentions to the UN Global Compact and the MDGs and confirm that, from the point of 
view of the ILO, recommendations are addressed also to “governments”, alongside 
companies, workers and employers, unlike the OECD Guidelines, which are 
recommendations to companies by member-States. In this line, the ILO states that these 
objectives “will be furthered by appropriate laws and policies”251, anchored in “basic 
human rights”252, therefore combining mandatory and voluntary schemes together with 
legalist and political strategies. The Declaration on MNEs was completed in 1986 with 
a dispute resolution mechanism on its interpretation253, which can be activated by any of 
the three constituents – the intrinsic originality of the ILO in the international system. 
Policy transfers may seem relatively evident between the UN and the ILO (an UN 
Agency) and the OECD, cross-citing each other standards. A similar cross-fertilisation 
can be studied in the particular case of the ISO 26000. We mentioned earlier that this 
(private) standard had a more developmental and business-friendly approach, rather 
than a proper human rights one. Though being business-oriented, ISO 26000 has a 
positive aspect: unlike other famous ISO standards, it is not certifiable and thus reduces 
the risks of creating a new “certification circus” related to CSR; in other words, it 
remarkably reflected the “lack of desire to create another product for the 
auditing/certification industry”254. ISO 26000 developmental approach can also be seen 
as a positive aspect, in terms of an “inter-marriage” between CSR and the MDGs255, in 
line with the UN strategy, which actually links human rights to development. In fact, 
this tendency to unite human rights and development has been confirmed by the new 
Sustainable Development Goals or 2030-agenda256, which continues to include many 
ESCR such as health, education, the environment, food and adequate housing. 
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Finally, although we see a de facto institutional coordination through policy transfers, 
many of which start to be openly deliberate, we find sometimes more formal 
cooperation agreements between organisations. Suffice it to cite the interesting 
Memorandum of Understanding between the OECD and ISO in the area of social 
responsibility, signed in 2008 to ensure that “ISO International Standard […] and ISO 
activities relating thereto are consistent with and complement the OECD Guidelines”257, 
through a mutual and timely communication, consultations, assistance and co-operation. 
Consistency and complementarity are difficult to balance; but anyone would agree that 
the express intention to do so is a must irrespective of the final result. We are already 
used to inter-agency initiatives on particular matters and to see officers attending 
meetings at the headquarters of other organisations depending on the subject, but this 
MoU consists of going a step further: an institutionalisation of coordination that may 
hopefully inspire similar institutional agreements in the future, perhaps in order to 
include all relevant IOs in the area of CSR. 
 
2.1.2. The challenge of substantive coordination 
We have shown in the previous section that our definition of CSR finds support in the 
work of IOs at a global level. We have also highlighted the common aspects of diverse 
standards as a result of policy transfers between IOs and an increasing, though still 
imperfect, institutional coordination. The next step should consist of promoting a joint-
reading of all these standards given the fact that there are overlapping initiatives 
addressing the same issues from different perspectives. 
Indeed, more and more IOs incorporate human rights concerns or related issues into 
their daily activities, regardless of their founding priorities. Our objective now is to 
show some sector-specific opportunities for coordination with substantive outcomes. 
The following examples, in a non-exhaustive way, would merit a longer, in-depth and 
distinct research; but our goal is just to suggest there are also substantive interactions 
and opportunities for convergence of social responsibility standards and related 
instruments. 
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Within IHRL, environmental protection has always been the spearhead of a regulatory 
evolution that has brought about improvements that start to be extended to other areas. 
For example, environmental footprints are widely used by the industry and the fact of 
being a quite easily quantifiable factor (including a strong ‘business case’) has 
decisively helped environmental standards on their path to a prompt success. 
International Environmental Law is a quite recent evolution within the history of IL, an 
area in which we also find a good amount of soft norms258 but more and more binding 
treaties, whose effectiveness in turn is discussable. We have already cited the 1992 
Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the Kyoto Protocol to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change259. The level of specificity of these 
treaties is also remarkable: suffice the additional examples of the International 
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna or the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, for the concreteness of their subject-matter and their 
repercussion on private actors, and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, for its procedural importance –an extraordinary formalisation of ‘procedural 
human rights’. Two international environmental treaties await a sufficient number of 
ratifications to enter into force: the 1999 Protocol to the Basel Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Waste 
and Their Disposal as well as the European Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law (1998). Moving to policies, environmental 
objectives mainstream all UN agencies, as confirmed by the new Sustainable 
Development agenda for 2030; even WIPO has jumped on the environmental wagon 
and has developed an internet-based marketplace to facilitate intellectual property 
services and databases for green technologies, which is by the way a good example of 
PPPs. 
For instance, the situation can be interpreted in terms of a progressive hardening of 
previous environmental expectations, a process accelerated since the late 1980s. 
Because of its early development, environmental protection has blazed a trail and has 
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always been one step ahead developing and intermixing hard and soft law instruments. 
This evolution of environmental regulation has contributed to three achievements: 1) the 
gradual inclusion of procedural aspects to operationalise simultaneous goals; 2) the 
progressive hardening of previous soft-law aspects; 3) the coordination efforts by a 
variety of IOs (both institutionally and substantially). 
We observe similar improvements in the area of the right to food and agricultural 
production. A highly topical human rights problem is food security while speculation in 
the stock markets is said to be related to several food crises in Africa, in particular due 
to the spectacular escalation of the price of corn after 2008’ crisis. The area of the right 
to food and agriculture is also in advance in terms of international coordination, 
including CSR instruments to tackle the current defies. Already in 2004, FAO issued the 
Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate 
food260, which take a transversal human rights-based approach, from good governance 
to specific ESCR, like water and sanitation, food security and labour rights.  
This path finally led to an unprecedented institutional and substantive co-operation: the 
principles framework for responsible agricultural investments, adopted in 2009 by an 
interagency working-group composed of FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and WB, a strong call 
for a global consensus. According to these principles, investments should not 
“jeopardize food security” (principle 2) but respect the environment (principle 7) and 
“existing rights to land” (principle 1)261. FAO has produced two additional guidelines: 
in 2012, the Voluntary Guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, 
fisheries and forests262 and, in 2014, the Principles for Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture and Food Systems263. We could also add FAO’s Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides, more clearly calling upon companies, apart from the usual regulatory 
responsibility of States. In summary, the current polemic turns around large scale land 
acquisitions (“land grabbing”) and the respect of the environment to ensure a 
sustainable agriculture. 
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In today’s economy, the ever-growing complexity of supply chains is not limited to the 
industrial sector and widely affects food products, which has marked a new priority in 
this subject. The OECD and FAO are currently working on a joint voluntary Guidance 
for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains264, therefore continuing their coordination, 
at an institutional level but also on the substance. The most recent example is the joint 
FAO-UNIDROIT Legal Guide on Contract Farming, where specific human rights 
concerns are straightforwardly addressed: it directly cites the UNGPs as a source of 
inspiration265 and recognises the intertwining of technical standards with several human 
rights, on which it assumes their interdependency266. This Legal Guide even states that 
Companies should respect human rights regardless of the local enforcement deficits at 
the government level, including procedural aspects like “participation, accountability, 
empowerment, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity and the rule of law”267. 
In this context of guidelines and codes, public goods and concerns are more likely to be 
introduced into private (contractual) relationships through certificates and standards that 
promote it268. 
All these instruments urgently need a joint reading, to be added to the numerous reports 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and the UNGPs, to cite the 
framework within which it should be interpreted; only such an approach will help 
moving from institutional coordination to substantive results. In this regard, it must be 
ensured that the development of guidelines and soft norms allows a sector-by-sector 
substantive operationalisation of CSR –as seen in the case of agriculture and food. 
However, at the same time, the multiplication of standards should not undermine the 
need for harmonisation (what we termed “coordination and consistency”). In any case, 
even though so many people die of hunger every day, the right to food and agribusiness 
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are a good example to demonstrate that “convergence among CSR standards and 
guidelines is in progress”269. 
Finally, in a totally different area that allows us to introduce the following section on 
trade and investments, besides the specialised work of the WB and the ICSID, or the 
WTO, we should have a look at other instruments and proposals from other 
organisations. In a particularly interesting and recent report, Mr. Alfred de Zayas, UN 
Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
has proposed to the General Assembly to request an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on 
the priority of the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations human rights 
conventions over other treaties –in particular, investment and trade arrangements270. In 
this research, we basically follow the same approach as his report, based on article 103 
of the UN Charter, article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, in order to conclude on the duty to make compatible human rights and 
UN obligations with other concurring international obligations271. 
However, the Independent Expert adopts a far more radical stance, compared to ours, 
inasmuch he even promotes a categorical abolition of investor-State dispute settlements. 
In our case, as it will be further developed in the following section, we adopt a more 
nuanced and pragmatic approach to show that there is room for improvement and that 
there are open windows to gradually mainstream human rights respect in trade and 
investment disputes. Regardless of our differences of opinion with the Independent 
Expert, we certainly support the idea that an emerging international practice reveals an 
increasing consensus on the fact that human rights entail some transversal principles 
that can also affect international economic law.  
The practice surveyed so far indicates that IOs and many States seem to go in that 
direction (mainstreaming human rights into any area), but it would be more delicate to 
precisely select what human rights and principles have really evolved, or can finally 
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crystallise, into customary obligations272.  Such obligations would have to be based on a 
consistent and generalised opinio iuris and praxis at the end of the journey. However, 
we rather think that, if such a customary rule of respect for human rights has emerged, it 
is more likely to affect only some selected principles on which we have scarce certainty, 
and probably not all human rights –therefore not being very useful in the far richer area 
of ‘business and human rights’. We essentially argue that, at this stage, it is rather 
inadvisable to request an opinion from the ICJ –we further risk an ambiguous and 
unhelpful answer, which is capable of blocking or slowing down the customary path 
already initiated. 
 
2.2  CSR and international trade and investments 
 
As we have seen so far, when dealing with transnational companies’ respect for human 
rights we need an interdisciplinary perspective –procedural law, commercial and labour 
law, civil law, public and private international law…- to cover legal relations that go 
beyond a single legal order or jurisdictional system. We are, therefore, projected to 
almost any kind of legal relationship. 
This is also why we need to analyse all actors, from States to private companies and 
international organisations, trade unions and consumers and almost any civil society 
organisation. We know globalisation mainly affects international trade and investments 
but, in the last decades, international transactions and external investments have 
significantly increased and, among other reasons, we might underline two:  
1) Both the WTO and the World Bank (WB273), together with financial 
institutions at a regional level and the private banking sector, finance a great 
part of these investments; 
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2) States protect foreign investors through three types of legal forms: bilateral 
treaties (BITs), multilateral investment agreements (MIAs) and, more 
simply, through international contracts between the State and concessionary 
companies. In this way, governments protect those who directly or indirectly 
finance projects, facilitating access to means of dispute settlement outside 
the State’s jurisdiction. 
As repeated elsewhere in this research, it is our understanding that, if there is any part of 
the legal order that could be made relevant for all sectors and branches of law, this is the 
case of international human rights law and its principles or, at least, core human rights’ 
principles that have penetrated into customary international law. In this vein, we should 
emphasise again that we are mainly speaking of States’ obligations and their 
responsibility of surveillance, also when it comes to private activities at the international 
level. Even if States weren’t to have ratified specific human rights instruments, such as 
the ICESCR, we need to recall some general obligations with regard to article 1 of the 
UN Charter and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which foresees the 
resolution of international controversies “by peaceful means and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law” (preamble) and “in good faith” (art. 31), in 
conformity with “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (preamble). We can 
obviously discuss the different degrees of compliance and standards, but it is recognised 
a high degree of consensus on the essential or core human rights principles, which can 
therefore be considered customary obligations regardless of the ratification of a specific 
treaty274.  
A widespread practice indicates that there are not watertight compartments in 
International Law. To quote just one example, the ICJ settled in a very simple way that 
“[a]n international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of 
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”275. It is precisely for 
this reason that we find “general exception clauses”, “public interest clauses” in the 
WTO agreements as well as recurrent references to general international law in some 
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interesting arbitral decisions. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, one of the most authoritative 
scholars in this field, has repeatedly warned of the dangers of so-called ‘self-contained 
regimes’ such as investment law in relation to public international law. We need 
coordination and an integrated approach to diverse international legal fields in order to 
tackle legal fragmentation, which is the reason “why international economic law fail[s] 
to protect global public goods”, not being irreconcilable with the due “respect for the 
legitimate diversity [and specificity] of international legal regimes”276 –we fully support 
Petersmann’s diagnostic277. 
We suggest below that there are practical examples, in which human rights have found 
their way into trade and investments issues, although timidly. Nothing impedes this 
practice from being extended and developed in the future; for instance, it is only a 
question of progressive development of the current instruments, bearing in mind the 
usefulness of referring to general international law as the only legal and legitimate 
method to make compatible the increasing transnational economic activities with human 
rights obligations. IOs role in regulating trade and investments shows a wider 
acknowledgement of the ‘relational character’ of IL and the transversal effects of human 
rights. 
 
2.2.1 International investments and human rights 
First of all, we propose that international organisations that finance foreign investments 
have, at least, an institutional and procedural role to play to protect human rights, even 
if their first legitimate objective might be the protection of their natural founding 
priority. 
The right to life and the right to health are prominent obligations of States under the rule 
of law and this necessarily implies the right to drinking water. According to our analysis 
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of the ICESCR (1966), no provision establishes that it has to be a free and public 
service, but drinking water needs to be made accessible and fully available regardless of 
its private or public management278. But economic and social rights usually require big 
initial investments, where the conflicting interests can be large and complex. 
Many investment contracts actually deal with basic public services (water, power, oil 
and gas, telecommunications, transport and waste disposal), which are narrowly linked 
to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. In many occasions, an 
international investment contract constitutes the first step before the enjoyment of any 
economic and social right in a developing country. Very frequent problems come up 
also with private security services and its related aspects, touching on civil and political 
rights. Sometimes tragically, we witness regular violations of the right to life and public 
security or freedom of expression. The rights of indigenous peoples are, finally, another 
recurrent problem in the operations of transnational companies, because of the remote 
location of many natural resources. 
Prevention measures could be put in place to avoid or reduce the potential negative 
effects on the host community, most of the times involving the following problems: the 
right to health, labour rights, forced evictions, the protection of cultural heritage and the 
environment, each of them including important procedural dimensions (information, 
consultation and public participation, access to justice plus effective and timely legal 
protection279). 
In a famous example, a gas pipeline through Chad and Cameroon led to a threat to 
human rights in both Central African countries280. Amnesty International warned that 
this threat was more likely to materialise if the investment agreement forgets, omits or 
clearly hampers State’s international obligations in terms of human rights and the 
management responsibility of concessionary companies. A consortium of companies 
was extracting gas of the fields of Doba (southern Chad) to cross Cameroon with a 
thousand kilometres pipeline to the Atlantic. It consisted of the biggest private 
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investment in Africa at that time and the consortium was composed of Exxon Movil and 
Chevron, both American companies, and Petronas, the gas State company of Malaysia. 
As it is often the case, this project was promoted by a number of investors, accepted by 
the concerned governments, supported with World Bank loans, private export credit 
companies and banks, some of which had already and voluntarily adopted social and 
environmental standards. The project was deeply criticised as an invitation for Chad and 
Cameroon to ignore their international obligations in terms of human rights. Particular 
clauses allegedly prevented these countries from adopting measures that might disturb 
the future of the project, even when such measures were meant to address a human 
rights’ demand281. This possibility should be excluded of any agreement: as said before, 
no international contract has its own life in a vacuum; it only exists in an international 
legal context. 
As for this particular case, in 2001 the President of Chad ordered that the head of 
opposition be arrested and tortured because he was against the creation of the gas 
pipeline. Even though it was one of the biggest investments foreseen in Africa, the 
project linked a consortium of big oil companies and was financed by the World Bank. 
The opposition to this project claimed that the rights of the citizens were not respected 
and further raised the fact that landowners were harassed and threatened with death to 
abandon their properties in order to place a pipeline instead of conducting a correct 
expropriation process with due legal guarantees.  
That’s when an NGO addressed the President of the World Bank asking for his help to 
liberate the opposition leader. In this case, in spite of the general scepticism about the 
effectiveness of using his “good offices”, and doubting that this case fell into his 
competencies, Mr. Wolfensohn finally phoned the President of Chad and the head of 
opposition was immediately liberated. This obviously opened a vivid debate and raised 
several questions: to what extent the World Bank is responsible for investment projects 
that end up in human rights violations (the WB, in itself, is not violating at any time 
those rights); whether formal and informal ‘good offices’ are sufficient and adequate to 
tackle these situations; and if there could be an better system to address human rights’ 
related issues.  
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In many cases that concern developing countries, projects are wrongly interpreted as 
allowing companies’ operations without being held accountable in front of local 
legislation in cases of alleged human rights violations. Amnesty International promptly 
raised the question and the inherent contradiction with general international law, in the 
sense victims would be deprived of any access to remedies creating inadmissible 
obstacles for the realisation of human rights. In many countries the exploitation of 
natural resources has contributed to worsening corruption, deteriorating social unrest, 
conflicts and abuses. It is important to note that, as in the case of Chad and Cameroon 
and most of the African countries, we face a situation of state fragility –if not failure282– 
what makes the population particularly vulnerable, where the judicial system is 
ineffective and, all in all, where it is more likely that the Governments succumb to the 
companies’ pressure and interests. It consists of a delicate and precarious equilibrium 
between economic development thanks to big investment projects, and the adverse 
effects it might cause. Other NGO’s claim that some African governments carry out 
prosecutions, tortures and massive murder to keep some oil reserves without population. 
A number of cases were deemed crucial to convince international financial institutions 
(IFI) to take some steps. Of course, there are precedents well before the Chadian case 
exposed. Since the 1960’s, when the WB did not stop lending South Africa and Portugal 
despite their apartheid and colonial policies respectively283, the CESCR has issued a 
good amount of Concluding Observations284 detailing the negative impact of IMF-WB 
actions on ESCR. It was argued that these IFI, being within the UN building, should –in 
accordance with article 103 of the UN Charter– make their policies consistent with 
wider UN priorities in terms of human rights285; nevertheless, this alleged organic link 
with the UN, in itself, is unlikely to force substantive changes in view of the functional 
independence of World Bank. 
The problem starts with the “apolitical” character of IFI, whose operations must only be 
guided by economic considerations. In particular, as it is well-known, article IV –
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Section 10 of the IBRD Agreement explicitly prohibits “political activity”286. The legal 
framework of the WB has evolved or, rather, its interpretation, especially since the 
Presidency of Wolfensohn. As shown by Roberto Dañino, former Senior Vice President 
and General Counsel of the WB, the “concept of political interference in the context of 
human rights has also evolved”287: the WB’s poverty alleviation and development 
objectives can be legally articulated in terms of human rights, in line with the MDGs, 
and consistently with art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Besides, 
a country’s poor human rights record might also be read as a “financial risk”, according 
to which the WB has to decide its loans. This work concluded that a distinction still had 
to be made between economic and social rights and civil and political rights, 
considering the latter outside the competencies of the World Bank. 
It can be argued that there was a historic over-dependence on the President’s personal 
capacity to conciliate conflicting interests288: in 1958, when holders of bonds issued by 
Tokyo and the city agreed to request the President a plan; a year later in relation to some 
goods confiscated by the British forces after their intervention in Egypt in 1956. This 
was also true in controversies dealing with nationalisations: the power sector in Egypt 
(1965) or some mining facilities nationalised in 1968 by the then Zaire (today DR 
Congo). The good offices of the President were not limited to private-public 
controversies; he also mediated in inter-State conflicts such as that between India and 
Pakistan leading to 1960 treaty on the Indus River and its exploitation. 
But it was urgent to find solutions less dependent on the “good offices” of the President 
of the WB. The final trigger for the evolution of WB policies was Sardar Sarovar 
Project in India (Narmada Project), a dam including water supply and drainage facilities 
that could, on the one hand, significantly improve the population’s access to water and 
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sanitation and the right to food (enabling better irrigation systems) in line with article 11 
of the ICESCR; but on the other hand, it raised serious allegations of human rights 
violations, in particular, damages to the environment and forced evictions. It was the 
first time that the WB fell compelled to create an ad hoc group of experts (the Morse 
Commission) to address this problematic situation; this case therefore constitutes the 
direct precedent of the WB Inspection Panel, finally created in 1993289. 
The progressive understanding of the WB’s Articles of Agreement has opened the door 
to non-investment issues to support economic development, in particular through 
informal interpretations that maintain a certain level of flexibility290. The practical 
materialisation of this evolution came, as said before, with the Inspection Panel, 
operative since 1994. With its quasi-judicial or arbitral function, the Panel allows 
individuals (at least two, or more, comprising their representatives or NGOs) to seek 
remedies if they consider that their interests or they themselves have been or could be 
adversely impacted, direct or indirectly, because of a project (partly) financed by the 
World Bank (IBRD and IDA)291. The procedure starts only if the Panel considers that 
the request is not manifestly unfounded. In reasonable, the President of the Panel 
informs the President of the WB and the Administration has 21 days to explain if the 
loan has followed the Operating Procedures and if problems have already been 
addressed. If this answer is considered unsatisfactory by the Panel, it can formally 
request the Board of Directors the opening of a proper inquiry. Once authorised, the 
President of the Inspection Panel appoints the inquirer/s (an “Investigation Team”) to 
undertake such review, interviewing staff members and even conducting country visits 
(which need to be authorised by the host State). Finally, the panel adopts an 
investigation report with its recommendations. This report is sent to the Board and to 
the concerned management departments, which have six additional weeks to exercise 
their right of reply (the so-called “Management Report and Recommendation in 
Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report”). Afterwards, the Board of 
Directors and the President of the WB re-examine the whole question and adopt a final 
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decision on the merits and the recommendations.292 Requesters are informed within two 
weeks after the Board’s meeting, including the public disclosure of the main documents.  
In all phases, the borrowing or guaranteeing country is informed and updated, while the 
Board can promptly adopt decisions on the subject matter without waiting to the end of 
the Panel’s investigation or reports, allowing a greater flexibility in terms of rapid 
response and effectiveness to ensure compliance with the Bank’s Operating 
Procedures293. It can obviously be criticised that, from the very beginning, the Panel 
needs the authorisation of the Board of Directors to effectively initiate an investigation, 
and that the Board will also have the last word as to the eventual measures to be taken. 
Moreover, since it is not a proper jurisdictional organ, the legal value of the decisions is 
in doubt, the operations are not suspended just because an investigation is under 
examination and requests are rejected if more than 95% of the loan has already been 
disbursed.  
Against this background, we shall recall however its originality and autonomy: for the 
first time, an international financial institution creates an ad hoc but permanent 
subsidiary organ at the highest level of the organisation, reporting directly to the Board, 
with a strong institutional margin of manoeuvre to engage with all parties concerned, 
thus bypassing technical barriers in terms of extraterritoriality and legal personality of 
such parties (individuals, NGOs, TNCs in cases of guaranteeing countries or States 
themselves as direct Borrowers and local companies). On the substance, the practice of 
the Panel shows a progressive openness to general principles of IL, especially in the 
interaction between international economic law and environmental protection, human 
rights (indigenous peoples, minority rights, health, and labour law), poverty and 
sustainable development, generating a sort of “osmosis”294 between the law applicable 
by the Panel and those other fields. The institutionalisation of the Inspection Panel has 
undoubtedly marked the evolution of the WB lending policies since 1994, moving from 
literal – historicist to more finalistic – systematic interpretations of the founding 
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agreements295. At the same time, this has inspired other IFI: in 2001 the IMF instituted 
the Independent Evaluation Office. At a regional level, only the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank have similar accountability 
mechanisms for the moment, which constitutes a minority of IFI.  
The private arm of the WB, the IFC and MIGA established in 1999 the Office of the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), whose 2007’ operational guidelines 
recognise as authoritative legal sources the environmental and social requirements 
“including international legal obligations” within the audit criteria296, perhaps implicitly 
including soft law instruments since it ambiguously distinguishes between “legal and 
regulatory requirements”. In the current CAO’s Operational Guidelines (2013) those 
‘audit criteria’ have mutated into “compliance investigation criteria”297, a little harsher, 
while an express mention of ‘business and human rights’298 issues is added. The IFC 
Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability establishes a set of eight 
performance standards, which directly refer to diverse ESCR299, inasmuch the “IFC 
recognises the responsibility of business to respect human rights independently of States 
duties”300, thus confirming correlative private duties as we exposed in the first chapter. 
Naturally, at the end it is “the responsibility of the client”, but the IFC commits to do 
everything in its power to foster due diligence, in line with its own standards but 
interestingly including “other internationally recognized sources”301. One cannot deny 
the potential influence of the IFC over the international financial sector. 
                                                          
295
 Ibíd., pp. 312-313.  
296
 “Audit criteria may have their origin, or arise from the environmental and social assessments or plans, 
host country legal and regulatory requirements (including international legal obligations), and the 
environmental, social, health or safety provisions of the World Bank Group, IFC/MIGA, or other 
conditions for IFC/MIGA involvement”. IFC/MIGA: CAO Operational Guidelines, Washington 2007, 
para 3.2 (at p. 21), available at www.cao-ombudsman.org.  
297
 IFC/MIGA: CAO Operational Guidelines, Washington 2013, para. 4.3 (at p. 23).  
298
 “This includes impacts related to business and human rights in the context of IFC Policy and 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Accountability”, ibid., para. 1.1 (at p. 4).  
299
 IFC performance standards are: 1) Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks 
and Impacts; 2) Labor and Working Conditions; 3) Resource efficiency and pollution prevention; 4) 
Community Health, safety and security; 5) Land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; 6) Biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable management of living natural resources; 7) Indigenous peoples; 8) Cultural 
Heritage. IFC: Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, Washington January 2012, para. 5 (at 
pp. 1-2).  
300
 This includes the International Bill of Human Rights and the eight core ILO Conventions. Ibíd., para. 
12 ( at p. 3). 
301
 According to the IFC, environmental and social due diligence typically includes the following key 
components: i) reviewing all available information, records and documentation related to the 
environmental and social risks and impacts of the business activity; ii) concluding site inspections and 
interviews of client personnel and relevant stakeholders, where appropriate; iii)analysing the business 
activity’s environmental and social performance in relation to the requirements of the Performance 
93 
 
It is evident that the World Bank Group has ended up assuming that, institutionally, it 
can play a positive role to pressure both governments and transnational companies to 
pressurise them to respect environmental and social rights, particularly dealing with 
their preventive – procedural dimension within investment operations (mainly, access to 
information and consultation, more importantly in cases of needed resettlements of 
populations or if indigenous peoples are involved). The WB Inspection Panel has 
received 104 cases until 2015, only 34 of these were admitted to the next stage (actual 
investigation) by the Board of Directors; in five cases, the Panel recommended to 
undertake the investigation but the Board of Directors did not authorise it. Most 
complaints come from Africa (31%) followed by the LAC Region (26%) and South 
Asia (22%)302. 
In summary, the institutional strategy of the WB was translated into two secondary 
objectives: in the first place, it was important to clarify and ‘grease’ the relationship 
between general international law and investment law, before analysing the place of 
internationally recognised human rights and the eventual responsibility of the WB or IFI 
in particular projects. This was done thanks to a progressive interpretation of the articles 
of agreement. The WB leads the way303 but the numbers show there is still a long way 
to walk. Lest we forget the vital role of States in their governing capacity of IOs. The 
attention paid to the direct responsibility of the WB as a lending institution is, very 
probably, “disproportionate” 304: legally speaking, the direct responsibility is more likely 
to fall on recipient States; substantively speaking, problems touch the WB only 
indirectly and institutionally. Financial institutions can play a role but, as member-
driven organisations, it is equally important to raise Member-States awareness of these 
problems. In other words, the WB institutional responsibility has evolved in the 
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direction of forcing or increasing Member States substantive responsibility, especially 
recipient States (as direct Borrowers or as Guaranteeing countries). Ultimately, the 
Panel can be described as an instrument to put pressure on recipient States, rather than 
on the Bank’s administration305, to comply with certain non-investment-related 
minimum standards. In any case, this evolution has clearly moved from mere “good 
offices” (a phone call in the Chadian case) to more predictable and better guarantees 
(the Inspection Panel). 
 
BITs, investment contracts, the ICSID and the place of human rights 
Having said this, the World Bank or regional banks are not the only financial investors 
for States. In reality, nearly 75% of world investments are actually financed by private 
institutions: banks and credit agencies to exports and investments. Business-lead 
initiatives have followed a very different approach and, as mentioned elsewhere in this 
work, companies were more concerned with corruption, the environment and social 
abuses in response to new societal expectations they were starting the detect in the 
markets. In this line, the Equator Principles, launched in 2003 under the auspices of the 
WB-IFC jointly with private banking houses, constitute the key code for the banking 
sector. Entities and institutions that voluntarily declare their adherence to this soft law 
instrument assume thereby their commitment to fostering sustainable investments and to 
take into account social risks when financing a project. The Equator Principles were 
followed by the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, another private-led code 
established in 2006 further to the initiative of the UN Global Compact and the UNEP 
Finance Initiative. Both the Equator Principles and the UNPRI constitute private-led 
initiatives to foster soft instruments that reassemble public and private financial 
institutions around some ethical standards and goals before green-lighting projects. The 
Equator Principles have been adopted by 81 financial institutions from 36 countries 
covering “over 70% of international Project Finance debt in emerging markets”306. In 
theory, projects without an adequate social and environmental impact assessment would 
be deprived of their financial support. The UNPRI defends six environmental and social 
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principles, plus 35 proposed actions in connection to these, voluntarily accepted by 
1380 signatories (asset owners, investment managers and service providers), which 
control $59 trillion in assets307. 
These key steps were applauded by the private sector although the real problem is to put 
flesh on the bones of notions such as “social impact”, while controlling the effective 
implementation of these objectives. During the 2005 revision of the Equator Principles, 
the mention to social impact was legally reoriented to the respect of international 
treaties and covenants adopted by States. We are therefore lucky if the State has ratified 
the main international human rights treaties (not always the case). Despite obvious 
critics concerning their legal value and actual effectiveness, there are two positive 
aspects: it introduces “process standards” within corporate behaviour and it increasingly 
considers its consistency and cross-fertilisation with internationally recognised human 
rights law. In other words, their contribution is mainly “cultural”, “normalising the 
consideration of social and environmental factors in corporate decision-making in the 
investment sector and, in this sense, it is contributing to the development of 
international CSR norms for financiers and investors”308. 
Leaving aside the private sector initiatives, globalisation has led to a second problem: 
when States make bilateral treaties or conclude contracts, they place themselves under 
the obligation to protect foreign investors in front of non-economic risks, and do not 
usually include responsibilities for investors as a counter-balance, for example, in terms 
of human rights. Bilateralism still dominates the regulation of international investments 
at a global level and international organisations might claim more room to make 
recommendations309. When an investor, for example, acts against an individual or 
collective right within the territory where the investment takes place, the bilateral 
agreement does not foresee any kind of sanction to the investor or the possibility of 
compensating the victim for the alleged damage. And if the State’s legislation does 
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envisage the situation or simply does not apply the legislation and turns a blind eye to 
problems, investor’s impunity can be almost absolute.  
In contrast, such bilateral texts allow the investor to solve potential controversies with 
the State directly through an international commercial arbitration, without exhausting 
internal remedies and excluding diplomatic protection. The investment protection 
system therefore creates an autonomous regime of States’ responsibility, tendentiously 
escaping or outgoing the general norms of international law310. This way, Sates find 
themselves involved in important controversies showing the tension between the 
necessary protection of investments with its particular regime and the respect for human 
rights. This tension usually emerges when dealing with privatisations of basic services 
such as drinkable water in developing countries, power supply, and highways 
construction, to cite only some of them. 
When a bilateral investments’ treaty is applicable, we expect States’ due diligence to 
ensure the protection of such foreign investments. Sometimes, it seems difficult to 
explain some States initiatives against concrete investors (mainly, nationalisations), 
except in clear cases of “general interest” or what is called the “parameters inherent in a 
democratic State”. 
The problem is that, when determining the applicable law to dispute settlements 
between States and investors, the parties do not usually consider the application of 
international human rights law, not even States themselves when making investment 
contracts. Nor is it done in bilateral treaties when, in the absence of choice by the 
parties, the applicable law in  a dispute based on a bilateral investment treaty is the law 
of the receiving State as well as principles and norms of International Law. Only this 
reference to IL, frequently vague and minimal311, could be linked to international human 
rights law or, for instance, clarify the obligations of the receiving State. 
This is the reason why the first question is the place of general international law within 
investment law, before wondering whether there is room for human rights or not. Some 
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arbitration awards show open possibilities to introduce public international law 
principles in investment disputes and, indirectly, core human rights principles. 
In principle, general international law is never excluded in dispute settlements. The 
problem starts with the interpretation of article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, the first 
sentence of which states that “the tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties”, while the second sentence adds that “in 
the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable”. Does this mean that general international law is 
only applicable in the absence of such a choice of law by the Parties? Or only in cases of 
lacunae or contradictions with domestic legislation? Is it then necessary to demonstrate 
that the parties have failed to choose the applicable law in order to obtain recourse to 
International Law? And in case of choice of law, is it then absolutely necessary to 
shame domestic systems and show inconsistencies and lacunae in order to open the way 
for public international law? Public international law hasn’t any role outside these strict 
requirements? The only possibility to use public international law is the second sentence 
of art. 42(1)? Is it otherwise excluded?  
When there is a choice of applicable law, the Tribunal has sometimes decided that there 
is no reason to ‘go further’ and that a very restricted role of IL may be enough, only for 
corrective or supplementary purposes. This is the stance in AUCOVEN vs. Venezuela, 
when the contract at stake was easily isolated upholding ‘self-contained regimes’ 
theories312. It is clear that the tribunal did not feel obliged by the previous and more 
liberal award, Wena vs. Egypt, where the ad hoc committee accepted that both domestic 
law and international law could be simultaneously applied: “The law of host State can 
indeed be applied in conjunction with international law if this is justified. So too 
international law can be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other 
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ambit”313. But in Wena, the tribunal had already stated that the parties hadn’t made a 
“choice of law under the first sentence of Article 42(1)”314, and this circumstance 
facilitated that broad margin of interpretation to include IL.  
It seems difficult to understand why the first sentence of article 42(1) would exclude 
general international law, when appropriate. It looks like legal juggling the requirement 
to place ourselves in the context of the second sentence –art. 42(1), before allowing the 
use of international law: nor the first nor the second sentence should, in principle, 
exclude international law. In support of this reasoning, the tribunal has clarified that 
both international law and domestic law are applicable jointly: “international law is 
fully applicable and to classify its role as ‘only’ ‘supplemental and corrective’ seems a 
distinction without a difference”315, therefore rejecting a simplistic and reductionist 
approach to international law. 
Interestingly, in AAPL vs. Sri Lanka, the tribunal made an unprecedented effort of 
systematisation of the ICSID case-law: a unique proposal of rules of interpretation, 
according to which “[i]n addition to the ‘integral context’ [of the treaty or contract], 
‘object and intent’, ‘spirit’, ‘objectives’, ‘comprehensive construction of the treaty as a 
whole’, recourse to the rules and principles of IL has to be considered a necessary factor 
providing guidance within the process of treaty interpretation”, and “establishing the 
practice followed through comparative law survey of all relevant precedents becomes an 
extremely useful tool to provide an authoritative interpretation”316.  
In light of this, there are no contracts without law, nor contracts overruling legal 
systems: in AAPL, the company maintained that Sri Lanka had failed to protect the 
investment since “the Parties [to the BIT] substituted the ‘due diligence’ standard of 
general international law by a new obligation creating an obligation to achieve a result 
(‘obligation de résultat’), providing the foreign investor a sort of ‘insurance’ against the 
risk of having his investment destroyed under whatever circumstances”317. But the 
                                                          
313
 ICSID: Wena Hotels Ltd. vs. Arab Republic of Egypt, Annulment Proceeding, Decision of 5 February 
2002, Case No. ARB/98/4, para. 40.  
314
 Ibíd., para. 36.  
315
 ICSID: Amco vs. Indonesia, Resubmitted Case, Award of 5 June 1990, Case No. ARB/81/1, para. 40.  
316
 ICSID: AAPL vs. Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award of 27 June 1990, Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 40 
(« rules D and E »).  
317
 Ibíd., para. 45.  
99 
 
tribunal finds that applicable law is a “false problem”318 and that a BITs interpretation 
that implies a higher exigency of due diligence against Sri Lanka is inconsistent with 
general international law, since it disregarded the fact that “rules of international law 
have to be taken into consideration by necessary implication, and not be deemed totally 
excluded as alleged by the Claimant”319 –here is also the limit of the prevalence of any 
lex specialis. So it seems that general international law is not excluded in none of the 
two sentences of article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, provided the situation 
sufficiently justifies it. 
SPP vs. Egypt constitutes a milestone in the ICSID jurisprudence. First of all, it 
confirmed the above considerations on a broader role for International Law, well above 
the traditional supplemental and corrective functions. It was ruled that the arbitral 
committee can make a reference to International Law and thus change the effects of the 
Parties’ choice of law, if necessary. This is the case even when such a choice of law is 
clear, in order to avoid a violation of IL by the “exclusive application of municipal 
law”320. In effect, nobody can ignore that the autonomous and isolated recourse to the 
law designated by the parties as applicable, at end of the day, can be in conflict with 
International Law, and not necessarily because internal legislation is ‘incomplete’ or 
‘incorrect’, but simply because an isolated application –by itself– can produce unlawful 
results. 
SPP vs. Egypt is also important because it allows us to address our second question, the 
place of human rights. This case concerns the annulment and expropriation of a tourism 
investment project following to the discovery of archaeologic remains –it was baptized 
“the pyramids case”. The company, Southern Pacific Properties, led a joint venture, 
which had already initiated the works by July 1977. After the discovery at the end of 
that year, public opposition increased against the project and pushed for a legislative 
change to protect cultural rights (art. 15 ICESCR) and, specifically, cultural heritage in 
line with the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, which entered into force in Egypt in December 1975. In 1979, at the initiative 
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of Egypt, the UNESCO Committee was requested to inscribe the Pyramids plateau as 
World Heritage Site, implying the maximum protection. According to the arbitral 
tribunal, the obligation to compensate an expropriation remains: the expropriation is 
considered legal under International Law and “an unquestionable attribute of 
sovereignty”321. The obligation to pay an adequate “compensation for a lawful 
expropriation” is not the same as a “reparation for an injury caused by an illegal act 
such as a breach of contract”322. Of course, the lawfulness of Egypt’s action does not 
diminish the expropriatory nature of the measure imposed, and to expect anything else 
is just unrealistic. But the role of the UNESCO Convention is also important when 
calculating the adequate compensation: first of all, it is precisely limited to a 
“compensation” and does not include any “reparation” since it was a lawful 
expropriation; and secondly, given that no reparation is foreseen, the arbitral tribunal 
decides that the investors are not entitled to any lucrum cessans after the date of the 
entry into force of the UNESCO Convention (1979)323 –a by no means negligible 
economic saving for the State324. 
We must be cautious and realistic: in CDSE vs. Costa Rica, the principle by which any 
expropriation is subject to compensation was confirmed, “no matter how laudable and 
beneficial to society as a whole […] even for environmental purposes”325 –in that case, 
to protect biodiversity. Only in case of unlawfulness of the measure, the investor would 
further be entitled to reparations and lucrum cessans. The “international source of the 
obligation to protect the environment”326 (we might add, human rights in general) does 
not always make a difference: it is also a problem of legal certainty with regard to 
guarantee private property and protect foreign investors, so as to promote States’ 
awareness of their own responsibilities and commitments before concluding contracts 
and accepting investments.  
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Regarding contracts and investments, States must conduct their own studies before 
committing themselves to new obligations. In Metalclad vs. Mexico, also touching on 
environmental issues but under NAFTA, a company incorporated in the USA had 
obtained a Mexican federal authorisation to build an hazardous waste transfer station 
and landfill in the valley of La Pedrera (Guadalcazar –Mexico), but the local authorities 
refused to issue the final building authorisation for environmental reasons. The arbitral 
tribunal logically considers that Metalclad “was led to believe, and did believe, that the 
federal and state permits allowed for the construction and operation of the landfill”327 
and the company “was merely acting prudently and in the full expectation that the 
permit would be granted”328. Again, human rights are not a trumpery excuse for States’ 
internal administrative chaos and lack of legal certainty. 
In sum, our discussion on the place of public international law and, subsidiarily, of 
human rights law, in relation to investment law, is not intended to demonstrate that 
IHRL and investment protection are “interdependent” –the ICSID already ruled they are 
not329, but to show that international investments have to be contextualised and 
integrated into general international law as a whole, which is a less audacious approach 
with a sounder legal footing. 
Indeed, the political discourse under which human rights obligations need to be 
prioritised over investment protection constitutes a dialectic trap without fundament in 
many cases, used by some States as a shortcut to wash their image and bypass internal 
inconsistencies. In our view, this kind of reasoning will probably be unacceptable for an 
arbitral tribunal in almost any situation, not even in the case of a developing country. 
For example, in Klöckner vs. Cameroon I, the award established that the company had 
failed to duly inform the State of the changing economic scenario in 1973, which would 
render the industrial investment unprofitable. The corporation therefore breached its 
obligation of full disclosure between partners, so the compensation would be limited to 
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the facilities already built and in use. However, as a commentator points out, the 
tribunal took care not to leave the door opened to the ‘right to development’330: 
obviously, one can ask if Cameroon wasn’t also able to learn on its own the worsening 
of the economic scenario by 1973, if it is enough to be a developing country to allege 
that the States’ capacities are reduced (in terms of access to financial advice and 
information). However, the award took a rather classic stand: the contractual 
relationship between Klöckner and Cameroon apparently implied that the company was 
responsible for all the phases of the project, from information and financial 
perspectives, to proper works. The failure to disclose all available information to a 
partner, including a damnun emergens, was sufficient to demonstrate a lack of “good 
faith” on the company’s side, avoiding the debate on Cameroon’s ability to detect on his 
own the economic crisis of 1973. 
Our “integrationist perspective”331 of investment law within general international law 
shouldn’t be understood as challenging the specificity of arbitral rulings, whose centre 
will remain commercial matters. Human rights can play a role in investment arbitration, 
but States’ powers to protect alleged public interests are not a passe-partout: IL does 
not allow States to disregard any of its international obligation; they are “subject to both 
international obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty obligations, and must respect both 
of them equally”332. With regard to water and sanitation, an ICSID tribunal has clarified 
this problem: 
« En réalité, les droits de l’homme en général, et le droit à l’eau en 
particulier, constituent l’une des diverses sources que le Tribunal devra 
prendre en compte pour résoudre le différend car ces droits sont élevés 
au sein du système juridique argentin au rang de droits constitutionnels, 
et, de plus, ils font partie des principes généraux du droit international. 
[…] Mais ces prérogatives sont compatibles avec les droits des 
investisseurs à recevoir la protection offerte par l’APRI. […] Mais 
l’exercice de ces pouvoirs ne se fait pas de façon absolue et doit, au 
contraire, être conjugué avec le respect des droits et des garanties 
octroyés à l’investisseur étranger en vertu de l’APRI […] 
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Contrebalancer ces deux principes sera la tâche que le Tribunal devra 
effectuer lors de son analyse des prétentions substantives […] ».333  
In the context of the serious Argentinian debt crisis in 2001 and 2002, which led to a 
‘corralito’ (bank freeze), it has been argued that the ‘state of necessity’ (a situation of 
economic emergency) justified the State’s failure to satisfy the rights of international 
holders of sovereign bonds. This led to a variety of arbitral awards with mixed results 
depending on the BIT applicable; in Impregilo, many authors regret that the arbitrators 
considered that Argentina itself had contributed to the financial crisis and that there was 
no justification to recur to ‘state of necessity’ allegations, on which it is said that too 
strict criteria were established334. But one may ask if we really think that Argentina did 
not contribute to the worsening of the financial situation –if not to its origin, starting 
with inadequate currency policies, like the creation of a new currency (the austral) in 
1983, which required new loans and inflated public debt, alarmingly increasing inflation 
rates, not to mention widespread corruption. The major lesson learnt from that crisis is 
that exception clauses, comprising non-precluded measures (for economic or 
whatsoever reasons), could be added to BITs so as to face economic emergencies while 
overcoming the unfortunate lack of a treaty or articles adopted on States’ responsibility, 
which would have probably clarified the notion of ‘state of necessity’ as in the project 
of the ILC.  
In any case, it has been said that such exception clauses can be interpreted as a lex 
specialis that somehow annuls the stricter requirements of customary international law 
to effectively put forward a state of necessity335; however, we think this consists of 
playing the game of those interested in the fragmentation of IL. The real lex specialis is 
the bilateral treaty and not a clause within it. It would be wiser to argue that such an 
exception clause is, as its very name indicates, an exception to the BIT, which is the real 
lex specialis. In this way, the proper lex specialis –the BIT, incorporates an exception 
clause aimed at reintroducing general international law into the BIT (like the state of 
necessity). If human rights clauses or general exception clauses are added to new 
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generation BITs, it is not to play the game of fragmentation and allege their character of 
lex specialis to ensure their primacy; on the contrary, it is to reflect the relational 
character of IL and that investment treaties operate within a wider legal context that 
may include human rights or the state of necessity. Legal doctrine has to adequately 
interpret those clauses as an open window for general international law and a way to 
effectively consider the relational character between competing regimes under IL (like 
investment protection and human rights). Such clauses should not be read in terms of a 
lex specialis within the lex specialis. Such clauses can precise and clarify some 
customary practices in the subject of ‘state of necessity’ –given that there is room for 
clarification since the General Assembly did not adopt the ILC draft articles on the 
responsibility of States. In this sense, States further have the opportunity, through those 
clauses, to specify and detail –to their liking– a consuetudine, without further 
contributing to the so-called ‘self-contained regimes’. In this sense, a spread practice 
that includes those clauses on human rights and state of necessity can be beneficial in 
the long term, provided we understand them in line with the relational character of IL.  
In any of the previous situations, the compatibility between IHRL and investment 
protection will naturally depend on the availability of an “alternative that is […] least 
inconsistent”336 with the BIT, MIA or Contract at stake. A different approach to the 
dialectic between investments and human rights will be likely to fail, as well as the 
misuse of human rights to hide legal uncertainty or to withdraw ex post risky 
investments not duly evaluated in advance. These considerations are essential to assess 
if “measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to 
the protection legally granted to investments” 337, as noted in an interesting case where 
the arbitral tribunal directly cites the ECHR to build this concept of proportionality. 
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Yet States do not always win these cases –sometimes because the arbitral tribunal finds 
their human rights allegations abusive or elusive of other international obligations, the 
open possibilities shouldn’t be neglected. All these cases constitute an important 
improvement in the overall because the evolution shows an increasing openness. States 
will have to make a genuine effort to duly prove their human rights allegations, the 
proportionality of the measures adopted, the compatibility with investment protection, 
as required by the above cited jurisprudence. Certainly, it is still not clear to what extent 
an arbitral tribunal –such as the ICSID– might put into practice this linkage: at first 
sight, investment headquarters don’t seem the place to protect human rights. It doesn’t 
look as if it was a competency of those tribunals. Furthermore, arbitrators are commonly 
selected amongst lawyers and litigators with sufficient practice in international 
commercial law, and logically not in public international law. The growing number of 
ICJ judges that also act as arbitrators (not being incompatible), may change the 
historical lack of public international law perspectives within investment disputes. 
However, it is interesting to note that there is nothing stopping one of the parties from 
proposing a human rights expert as an arbitrator, at least in some cases, obviously 
jointly with commercial lawyers in the arbitral tribunal. Nevertheless, the language of 
investment contracts usually lacks of this level of concreteness and specificity. 
From a pragmatic approach, a high specialisation in international commercial law is 
perfectly understandable; the easiest desirable solution could be double: a) to provide 
arbitrators with a human rights perspective that might complete their assessment of the 
facts; b) to make sure that the contract includes at least one general reference to 
“general international law and other international obligations of the State” in line with 
the usually vague language of these contracts. Historically speaking, international 
investment law was born to protect investors, who traditionally were the main 
beneficiaries of arbitration; this has changed and States’ legitimate interests are now 
“protected” in more and more cases338 and some general interests have found a place, 
even anti-corruption339. 
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We don’t forget either that arbitrations are conducted in closed sessions, making it 
difficult to know the comparative importance given to human rights or non-investment 
issues, and their final weight, except when the arbitral award is explicit and public. It is 
true that an increasing number of decisions are made public and transparency is wider, 
since Metalclad vs. Mexico (cited above), the first time an amicus curiae submission 
was accepted, which is a consolidated practice by now340. Acting more boldly, but less 
realistically, we could also think of including specific human rights clauses in bilateral 
investment treaties or some kind of reference to the protection of human rights and its 
levels of obligations, both for States and investors. 
Investment contracts could eventually be revised in order to include a clause by virtue 
of which the investors accept the obligation to respect international human rights law. 
However, as we have said above, this is an unlikely event: companies pressure States 
affirming that specific human rights legislation could decrease the economic growth and 
the benefits expected from the project.  If a State assumes this reasoning, it should be 
considered to constitute a breach of its responsibility with regards to human rights. To 
sum up, under the light of public international law, an investment contract should be 
interpreted in a way that a State action to protect human rights cannot be considered 
contrary to any investment contract, or impeding its development, and of course would 
not constitute a reason for the termination of the contract. This does not mean that 
investors will be left unprotected: we have seen that the open windows for human rights 
protection do not challenge the essential principles of investment law. Depending on the 
strength of the public goals pursued by the State, the amount of eventual compensations 
might vary; and reparations might be excluded, only if States act more responsibly 
when juggling with their diverse international obligations and their internal problems.  
 
Conclusion 
There are signs of hope but the work is still incomplete to ensure respect for human 
rights with reference to international investments. Transparency on the content and 
scope of the projects being financed is absolutely crucial, as well as the content of 
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investment contracts and international agreements –of course, without disseminating 
confidential issues that can be important for private companies in front of their 
competitors. 
All in all, human rights mainstreaming is an idealistic strategy to include HR within the 
contractual framework and, even before, during its negotiation. The solution can be both 
pragmatic and holistic:  
-reinforce multilateralism and the role of IOs to offset the negative effects of a 
mainly bilateral or simply contractual system of regulating international investments341. 
Multilateral fora are more likely to promote consistency at an international level, by 
avoiding undue legal fragmentation, fostering policy transfers and proposing model 
BITs and MIA together with additional interpretative instruments able to consolidate an 
opinio iuris in favour of consolidating the human rights’ transversality. 
-means of dispute settlement can be provided with a human rights-based 
approach when necessary, which is not a threat to the central place of international 
commercial law, but taking into account that States have concurring international 
obligations; 
-general exceptions clauses could be put in place in model BITs, MIAs or 
contracts. Bearing in mind the tendency to vagueness or ambiguity in these instruments, 
a general mention to ‘international law principles and other international obligations’ 
could be enough to open some windows, read in conjunction with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. More specific formulas directly mentioning human 
rights might be studied (human rights clauses). The spread inclusion of such clauses can 
have customary effects in the long run and solve the problem of allegedly self-contained 
regimes.  
-in connection to this, further clarification could be made as for the role of 
general international law, which has been used so far to solve contradictions between IL 
and domestic law, or to complete the latter when necessary. The use of general 
international law could be extended to include core internationally recognised human 
rights principles if necessary. The practice in this regard shows some open windows to 
be further developed. 
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-it could finally be envisaged to require that potential concessionary companies 
(or consortium of companies) have CSR measures and codes of conduct, extended to 
subcontractors. In parallel, it has to be studied to what extent the existence of codes of 
conduct, made public and approved at the senior level of TNCs, can have a “contractual 
value” in the context of a dispute. At least, such a development may not be discarded ad 
futuram, if the international practice continues in the same direction342. 
Many States are developing Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines and NAPs, 
conscious that a soft law instrument can contribute to the improvement of their respect 
for human rights, in the understanding that human rights are a transversal interest within 
the international society and, if a hard law perspective is finally needed, it should be 
made available and mainstreamed within the means of dispute settlement without 
challenging the specificities and central place of commercial matters. More importantly, 
a current trend shows that more and more States include general non-investment clauses 
in BITs and MIA: an early precedent is the Netherlands-Costa Rica BIT (1999) 
expressly “including its laws and regulation on labour and environment”, or even in the 
multilateral Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, investments might be 
subject to environmental and social impact assessments343. The spread of these “new 
generation BITs”344 would support the consolidation of an international practice in this 
regard and building a wider consensus in the long run. Individuals have the rights to 
claim against the investing company and access to justice has to be guaranteed, up to 
the exhaustion of domestic remedies (with the well-known exceptions of unreasonable 
delays, ineffective or unavailable appeals). Otherwise the equality before the law is 
seriously undermined and non-discrimination is a general principle that, whether or not 
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a State has ratified a particular treaty, is considered customary international law. No 
investment contract may operate outside this frame even though the success or failure of 
developing these niches of opportunity (for human rights within investment law) will 
depend on the States’ good faith when it comes to put it into practice. 
 
2.2.2 Screening the WTO: open windows 
The approach to this subject is recurrently passionate: if it is true that trade is about 
business and business is about competition and private benefits, we need to 
acknowledge that it makes sense to promote a trade culture that respects consumers’ 
rights to the extent trade doesn’t happen without consumers. As investment contracts 
are not, by themselves, ontologically opposed to human rights, multilateral trade 
agreements aren’t necessarily a threat to consumers’ rights. We face, of course, a 
number of conflicting interests: States, TNCs, lobbies, media, NGO’s and CSO’s, 
individuals and international organisations. There are, also, shared responsibilities. This 
said, we would falsify the debate if we shift responsibility only towards consumers: it 
would be impossible for every single consumer to ethically evaluate every product he or 
she buys before purchasing it. Responsibility is also sitting on the rest of actors. 
 
WTO’s institutional role in context 
Trade has suffered substantial changes in the second half of the twentieth century, 
starting with the rising exchange of intermediate goods instead of final products. 
Commercial services grow faster and are the biggest part of international trade in a 
context of constant decline of communication and transportation costs. A more recent 
change is the growing importance of services –the enablers of global value chains. 
Comparative advantages are in intermediate goods and not anymore in final products so 
that countries can specialise in tasks within the framework of a more and more 
knowledge-based economy345. In fact, the so-called global value chains are not chains 
                                                          
345
 The following pages of this manual will provide a good explanation of the types of intra-industrial and 
inter-industrial specialisation, changing current comparative advantages in relation to global value chains, 
at: M. CARRERA TROYANO, D. de DIEGO ÁLVAREZ and R. HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍN: “Lección 8. 
Comercio internacional” in J.A. ALONSO (Dir.): Lecciones sobre Economía Mundial. Introducción al 
110 
 
anymore, but networks, generally dominated by three regions (North America, Asia and 
Europe).  
A good example is the study made by Rivoli346, who has tracked the supply chain of a 
simple t-shirt, from the cotton grown in Texas, to its manufacture in Shangai, its 
printing back to the US (logos), and finally placed in the international markets, even 
sent to Tanzania shredded as furniture padding. We are witness to a highly fragmented 
production system where supply chains are obscure for most of the consumers; there is 
almost no person who knows all steps of a product. Decisions are, in turn, distributed in 
this global network. Another challenge in the internet era is data protection and the 
acceleration of exchanges, where legislation is still slow to meet consumers’ problems. 
On the other side, we find difficulties for small and medium producers/traders to reach 
international routes. We also find a number of legal gaps despite the intense 
international transactions. A recurrent cause of disagreement we should keep in mind is 
the continued subsidies in OECD countries, especially in the agricultural sector. And 
finally, we tend to obviate that trade is an easy victim of other political tensions, which 
are immediately reflected in multilateral fora347.  
Beyond the directly related human rights issues of international trade348, we can also ask 
ourselves a more general question: is there a clear link between globalisation and 
income inequality? Do we find a substantial relationship of cause and effect between 
trade liberalisation and unemployment, especially during the current economic crisis? 
Of course, we cannot give a definitive and rigorous response as far as the economists 
don’t agree in this respect. Up to a certain point, economic openness promoted by the 
WTO can increase income inequality to the extent networks and conditions need to be 
developed to participate in and benefit from global markets. On-going adjustments are 
more or less painful, even in the OECD countries, depending on their level of previous 
preparation to markets instability through consistent and proficient public policies. 
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It goes without saying that trade liberalisation has a potential for growth and 
development but is insufficient to make widely available the benefits from global value 
chains: “[n]ot all countries, firms and workers are equally prepared for the adjustments 
associated with more integrated markets”349. There are always particularities that make 
different the situation from a country to another; nevertheless, it is strongly advisable to 
maintain a sustained investment in education, skills and training, combined with social 
protection systems (regardless of the chosen formula) and comprehensive labour 
policies. These policies soften the adjustments to markets volatility and make it easier to 
prepare the country’s workforce to changing supply-demand dynamics. 
A nuanced discussion would recognize the possibilities of trade to generate growth and 
development, but would point out that the benefits of increasing trade are unequally 
distributed so that complementary policies are needed to accompany trade liberalisation 
towards a more equitable international order. Sustainable development means, 
primarily, a sustainable and respectful use of resources, not an idealistic renunciation to 
use them. Consumers’ education and awareness has to be fostered, together with 
capacity building initiatives in the developing countries to tackle corrupted regimes and 
expand democracy and the rule of law. We lack of a holistic approach in which trade 
facilitation of goods and services is oriented to make benefits accessible to the poorest 
regions and people350. 
When international organisations are accused of ineffectiveness and helplessness, then 
again it reflects the situation of the member States as member-driven organisations. 
First of all, State representatives usually have a very slight margin of negotiation when 
plenary debates take place (red lines are tight). Secondly, the home countries’ situation 
holds back many possible improvements, because of the multiple political and legal 
systems and, in many occasions, due to lacks of good governance. Finally, even in the 
best case scenario, we come across uncertain domestic determinants (from elections to a 
wide range of political imponderables). In sum, a basic mismatch persists: trade is not 
sufficiently mainstreamed in development strategies and, at the same time, human rights 
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aren’t adequately mainstreamed in trade policies. Simultaneously, the work of different 
international organisations still lacks of coordination. 
From an institutional perspective351, the WTO replaces GATT 1947, as the result of the 
Uruguay Round (1986), culminating in the Marrakesh Agreement (1994), which entered 
into force in 1995. Biannual ministerial conferences or rounds mark the agenda and 
conclude binding subsequent agreements352, added to the diverse treaties on specific 
trade issues. The main purpose of the organisation remains trade liberalisation through 
the elimination of trade barriers, i.e., against trade tariffs and all forms of protectionism 
and discrimination of products. With over 162 member-States (Afghanistan will be the 
163rd member by June 2016), and 34 members considered Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), the WTO is no longer a club of developed and like-minded States, but has 
evolved into a strongly multilateral forum. Perhaps the other side of the coin is the 
lengthier process of negotiations and less outcomes from trade talks and rounds. 
With its pros and cons, the institutional role has to be analysed in light of a prominent 
particularity of the WTO compared to other international economic organisations: the 
WTO is the only international economic organisation that follows the system one 
member – one vote, more typical of IOs of political character. For instance, we shall 
further note that WTO membership necessarily implies accepting its jurisdictional 
organs and their decisions, with a unique force among international organisations (the 
Dispute Settlement Body –DSB). No member of the WTO can opt-out of this settlement 
mechanism. In more general terms, and despite its relatively reduced administrative 
structure in Geneva (Switzerland), we can distinguish four functions of the WTO,  all of 
them highlighting the solidity of its institutional role353: an executive function (the 
application of the Marrakesh Agreement and subsequent trade agreements), a 
jurisdictional function (the administration of the DSB), a legislative function (creates 
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the institutional framework and become the forum for consecutive binding agreements 
and decisions through Ministerial Rounds or the General Council’s regular meetings), 
and finally, a function of participation in international relations (coordinating itself with 
the IMF, WB, WHO, ILO, when appropriate, in economic and developmental issues). 
Strength and flexibility equally characterise the WTO’s institutional building, the first 
because of its capacity to produce major legislative changes on global trade rules, and 
the second because, at the same time, it shows an undeniable capacity to adapt itself to 
changing scenarios, starting with its re-founding in 1994. The increase of amicus curiae 
submissions to Panels and the AB is another example of flexibility or, if we insist in 
talking in negative terms, maybe an “acrobatic”354, but useful interpretation of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (art. 13). In the pursuit of transparency and public 
participation, an annual forum is organised in Geneva’s headquarters, where a good 
amount of NGOs’ and CSOs’ representatives can raise their voice, though with mixed 
results. In the course of 2014 Annual Forum355, a disenchanted Argentinian trade-
unionist ironically described the “cathartic effect” of a 10 hours flight to Switzerland to 
raise his voice in front of “circumspect” WTO officers that will gently listen to his 
complaints and regrets, on the lack of further agreements after Doha and on the 
continuation of more SME-inclusive initiatives. A better trade system may be imagined, 
but the fact is also that CSOs’ and NGOs’ representatives continue to attend those 
meetings, which originally constituted an institutional improvement. 
An additional example of evolution and institutional flexibility is the way development 
has reached an unexpected place in international trade rules and debates. The 
relationship between development and human rights, and their compatibility with the 
WTO founding purposes, has caused an endless debate with a good amount of wishful 
thinking, especially after the Doha Round introduced the so-called ‘development 
mandate’ into the WTO356. The importance of Doha’s Ministerial Declaration lies in the 
explicit pro-developing countries language, emphasizing that “no country should be 
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prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment at the levels it considers appropriate”357, provided they are 
made consistently with WTO agreements and they do not disguise protectionist 
measures. This stronger developmental approach was later confirmed in Hong Kong 
(2005) and, ever since, the organisation’s work entails a more sensitive approach to 
non-trade-related issues, expressly encouraging coordination with other international 
organisations to undertake capacity-building and technical assistance in development 
issues. In short, the WTO’s developmental vocation at an institutional level was not 
born at Doha, despite the profuse literature in this line; it could be said that it was 
reinforced in 2001, but one should recall –under GATT 1947– the Enabling Clause of 
1979, according to which preferential treatment could be granted to developing 
countries, temporarily annulling MFN obligations, in so far as they are generalised, non-
reciprocal and non-discriminatory358. Development was, therefore, latent in the WTO’s 
institutional practice well before Doha, without denying the moderate importance of 
2001 Round. 
Major changes have been adopted at the latest Ministerial Conference in Nairobi (15-19 
December 2015), including quite significant progresses in the elimination of agricultural 
subsidies. As of January 2016, developed countries immediately commit to end 
subsidies on farm products; developing countries359 will do so by 2018 with a flexibility 
calendar until 2023 to cover transport costs and marketing difficulties; and least 
developed countries, until 2030. The financial crisis since 2008 has generated instability 
in the stock markets, affecting commodities and primary products –a tragic example is 
the rise of the price of corn. At the same time and paradoxically, depending on the 
markets fluctuations, imports of primary products (or even food aid) from developed 
and developing countries into LDCs notably increases the supply in LDCs, imbalances 
their internal market and dramatically reduces the prices for local producers, creating at 
the end similar problems. With food security under threat, many LDCs and some 
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developing countries put in place public stockholding programmes (for cases of sudden 
rise in prices) and tariffs (for eventual rapid import surges) to address both 
problematics. Already established in Doha Round and confirmed in 2005 in Hong 
Kong, a Special Safeguard Mechanism was a tool to face suddenly increasing imports, 
to provide “the flexibility to self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as 
Special Products guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood 
security and rural development”, and “based on import quantity and price triggers”360.  
For the moment, Nairobi’s package does not provide a definitive solution in this regard, 
but provisionally allows Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, as well as the 
extension of the Special Safeguard Mechanism while negotiations continue, that means 
at least until the next negotiation round in 2017. Finally, there are very concrete 
successes for LDCs, mainly sub-Saharan African countries: the ministerial conference 
approved preferential rules of origin to determine when a product is ‘made in an LDC’ –
products can use foreign materials provided they constitute less than 75% of the final 
value of the product; also from 1 January 2016, cotton from LDCs will have quota-free 
and duty-free access to the markets of developed countries and those of developing 
countries willing to do so, while it foresees the immediate prohibition of cotton 
subsidies in developed countries and the progressive prohibition in developing ones. A 
different Ministerial Decisions extended the waiver on MFN obligations under the 
GATS to allow preferential treatment to LDC services and service suppliers for an 
additional period of 15 years (until 2030), with a view to address the historic delay of 
these countries in trade in services.  
It is early to know if Nairobi is a turning point, or even the “death of Doha”361 and a 
shift towards a more pragmatic, consensus-based and item-by-item approach so as to 
ensure delivering results. The link between trade and development might receive a new 
long-term impulse because of 2008 crisis362. There was an undeniable need to unblock 
the remaining issues of Doha’s Work Program and to reinforce or revitalise the global 
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institutional role of the WTO, moreover taking into consideration the spread of regional 
trade arrangements outside the WTO and, very prominently, the US initiatives with the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the parallel Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership with the EU (still in negotiation). Regardless of future changes, it can be 
concluded that this institutional profile facilitates the WTO substantive contribution, 
though some natural limitations remain. 
 
WTO’s substantive contribution 
On the substance, there are numerous human rights’ aspects of international trade and 
there are open possibilities to introduce non-trade-related issues into the WTO practice. 
Similarly to what has been argued with regard to development and its origins well 
before the Doha Round, the “GATT-WTO legal regime already harbors a number of 
putatively human rights-based principles”363, as noted by Prof. David Kinley referring 
to non-discrimination between trading nations, the inclusion of intellectual property 
rights after TRIPS Agreement, and the significant precedent of article XX of GATT 
1947 as an exception clause. 
Precisely article XX of GATT has inspired the rest of general exception clauses in the 
following multilateral trade agreements, in order to allow measures “necessary to 
protect public morals”, “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, 
“relating to the products of prison labour”, or “imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”. Article XIV of GATS foresees, 
mutatis mutandis, the same exceptions, to which it adds “the privacy of individuals” and 
“safety”. Article XXIII of the Public Procurement Agreement includes in its first 
paragraph an exception for national security reasons and, in the second comma, the 
general exception clause according to which “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent any Party from imposing or enforcing measures: necessary to 
protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plan life or health or 
intellectual property, or relating to the products or services of handicapped persons, of 
philanthropic institutions o of prison labour”. Article 27(2) of TRIPS assumes that, if 
“necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
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plan life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment”, inventions may be 
excluded from patentability. TRIPS Agreement also establishes that intellectual 
protection “may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use” even 
though in these situations “the right holder shall […] be notified as soon as reasonably 
practicable”. Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement further recognises “legitimate 
objectives” in a broad manner since it makes a non-exhaustive list:  “Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive 
practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment”. Finally, article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement limits sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures to “the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health” and “based on scientific principles, and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence”, obviously complicating our debate.  
Compared to investment treaties and contracts, the language of WTO Agreements 
suggests, at first sight, a more embracive relationship between trade regulation and non-
economic concerns, but this optimism has to be balanced with the organisation’s 
practice in the field. Continuing similarly to investment cases, we shall first assess the 
linkage to general international law and, in a second stage, examine those “open 
windows” for human rights. Besides these latent human rights aspects in the exception 
clauses cited above, it is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) who has opened those 
windows, sometimes in the form of a panel’s report and, in other occasions, the 
Appellate Body (AB), which is the last instance in the dispute settlement procedure as 
foreseen by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
For instance, many disputes support our integrationist approach, against the 
fragmentation of International Law through allegedly autonomous self-contained 
regimes, so we may only mention a few famous cases chosen for their expressiveness. 
The Appellate Body (AB) promptly clarified that the General Agreement “is not to be 
read in clinical isolation from public international law” and directly cited the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties364, when interpreting the scope of article XX GATT 
(commas b) and g)). From the perspective on general international law, the AB has 
further expressed that its work has to be “faithful to the ‘customary rules of 
                                                          
364
 WTO (AB): United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the 
Appellate Body, 29 April 1996, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17.  
118 
 
interpretation of public international law’”, and very eloquently added: “WTO rules are 
not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting 
the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real 
world”365, thus sustaining an evolving and progressive development of International 
Law, closer to the material reality366. In the same vein, the AB has aligned itself with 
the “contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment”, implicitly recognising that there are common 
interests of the international society, such as “sustainable development”, as included in 
the preamble of GATT 1994. Moreover, it has adopted a progressive approach to 
evaluate the meaning of ‘natural resources’ in art. XX(g) GATT, a term that “is not 
‘static’ in its content or reference but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’”367. WTO 
Agreement should not be interpreted literally, but finalistically in accordance with the 
preamble of WTO Agreement, which “gives colour, texture and shading to the rights 
and obligations”368. 
Bearing in mind this framework, recourse to exception clauses and public international 
law is obviously not unconditional. The first paragraph of article XX GATT details the 
chapeau under which it can be used. In sum, the reasoning has two steps: the measures 
at the origin of the dispute must fall within the scope of the exception clauses; and 
secondly, it must also be demonstrated that they are consistent with the chapeau to 
avoid a misuse or abuse of article XX GATT.  
It is worth citing two precedents under GATT 1947. In Thailand-Cigarettes the Panel 
used this test on equivalent domestic measures to prove that Thailand’s prohibition of 
American cigarettes disguised a protectionist initiative to benefit local production. The 
test must assess that measures are “necessary” to protect a public interest enshrined in 
art. XX GATT, i.e., “only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the 
General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it”, and “provided they do not thereby 
accord treatment to imported products less favourable than that accorded to ‘like’ 
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products of national origin”369. Thailand-Cigarettes case was also a landmark because 
of the important submission by the WHO, an example of coordination between 
international organisations. Also under GATT 1947, in a case between the US and 
Canada on the protection of tuna in line with the International Convention on the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, the Panel decided to adopt, without consequences, its 
report despite the previous amicable conciliation between the parties outside the 
DSB370. The Panel observed that trade exceptions based on environmental concerns are 
not allegeable to hide other interests –in that case, the US non-recognition of Canadian 
sovereignty over tuna in its Atlantic coastal waters, initiating the WTO dispute when 
Canada seized US-flagged fishing vessels371.  
After 1995, the WTO has continued this practice while further detailing the exact 
conditions laid down by the chapeau of art. XX GATT. In US-Gasoline, the AB stated 
that the import restrictions had no equivalent internal measures in the US; therefore, 
though clean air may fall within the scope of art. XX, the US failed to demonstrate that 
the measure adopted was consistent with equivalent measures at a domestic level, and 
the AB concluded that the US put forward biased environmental purposes to actually 
grant privileges to internal producers of gasoline372. When dealing with Japan’s higher 
taxes for foreign alcoholic beverages, alleging public health concerns, the AB similarly 
ruled that, though possibly falling under the scope of art. XX GATT, the measure 
unfairly discriminated foreign like-products, in comparison to local alcoholic 
beverages373. In relation to the protection of sea turtles threatened by shrimp fishing 
methods, the AB finally decided that import restrictions of shrimps put in place by the 
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US fell within the scope of art. XX (g), were consistent with equivalent internal 
measures, but were too “rigid” and, at the end, extraterritorially imposed an excessively 
concrete fishing method and a particular certification scheme, which went beyond a 
reasonable, environmentally finalistic requirement to allow third States’ imports of 
shrimps or shrimp products374.  
In all these cases, States are unsuccessful in alleging an exception under article XX. But 
in the practice of the DSB it starts to become clear that there is no fear to use general 
international law, through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and even 
including soft law instruments from other organisations to clarify, in a particular 
situation, the link to other International Law regimes and principles375. It has been said 
that a weakness of the WTO system is this process that imposes on States a sort of 
“probatio diabolica”376 to justify human rights exceptions. But we do not think it is a 
problem of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. For example, the assessment of 
“necessity” is more flexible that what it seems. According the DSB, the necessity to 
protect public goods “is not limited to what is indispensable”, given that it constitutes a 
“continuum”377 with different degrees of necessity, depending on the proportionality 
between the measures imposed and the ends pursued. In reality, it looks more like a 
triangle according to which the DSB carries a process of “weighing and balancing”378 of 
three factors: the measures adopted, the ends pursued, and their degree of WTO-Law 
consistency. When a more WTO-consistent measure is reasonably available, it is the 
one that States should put in place. As noted with investment disputes, human rights are 
not a shortcut for avoiding other international obligations without the due justification. 
If States don’t satisfy this test, it is because most of the times we find hidden purposes 
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to influence international trade or other non-trade related political and economic issues, 
which do not respond to genuine human rights’ concerns. 
A paradigmatic (and unique) case is precisely EC-Asbestos, where the then European 
Communities are able to show that asbestos prohibition is fully justified step by step: 
first, it falls within the scope of article XX GATT (in three areas: health, labour law and 
the environment); secondly, it complies with the conditions of the chapeau in the sense 
that measures adopted are proportional enough (to the ends pursued), necessary (a 
sufficient level of risk is shown) and non-discriminatory (they are applicable to the 
same product wherever it may come from, including domestic equivalent measures). 
Given that this test usually requires a variable level of scientific evidence, we cannot but 
praise the Panel’s acknowledgement that “it is not its function to settle a scientific 
debate” –that would amount to put an excessive burden of proof on defendants, but to 
“determine whether there is sufficient scientific evidence to conclude that there exists a 
risk for human life or health”379. The Panel’s decision was upheld by the Appellate 
Body in 2003 modifying some aspects of the reasoning but without touching on its 
essential structure. The evidence before the Panel “tend[ed] to show” that asbestos was 
“a risk to health rather than the opposite” and “[a]ccordingly, a decision-maker 
responsible for taking public health measures might reasonably conclude that the 
presence of chrysotile-cement products posed a risk”380. Interestingly, the Panel adopts 
this decision taking into consideration ILO Convention 162 on asbestos and the WHO 
list of carcinogenic products, being the first a hard law instrument and the latter a soft 
law guidance. Besides, we consider that “risks” are quite pragmatically interpreted by 
the Panel: there is no need to wait “until scientific certainty, which is often difficult to 
achieve, had been established over the whole of a particular field before public health 
measures could be implemented”381. This confirmed by the way the rather preventive 
approach of the EC-EU and its member States382. We infer that exceptions are perfectly 
defensible under the GATT’s notion of “risk”, if WTO-members succeed in passing the 
test.  
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This powerful and sound interpretative methodology to approach the GATT has been 
extended to other WTO Agreements by the DSB, progressively detailing the 
components of the chapeau, which is said to be just “but one expression of the principle 
of good faith […], the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, 
prohibit[ing] the abusive exercise of state’s rights”383. Of course, in the area of 
preventive human rights, grey zones are frequent and make it more necessary than ever 
to build solid defence strategies based on the WTO’s own practice. 
With regard to other multilateral trade agreements, the practice under GATT and the 
general logic explained so far, have been confirmed and extrapolated, mutatis mutandis. 
Under the SPS Agreement, the AB clarified that, in connection to risk assessments and 
sanitary measures, preventive measures or, in general, a “precautionary principle” is not 
part of customary international law yet (there is no consensus in that regard). Hence, 
prevention cannot “override”, by itself, other provisions of international trade 
agreements384. This is why a test is also needed to further analyse if preventive 
measures are justified under the exception clauses –the door is moderately opened.  
The SPS Agreement is, moreover, a good example of how the WTO promotes 
coordination between international organisations, recognising their work on standards, 
guidelines and recommendations, in relation to which States have room to establish 
higher levels of sanitary measures (art. 3.3). Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement 
establish a presumption of consistency with WTO-Law for measures taken in line with 
international soft law instruments (guidelines and standards). In principle, the logic rule 
goes: if A then B, no-A means no-B; but in social sciences and legal studies this is not 
necessarily the case. Indeed, the AB has ruled that the presumption of consistency for 
measures following international standards does not mean that measures taken outside 
those standards are presumed to be inconsistent. Otherwise, the legal value of these soft 
law guidelines would be excessive and defendants would have an unfair burden of 
proof. There may be sanitary measures, not already standardised at an international 
level, which are perfectly consistent with the SPS Agreement or, perhaps, be justifiable 
under an exception clause. That’s why claimants still have the duty to construct a 
sufficiently solid prima facie case, even when SPS measures are outside international 
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standards; only afterwards, it is the defendants’ turn to argue their case385. In other 
words, as in EC-Hormones, the fact that the EC measures did not follow a specific 
international standard did not “absolve” the US and Canada from showing there is a 
prima facie case of violation of the SPS Agreement. 
Unfortunately, the problem for the EC came later, to demonstrate a sufficient risk 
assessment: in that case, we rather argue that the EC’s priority should have been to put 
political pressure on other international organisations (mainly the ISO and WHO) in 
order to create guidelines on hormones and, in that process, influence its outcome so as 
to satisfy the EC’s sanitary concerns (indirectly affecting SPS trade rules). Put in other 
words, the SPS Agreement is probably the best example of “soft law instruments 
hardening up”386 through WTO’s practice, and this indirect way to influence SPS trade 
rules shouldn’t be undervalued. Concerning articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, 
also on international standards, in Tuna Dolphin II the AB has ruled that standards 
sourced from other organisations still have to be legitimate and, at times, a private 
standard might be “more legitimate” than a public one, or vice versa depending on the 
case, on its procedural foundations and technical aspects: CSR can play a prominent 
role in the harmonization of private and public, hard and soft instruments, even within 
trade disputes387. 
In sum, to simultaneously influence other standard-setting international organisations, 
private and public, can deem to be a wiser complementary strategy, like in a more 
recent WTO-complaint by the US on an EU ban of poultry meat treated with certain 
chemicals to reduce microbes –still pending388. It will also be interesting to see the 
evolution of case DS-495, where a Panel established in September 2015 will have to 
analyse the lawfulness of Korean extra-requirements on Japanese food products 
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regarding the presence of radionuclides after the nuclear accident at Fukushima back in 
2011. We will finally have to follow up the EU’s complaint on Russian import 
restrictions of live pigs and pork products, alleging concerns on African swine fever 
(dispute No. DS- 475), though one would hypothesize that the Ukrainian crisis had an 
influence –it chronologically coincided, in parallel to similar problems with European 
fruit products usually exported to the Russian Federation. 
In relation to the GATS Agreement, art. XIV a) was specifically addressed in US-
Gambling: when there are concurring international obligations, States’ good faith is 
demonstrated when they opt for the “least inconsistent” and “reasonably available” 
measure in terms of WTO law –just as with investment protection389. In that case, the 
US restrictions of internet-based gambling services, on the ground of public order, fell 
within the scope of the exception clause, but were found to be partially discriminatory 
because, in the particular area of horse racing, only domestic suppliers were exempted 
from the restrictions enacted, unlike foreign betting companies390. 
A different significant example is when former PM of Brazil Lula da Silva used the 
expression “a national interest” to define the fight against HIV/AIDS and, accordingly, 
find inapplicable patent legislation under the flexibility of article 31 of TRIPS 
agreement391, in coordination with the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the 
World Health Organisation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. This is an interesting case where we detect the important role of and interaction 
between international organisations and the possibilities they might offer. For good or 
for bad, one year after having filed a WTO complaint against Brazil, the US dropped it, 
so no Panel could finally discuss the question392. There is a very well-known debate 
between the access to medicines and the respect of intellectual property rights, which 
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have both a human rights’ dimension393: to balance the moral and economic rights of 
creators and inventors, on one hand, and the access to the benefits of science for the 
effective realisation of social rights, on the other hand. After the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the General Council adopted a waiver of art. 
31 for “eligible member States”394, mainly LDCs, who had poor pharmaceutical 
capacities, allowing them to issue “compulsory licences” to ensure access to certain 
medicines under clear conditions and supervision of the Council for TRIPS. In the 
meantime, Nairobi’s Ministerial Conference has agreed to extend the freezing of non-
violation and situation complaints dealing with TRIPS Agreement, at least until 2017 
when the ministerial conference will re-examine this issue.  
Of course, these actions do not solve the causes of pharmaceutical shortages for 
developing and least developed countries, but awareness is increasingly widespread395. 
Apart from compulsory licences, a different way to obtains medicines at better prices 
for developing countries and LDCs is “parallel imports”: once the patent owner 
consents to introduce a product in a particular market, it is understood that he loses 
control over its commercialisation and it can be resold to a third country wishing to 
benefit from a lower price, instead of buying it in the international markets. Parallel 
imports are not contemplated by TRIPS and simply constitute a tricky (though 
legitimate) circumvention of the treaty, whereas compulsory licences are limitedly 
justified under art. 31. These two flexibility strategies under TRIPS (compulsory 
licences and parallel imports) are, however, unlikely to bring about long-term solutions, 
unless we really solve the twofold root of the problem396: transfer of technology and 
capacity building together with further investigation on ‘neglected diseases’.  
A very frequent problem of TRIPS is the production of generic medicines and the 
patent’s owners enjoyment of their rights, while “both society and the scientist have a 
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legitimate interest”397 in using discoveries before the expiration of the 20-year patent 
term. In 1997 the European Communities filled a complaint against two aspects of a 
Canadian patent regulation, mainly affecting pharmaceutical products. In the first place, 
Canada had allowed eventual competitors of a patent owner to initiate the process of 
obtaining the relevant governmental permits before the patent term had expired, so that 
competitors could sell their products immediately after the end of the patent. The EC 
alleged that governmental regulations of pharmaceutical products actually reduce that 
20-year exclusivity, as a matter of fact circa 40/60% shorter, so that the marketing 
approval process for competitors shouldn’t be initiated before the exact end of the 
patent term, alleging it would be inconsistent with article 27 TRIPS. However, the Panel 
rejected this reasoning alluding to the above-cited “legitimate interests”, understood as a 
broader notion than mere ‘legal interests’398.  
As for the delays generated by public marketing licences, the Panel reframes or 
refocuses it on whether it is discriminatory or not. According to the Panel, all producers 
are subject to such reduction of the “effective period of market exclusivity”, so it is not 
discriminatory –implicitly confirming that the fact of alleging an exception clause does 
not liberate us from showing it is not used in a discriminatory manner. Many States, 
acting as third parties, were in favour of “granting compensatory patent term 
extensions” due to the regulatory delay that reduces de facto the effective period of 
patent exclusivity. However, the Panel interestingly noted there was still no 
international consensus with regard to such a compensatory extension of the patent 
term399, partially benefiting the prompter placing in the market of generic medicines 
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once expired the patent at stake. Nonetheless, the Panel concluded against the second 
question of the dispute inasmuch as it considered inconsistent with art. 28.1 and 30 the 
Canadian regulatory exception that allowed manufacturing and stockpiling patented 
products, regardless of the fact that they would not be sold before the expiry of the 
patent –the Panel applied here the principle of effectivity and understood that such 
exception substantially contravenes the patent’s owner exclusionary rights400. But 
initiating the administrative procedure to obtain the regulatory permits for a generic 
medicine, before the end of a patent, is then compatible with TRIPS Agreement. In sum, 
the third flexibility strategy under TRIPS (the so-called ‘Bolar exception’ or ‘regulatory 
exception’), as seen in the Canadian case, was the result of WTO’s jurisprudence. This 
‘regulatory exception’ passed the test of the Panel and the time lag caused by 
governmental permits can be circumvented: potential competitors can accelerate the 
merely bureaucratic procedures even before the patent expires, so that generic medicines 
can be placed in the market immediately after the expiration of the patent. 
TRIPS Agreement is certainly a curious example of how essentially private interests 
(patents and patent owners’ rights) are protected by States in an international dispute 
resolution mechanism against other States’ regulations, other than traditional diplomatic 
protection, as a parallel road to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
and accepting rather loose connections401 between the origin of corporations involved 
and the country that decides to take over and bring the issue to the attention of the DSB. 
In conclusion, the reasoning started with article XX GATT and has progressively been 
detailed through the DSB’s practice, now extended to other agreements (GATS, TRIPS, 
SPS…) and their respective exception clauses. The use of an exception clause has to be 
justified and is not unconditional. The WTO-consistency test has three basic elements: 
measures shall be necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory, which are not new or 
surprising concepts in international tribunals or arbitrage seats against the abuse or 
misuse of States’ prerogatives. We have also noted that the DSB has a perfectly 
sharable approach to different situations and cases: realistic –close to the concrete 
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factual evidence; explicitly integrative –no fear to public international law; and open to 
progressive interpretations of treaties and agreements –in the light of preambles, the 
travaux préparatoires, customary international law in other fields like the environment 
or health, and the practice of other international organisations (even soft law 
instruments). It starts to be clear that it doesn’t seem difficult to show that a particular 
measure falls within the scope of exception clauses; problems rather arise when it 
comes to demonstrate that measures are sufficiently justified. It does not seem to us an 
insuperable burden of proof, provided States duly manage their overlapping and 
concurring international obligations in good faith. It is now the responsibility of 
member-States to effectively and reasonably use these open windows: it will depend on 
how they use the inherent multilateral, consensual and evolutionist402 genetics of WTO 
Law. 
 
2.3  Soft law and the potential of international organisations 
 
2.3.1 Soft law and corporate human rights respect 
Notwithstanding the fact that we discuss in detail the value of soft law through the 
European Union’s practice in Chapter IV, we shall make some initial remarks to serve 
as a starting point. The debate on soft law hides the last dichotomy we did not address 
in the first chapter, i.e., the one opposing mandatory and voluntary schemes. In the first 
chapter, we addressed the problems of the ‘treaty route’, both in theory and practice, but 
that problematic is the consequence of a previous choice: hard law vs. soft law, which 
implies more theoretical (if not ideological) questions. Of course, hard law enthusiasts 
will immediately identify themselves with the defence of a new international treaty on 
business and human rights. And soft law supporters will say that everything has to be 
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left to companies’ discretion because mandatory schemes would place an “unwarranted 
burden on business”403. 
It is often heard that corporate social responsibility is only about soft law; that it 
responds to a negative feudalisation caused by global capitalism: our “age of neo-
medievalism” would have diversified the sources of power, legitimacies and norms, 
thus creating soft instruments aimed at clarifying some private (corporate) duties –
always softly404. In practice, we have found both voluntary and mandatory aspects and, 
contrary to a widespread belief, minimum legal requirements are also part of CSR, 
ideally to go beyond them so as to achieve “best practices” –but always within the 
framework of legal compliance. In sum, in view of the current international practice, 
what we actually infer from our analysis is an interaction between both hard and soft 
law instruments in the area of corporate human rights respect. 
This mixture responds to the fact that mere self-regulation is not sufficient after having 
detected many traps and contradictions. For example, in the occasion of the 2014 
Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (Russian Federation), many companies could not do 
anything to avoid sponsoring the games –contrariwise, it was part of their ‘CSR’, 
despite the increasing unease in relation to widespread discrimination in Russia on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, affecting also some athletes405. We have mentioned other 
risks of CSR, like ‘blue washing’ –when the UN logo is unduly used in the Global 
Compact by poor performing companies, or ‘green washing’ when only a small 
percentage of ‘green providers’ hides essentially the same bad performance in supply 
chains, phenomena that have been investigated in many areas406. The many examples 
available have led to some authors to think that CSR is just about voluntary and 
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“ceremonial commitments” seasoned with an institutionally “organised hypocrisy”407, 
maintaining the imbalances between developed countries and the rest of the world. But 
the CSR movement has surely served to reveal these contradictions to a wide public 
and, from a social perspective, more and more people think that “benefits that come 
from human rights violations are illegitimate, if not directly illegal”408 –extrapolating 
the so-called doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned tree. Shall we recall SPP vs. Egypt 
recognising lucrum cessans only until the entry into force of the UNESCO Convention 
on Wold Heritage, after which any benefit would have been internationally illegal; as in 
other investment and trade situations analysed in the precedent section in terms of ‘open 
windows’. For us, the obvious deficits and traps of CSR are not enough to totally reject 
it; given that we have defined it as a human rights strategy mixing hard and soft law 
instruments, our conclusion is on its relative usefulness and certain potential; 
nevertheless, it is clear that a merely voluntary approach does not seem sufficient. 
More generally, the expansion of soft international law is frequently criticised in terms 
of a feudalisation of global regulation, to primarily serve private interests, a sort of post-
modern lex mercatoria409. But this argument simply forgets that CSR and soft 
international norms are nothing new under the sun. Besides, they are not necessarily 
negative: the so-called “Incoterms” is a set of international trade terminology created in 
1936 by the International Chamber of Commerce, also responsible for the “Uniform 
Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits”, operative in 175 countries. 
Continuing with the banking sector, we shall also cite the “Basel III Guidelines” on risk 
management formulated by the Committee of the Bank for International Settlements (a 
mix private-public institution whose members are central banks, but not exactly an 
intergovernmental one); the International Financial Reporting Standards are the product 
of another private institution (the International Accounting Standards Board). There are 
examples in other areas: the World Wide Web Consortium, responsible for the World 
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Wide Web rules “totally outside of international treaty”; and the work of the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), a non-governmental organisation 
whose numerous standards are just unavoidable in international business410. 
Precisely in the area of global financial regulation is where soft law is stronger or, at 
least, a subject that more evidently shows that “soft law can have its own hard 
edges”411, with its positive and negative effects. Of course, the abundance of soft norms 
in international finances can be partially linked to 2008 global economic crisis: besides 
a good number of market causes, it is true that there have been failures in the successive 
Basel Accords and Principles, in international accounting standards and credit-rating 
agencies –in sum, in the “global systemic risk regulation” 412. The crisis might have 
marked a turning point towards a bigger public input and stricter regulation of 
derivatives, hedge funds and rating agencies413, a trend that still has to be confirmed in 
the future. 
In this context, the critique can be easily summarised in Marxist terms: for the capital, it 
was not enough to control the means of production; it now wants to control the means of 
production of norms, by fostering soft law in a frame of global benefits but fragmented 
jurisdictions. Against this background, it must first be said that sources of legitimacy 
and norms have historically been diverse: even in Roman law we might find ‘soft law’ 
examples, starting with the difference between potestas and auctoritas, the latter being 
the simple capacity to persuade but deprived of the formal competency to command414. 
Those who point out soft law’s positive effects frequently refer to a wider flexibility to 
adapt to changing scenarios and more easy corrections or changes when needed, while 
the negative side would be an alleged lack of democratic legitimacy in the rule-making 
process. Equally positive would be its capacity to set itself up as an interpretation of 
hard law instruments, which at times would otherwise be difficult to operationalise, but 
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the other side of the coin is its obscure judicial review. Again as a starting point and 
before this research focuses on the EU’s contribution, the most authoritative and cited 
reference on soft law is Abbott and Snidal’s research, according to which it is a 
“continuum” far away from Kelsen’s positivist tradition415, to rather show the “deep 
connection of law and politics”416. We already warned on the tight link between law and 
politics in the introduction, in line with Max Weber’s thinking. Indeed, the influence of 
the political debate is unavoidable and it would be naïve not to recognise that 
companies are “already engaged in these governance processes”417. At least the largest 
corporations are de facto both economic and political actors, so that some kind of 
political ingredients need to be included in the CSR discourse and development, like 
democratic legitimacy and human rights, opened to all kind of stakeholders418 from a 
pragmatic standpoint. 
In IHRL, the so-called ‘name and shame’ strategies have generally failed to improve 
States’ human rights performance or, at least, to generate long-term and structural 
improvements. In our view, name and shame strategies are more likely to work in the 
case of TNCs, unlike States, since the market’s reward or punishment directly threatens 
their obvious raison d’être: reputational risks may have a translation into their 
economic performance, provided there exists a certain level of consumer’s awareness. 
This is a kind of “social sanction”419, which has never ceased to exist whether or not the 
positivists like it420, coherently with our sociological approach to the formation of 
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International Law. And quite more importantly, soft law instruments can contribute to 
extend an international practice and generate, in the long term, a consuetudine that can 
be said to follow an opinio iuris if sufficiently consistent and expanded421. 
In this line, soft norms can also contribute to effectively ‘open’ the windows of 
opportunity we have detected concerning international trade and investments, as long as 
we renounce to maximalist demands and wish lists. However, the list of pros and cons 
is endless and it is not our objective to settle the debate on whether soft law advantages 
compensate the eventual shortfalls and gaps: we only suggest the answer is probably a 
matter of degree, that is, the quantity of soft instruments and how they are used. 
As said before, we are no longer in the initial choice between hard law and soft law. As 
a matter of fact, CSR is not anymore an exclusively soft law area. At the end of the day, 
the question is wrong: it is “not an either/or proposition: both are necessary”422. We 
have rather observed an interaction and intermix of hard and soft norms. For the time 
being, we may conclude that soft law is helping or completing IHRL, or has shown its 
potential to do so, in two essential aspects: prevention and horizontalisation with regard 
to TNCs, while bypassing some crucial legal problems that could block for a long time 
any hard law initiative (for example, international subjectivity). 
As said before, we referred to this in further detail when we criticised the ‘treaty route’. 
Ultimately, only States have to respect their international obligations and, even though 
many academics put forward the need of designing a specific legal personality for 
transnational companies and individuals, we don’t think this is a really effective 
shortcut to improve respect for human rights when international businesses are 
involved, as we have also justified that the proliferation of biding international treaties 
isn’t either always the best way to materially foster human rights and, hence, part of the 
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usefulness of complementary soft law instruments423. In order for human rights treaties 
to have –in and of themselves– tangible effects in the field, we usually need to be in 
democratic countries with relatively strong CSO’s and NGOs, preferably with solid 
international connections; otherwise, the real impact of international human rights 
treaties has proved a very limited one424. More regulation does not automatically and 
necessarily lead to better compliance, neither in internal legal orders nor at an 
international level. We therefore have to abandon ideological misunderstandings on 
what regulation is and its real effectiveness and demystify hard law –while avoiding the 
other extreme of uncritically praising soft law. In our subject, the effectiveness of IHRL 
is not obvious in view of the regularity of violations. As pointed out by Prof. Douglass 
Cassel, the real impact of a human rights treaty will largely depend on the institutional 
environment and its valuable effects have to be “understood as part of a broader set of 
interrelated, mutually reinforcing processes and institutions –interwoven strands in a 
rope– that together pull human rights forward, and to which international law makes 
distinctive contributions”425. 
Consistently with our analysis in Chapter I, we therefore propose overcoming certain 
blocking dichotomies and this includes the apparently irreconcilable opposition between 
mandatory and voluntary schemes. International practice shows an interaction and 
combination of both policy options. We can also anticipate that the EU, at a regional 
level, has followed a sort of third way consisting of a voluntary within mandatory 
approach, as it will be developed in the second part of this work. In this line, we take as 
a premise that hard and soft law are “complements, not alternatives”426. 
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2.3.2 The role of international organisations 
The media and popular imaginary expect any ‘expert’ worthy of that name to 
mercilessly criticise international institutions. It is commonplace to blame international 
organisations under any pretext and an interestingly similar discourse demonises TNCs. 
Black and white analyses seem to us oversimplifying and useless; we will now make 
some institutional remarks. 
In a gradually liberalised world economy where international contracts and investments 
are widespread, States and International Organisations have a crucial role to play. The 
trade of diamonds and the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme provides again an 
enlightening example of the radical importance of the institutional environment to foster 
CSR, including “carrots and sticks”427 in a mixed legislative-voluntary scheme and 
tripartite negotiations involving States, NGOs, CSOs and the industry, all of which 
should ideally have a proved legitimacy: States to be preferably democratic and 
institutionally solid; NGOs and CSOs have legitimate interests and be representative; 
and the industry should be consolidated and agree on the starting point (the need to 
tackle the adverse impacts of their business activity). In our view, we fully agree with 
the idea that institutionalisation is the key to “translate CSR rhetoric into concrete 
actions”428 and, in this respect, international organisations have played a prominent role, 
though improvable or unfinished. 
In our view, international institutions can decisively contribute to the development of a 
human rights-friendly business milieu. Similarly to human rights treaties, corporate 
social responsibility –understood as a mixture of hard and soft law instruments mainly 
centred on ‘business and human rights’ issues– is more likely to have an effect the 
stronger is civil society and the “institutional terrain within corporations operate”429, to 
name just a few aspects: public pressure, trade unions, NGOs, monitoring and 
inspection bodies, proper legislation encouraging and framing CSR, a competitive and 
healthy economy and, of course, a democratic regime.  
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Both national and international institutions have a critical role to define the framework 
within which they discipline the diverse initiatives, facilitate and promote corporate 
human rights respect. The institutional environment is the reason why, for example, this 
research is peppered with tangential references to other problems, being a prominent 
example the issue of fragile and failed states, but also other factors like aid and 
development430 or political and legitimacy questions 
In developing and least developed countries, public debt imbalances, economic 
weaknesses and needs are priorities that tend to shadow their human rights obligations. 
On the companies’ side, we have already stated that it is Manichean and inaccurate to 
only blame companies, alleging that they specifically look for weak State regimes. 
However, generally speaking, the business tendency will be more likely to adapt to –
let’s say– undesirable situations in third countries rather than put at risk investments or 
benefits. We can now add another reason why only soft self-regulation is insufficient: 
once again, the institutional environment of developing and least developed countries. 
Strategies based solely on the self-interest of companies (the ‘business case’) clearly fall 
short; public inputs and frames are needed, on which international organisations can 
provide significant guidance to overcome and address, in parallel, weak governance and 
poverty in those countries. 
Concerning the politics of democracy and legitimacy issues, the critiques against soft 
law are ultimately rooted in alleged problems of democracy and legitimacy within 
international institutions, the ones who create those soft instruments. We must note, 
even at the risk of being repetitive, that IOs are created by and for States, so the latter 
are the key-players. As rightly indicated by Norberto Bobbio, the international 
community will be democratic only when all States are themselves democratic and, vice 
versa, a State’s democracy will be imperfect and experience problems in the 
international community if there are still non-democratic regimes in the world431. This 
situation has its reflection within international institutions in terms of transparency, 
accessibility, public participation and human rights performance. In this vein, we should 
stop using the 19th century-logics on nation-state democracies to design the multilevel 
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international governance and rather start thinking of IOs differently. Perhaps novel 
forms of international democratic accountability appear someday. For their success, 
they will have to overcome the three main problems of multilevel governance: the 
“weak visibility” of its inherent networks, “their selective composition and the 
prevalence of peer over public forms of accountability”432. 
In this regard, functionalism still dominates the theory of international organisations, 
with the immunity doctrine and the ‘members-driven’ leitmotiv at its heart. In practice, 
the predominant functionalist theory of IOs fails to assess the real role of politics within 
IOs and the complexity of overlapping functions and powers, interface subjects and 
accountability problems433. In the first section of this chapter we have mentioned a 
number of overlapping CSR initiatives undertaken by different IOs. And we witness 
timid improvements that occur in the normal way many things happen in the 
international sphere –through simple faits accomplis. In effect, nowadays IOs start to 
coordinate each other policies and engage in unprecedented manners with actors other 
than member-States, which shows a growing openness; at the same time, the doctrine of 
human rights mainstreaming is more widely accepted to introduce human rights 
concerns into the practice of specialised institutions, of course without turning around 
their founding goals. In the second part of this research, we will see that the EU, as an 
“extreme”434 international organisation, accordingly carries substantive CSR to the 
extreme, compared to the global instruments. This change or evolution of IOs is in its 
infancy and silently challenges the above-mentioned limits of the functionalist theory of 
IOs. Furthermore, the daily practice and work of IOs could be explained in terms of 
‘implicit powers’ and escapes traditional moulds435. There are organisations more 
geared to services (the UN) and others tend to serve as fora (the WTO)436, but this 
classification does not provide us with clear-cut distinctions either. 
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That said, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent an IO, created by States as “an 
institution with a life of its own”, can become a threat to States themselves and, at 
times, eventually act against their interests, which is very much the case in many 
delicate human rights situations. Perhaps the remaining insistence on functionalism and 
the recurrent limitations of IOs are, in fact, the States “response to the Frankenstein 
problem”437 –thus preventing IOs from becoming a ‘monster out of their control’. Apart 
from theorisations, the fact is that IOs legitimacy will largely depend on two factors: 1) 
the number of democratic States within the international community; and 2) the 
formation of a specific sociological legitimacy for IOs, precisely built  through their 
compliance of International Law and, very prominently, of human rights law438. 
Finally, by way of conclusion, the following points indicate some of the most prominent 
contributions that could be made by international organisations at a global scale: 
1) To build an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, indispensable basis on which 
the international society can conduct negotiations and reach agreements; 
2) Mainstream human rights into their founding objectives, whatever these are; 
3) Give priority to capacity-building in developing and least developed 
countries. Capacity-building should include all actors: States, institutions, 
policy makers, investors, traders and producers, companies, lobbies, judges 
and arbitrators, workers and consumers, NGO’s and CSO’s; 
4) Prioritise good governance. Essential components are democracy, rule of 
law, predictability, political stability, transparency and access to justice; 
5) Link the agendas of the different international organisations;  
6) Promote cross-cutting public agencies, both national and international, to 
help address transversal human rights issues, capable to put in place tailored 
measures and initiatives adapted to each economic sector; 
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7) Support negotiations as usual, but also at a domestic level providing with the 
organisation’s expertise; 
8) To work on international standards is critical in order to extrapolate good 
governance to the international sphere and, through harmonisation, attain a 
predictable international order. Proposals ought to be clear, concise, 
pragmatic and understandable, built on a long-term and technical vision; 
9) For the success of this work on international standards, organisations could 
create reliable information systems, including human rights indicators, as 
objectively as possible; 
10)  Bring all stakeholders to the table and make sure their voice is heard, 
extending the external participation channels in the decision-making process, 
even though the final decisions fall on member-States; 
11)  To structure and spread public-private dialogue and PPPs, at an internal 
level and internationally. International organisations could without fear 
engage in more and more direct dialogue with the private sector –there is no 
reason why this dialogue might go against their intergovernmental nature 
and scope. 
12)  Lastly, the possibility of promoting private sector partnerships could be 
explored by governments and international organisations to expand good 
practices and encourage social responsibility guidelines and codes of 
conduct.  
13) Promotion of “human rights impact assessments”439, inspired in the 
environmental ones. 
The successful interplay of the foregoing bullet-points will mark the final contribution 
of IOs in two crucial aspects: the progressive development of International Law in 
relation to business and human rights, and the promotion of an extended and consistent 
States’ practice in the same direction. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the European Union 
 
CSR is somehow linked to many different policies of the European Union, even before 
being labelled and receiving that name. One of its related issues is sustainable 
development: fight against poverty is essentially articulated through development 
policies which are, since 2000, tightly related to the MDG’s of the United Nations. 
However, this commitment to human rights and engagement towards developing 
countries goes beyond mere development policies and, more and more, affects other 
European actions such as commercial and neighbourhood policies. In this sense, we 
need to analyse to what extent CSR and fight against poverty have started to overlap 
and to create synergies with other EU policies, advancing in the achievement of the 
MDG’s and the post-2015 agenda.  
The EU has developed CSR on three different levels: 
1) Within the international framework in this subject, that is, in accordance with 
codes and norms of other international organisations and some particular 
initiatives of member States.  
2) Secondly, a specific frame was born after the Green Paper on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (2001) together with an important Communication of the 
Commission on CSR (2002), which constitute the initial benchmark, followed 
by a rich documentation functioning as a general guidance. 
3) Lastly, the EU has introduced CSR in almost any of its policies, which now 
include CSR objectives. Among these policies, the most important fields are the 
cooperation and development, environment, employment, consumers’ protection 
among others. 
 
3.1. The emergence of CSR in the EU 
 
3.1.1. From a limited concern ad intra to a wider development goal 
CSR could initially be understood as another complementary way to promote a fully 
integrated interior market and to facilitate the enlargement eastwards, making it 
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compatible with the European values. Its link with more general human rights and 
development goals has been understood more recently, in particular for those countries 
with which the EU has commercial, financial or political-strategic relations.  
The obvious problem at the beginning is that the EU’s CSR objectives were far from 
reflecting the real problems and needs of developing or under-developed countries, as 
summarized in the UN goals. The level of development of member States might explain 
why European companies usually didn’t include among their CSR objectives the most 
prominent human rights issues, such as the reduction of extreme poverty or child labour, 
which are not urgent problems inside the EU but core goals of the 2015 world agenda 
and the new SDGs for 2030. Nevertheless, European companies have the engagement of 
promoting the respect of the same norms and codes of conduct in all countries in which 
they operate, regardless of the usual breach of fundamental rights in some of these 
places.  
Delors declaration in 1993 against social exclusion is the most repeated key date when 
studying the origin of CSR, inaugurating the European Union after Maastricht with a 
clear social agenda: “[t]he social dimension is the Achilles heel of a Community that is 
misunderstood, that lacks grassroots support”440. It could have been a perfectly 
forgettable political statement; its importance a posteriori lies in the impact it had in the 
private sector, leading to the creation of European networks of companies, and because 
it helped to launch a new conception of a social Europe, linking it both to economic 
prosperity and to its external action: “without economic muscle the Community will be 
in no position to demonstrate solidarity with countries suffering from internal divisions 
and underdevelopment, or to exert any influence on world affairs”441. The inclusion of 
new social concerns is logically related to the introduction in Maastricht of the 
European citizenship. 
Delors’ triangle linking the social agenda, the economic integration and prosperity 
together with the EU international role, constituted the first step towards the 
development of new non-economic concerns of the European Union, both internally and 
externally. Not surprisingly, it is also in 1993 when the European Council at 
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Copenhaguen established a set of four criteria for eventual enlargements (completed 
with a fifth requirement in 1995 in Madrid) including clear human rights and 
democratic references442. The political environment induced the European Union to 
become more aware of its international role beyond mere economic factors.  
In 1999, the EU Parliament approved a Resolution on the EU standards for European 
Enterprises operating in developing countries: towards a European Code of Conduct. 
This document called on the Commission and the Council to keep working on corporate 
responsibility in line with the work of other international organisations, particularly the 
OECD and the ILO. Besides some classic initiatives from a European approach, such as 
the creation of a “social label”443, this Resolution insisted on the need of monitoring 
mechanisms, in order to ensure that Companies operating on behalf of the EU in third 
Countries respect EU standards, at the risk of losing the adjudication of projects through 
the European Development Fund or the Commission’s budget444. An explicit reference 
is also made to future EU agreements with third countries, which should not forget 
social and human rights issues, including investment agreements445. The Parliament 
finally foresaw a European code of conduct to facilitate the standardisation of voluntary 
good practices, with the help of an observatory on CSR eventually comprising of 
complaints and coercive measures.  
This control is very problematic when dealing with the international activity of 
European transnational companies. A supplier of several European transnational 
companies could be subject to different codes of conduct imposed by its clients, in such 
a way that part of its commercial relations would be seen as “socially responsible” but 
some others not, even in the case of the same product and the same production criteria. 
This is why, even though many companies were already writing their own CSR reports, 
generally centred on the environment, health or safety at work, only very few included 
respect for human rights in general terms or child labour. The diversity of the data in 
these reports showed the need of a wider consensus at an international level on the 
contents of CSR, its structure and reliability. Furthermore, the complexity of corporate 
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structures, that is, the fluidity and confusion between EU-based parent companies and 
their international operations in third countries, make this problem even more difficult.  
On the other hand, all the documents on CSR emanating from EU institutions 
acknowledge and assume the previous work of other international organisations, so that 
there is no doubt on where the EU has found its inspiration. The most usual explicit 
references are the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the most prominent international human rights law, the 1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration 
of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the 1976 OECD 
“Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, specific recommendations of FAO, WHO, World Bank 
and other specialised agencies. After 2000/2001, further references will be made to 
more recent guidelines and documents, in particular to the work of the SRSG John 
Ruggie in the area of business and human rights.  
In March 2000 we find the first explicit and important reference to CSR: the European 
Council at Lisbon made “a special appeal to companies’ corporate sense of social 
responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, work organisation, equal 
opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development”446. In this way, the Council 
highlighted the will to develop CSR by establishing good practices in areas such as 
education, continuous training and social affairs, consistently with the notion of 
sustainable human development, i.e., the fusion of sustainable growth and human rights. 
This objective represented an important advancement and a challenge to the extent it 
was aimed at facing future changes derived from globalisation and a knowledge-based 
economy, all in line with European values and social conceptions. In this direction, it 
was necessary to increase the investment in human capital and to combat social 
exclusion in order to proceed to a real modernisation of the European social model. In 
the same direction, it was acknowledged that human capital was the main asset of the 
EU and this idea had to inspire any European policy including CSR aspects (at least, 
indirectly). More concretely, it was proposed to significantly increase per capita 
investment in human capital; to reduce by half before 2010 the number of citizens 
between 18 and 24 years old with secondary education who do not receive any further 
preparation; and to define new basic skills for continuous training, as well as the 
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promotion of private-public partnerships in the field of education447. In this sense, even 
though the EU would act as a catalyst, the fundamental actions had to be undertaken by 
the private sector (companies).  
In the Commission’s Social Policy Agenda 2000448 a special mention was made to the 
requirement of incorporating social responsibility as an active strategy to remediate the 
negative consequences of globalisation and economic integration in the employment 
market. For that purpose, the impulse of a coordinated CSR strategy in Europe had to go 
through multi-stakeholder partnerships (NGO’s, CSO’s, companies, social public 
authorities, etc.). The so-called “social partners” had a crucial role in the view of both 
the Commission and the Council; it is our understanding that the level of institutional 
engagement was still low, limited to the general promotion of these initiatives without 
really launching concrete actions, even though it is necessary to point out that the social 
aspects of the “European Union external relations” were reaffirmed, not only in 
anticipation of enlargements but also in general terms with regard to third countries449.  
During the Stockholm European Council, in March 2001, whose main target was full 
employment, a variety of CSR related issues were considered, although indirectly. The 
pre-crisis politics were centred on building a sustainable growth, wondering on which 
way the European social model had to be updated so as to include new educational and 
training skills, adapted to the information society and knowledge-based economy. In 
this strategy, well-designed systems of social protection deserved being studied as 
important productive factors: more but also better work, as already stated in the Lisbon 
Council (2000), to improve working conditions, foster equal opportunities (gender 
policies and persons with disabilities), facilitate continuous training, ensure safety at 
work and reach a better balance between family life and career. 
A specific heading on Corporate Social Responsibility was included, welcoming 
business-lead initiatives and the already existing project of a Green Paper in this area450. 
What is important to note is that, little by little, an external dimension was progressively 
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added to CSR issues, consistent with more general development goals at an 
international level.451 
The European engagement to renovate economic and social policies received a powerful 
impetus at the Gothenburg European Council (June 2001), when a general new strategy 
for sustainable development was approved adding a new environmental approach to 
some of the previous agreements, particularly relevant to complete the Lisbon strategy 
for CSR. We still don’t always find explicit references to CSR but the bases were 
settled to build its further development. It was recognised that all economic, social and 
environmental policies had to be implemented taking into account their social effects 
and interactions, in order to design a comprehensive and holistic approach to coordinate 
institutional initiatives towards sustainable development. Since Gothenburg, 
considerations on the “social impacts” had to be introduced into the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the Fisheries Policy, the Integrated Product Policy (“in cooperation 
with business”, especially to improve waste management)452, what established a 
precedent to potentially mainstream CSR issues into any European policy.  
On a more general note, the Council also made some significant political statements, 
saying for example that “[s]ustainable development –to meet the needs of the present 
generation without compromising those of future generations- is a fundamental 
objective under the Treaties”453, providing us with a definition at the same time it 
informs us on which direction is evolving the approach to social responsibility linked to 
more global and general goals. To confirm it, the Council expressed its engagement 
towards reaching an agreement at the then forthcoming Doha Round, which indeed 
ended up inserting into the WTO practices a more friendly attitude towards 
development, taking into account the ever since undeniable importance of the social 
dimensions of globalisation454. However, Doha would block the WTO for a decade. 
At this point, we start to realise that the emergence of CSR in the EU has two main 
characteristics: it initially follows the initiatives taken by other international 
organisations, assuming this global work without additions. CSR receives of course 
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some institutional support through the documentation cited above, but its content 
heavily relies on private and voluntary initiatives, who may take over. As it has 
happened in many fields of the European integration, the society takes the baton and 
runs with it in parallel to slower and highly bureaucratised EU institutions. Later, back 
to the institutional level, whilst CSR is gradually consolidated, the EU has made an 
interesting contribution that we start to witness since year 2000: to strengthen the global 
dimension of CSR, its potential in terms of sustainable human development through 
cooperation and development policies, and even through trade or investment contracts 
(in the case of the Parliament resolutions, usually more audacious than the Council or 
the Commission).  
This very important international or external dimension of CSR is again confirmed at 
the Gothenburg Council. Part of the agreement stated that sustainable development had 
to be included in cooperation programs, aimed at extending this practice to other 
international organisations. The European Union was assuming this way its 
international role, perhaps even a desire for leadership, to promote an adequate 
protection of the environment and a consistent commercial policy. There were four 
concrete areas on which the Council put emphasis: climate change, natural resources, 
transport and public health. 
At this first stage of CSR in the EU (before 2009), apart from the practice of the 
Parliament and the Council, the Commission was also working in this field and made 
two main contributions: the Green Paper promoting a European framework for CSR 
(2001)455  as well as the famous 2002’ Communication456, when CSR received proper 
consideration by itself as a new crosscutting strategy in the EU.  
The Green Paper was aimed at creating a general frame for companies and all eventual 
stakeholders, in line with the sustainable development agenda settled at Gothenburg and 
with a view to avoiding the potential adverse effects of European integration and 
globalisation trends in the economy and labour markets. The Commission insisted on 
the fact that corporate contribution must be understood as going beyond the existing 
legal obligations, so that CSR is not a substitute for legal constraints, but a complement 
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to boost development consistently with both general human rights compliance and the 
European social agenda. According to the Commission, it was crucial to work on a 
double direction: to involve all stakeholders and as many CSO’s / NGO’s as possible, 
and secondly to extend these initiatives also to SME’s, which actually constitute the 
majority of the productive and business sector.  
In a more concrete manner, the Green Paper includes different engagements from an 
intra-European point of view: 
a) Concerning the management of human resources, the objective is to foster and 
maintain qualified workers thanks to continuous education and training, equal 
remuneration programs and better information on the companies themselves. 
Non-discrimination responsible practices were encouraged so as to facilitate 
labour opportunities to less qualified work force, less educated or elderly people, 
sustained on training policies in close cooperation with local public authorities 
in charge of education and professional programs.  
b) As for public health and safety at work, this is to a great extent a pending subject 
in the EU due to the expansion of subcontracting and outsourcing practices 
making it difficult to apply CSR principles (or even prevent directly illegal 
practices). We cannot forget that most of the historic improvements in labour 
and social security law have been achieved through legal constraints. To 
stimulate good practices in this area, we might propose quantifying its benefits 
in the companies’ management and within marketing policies.  
c) In regard to the environment, the main goals are the reduction of use of 
resources, pollution and waste management. This field has experienced a 
significant and prompt improvement because companies were primarily 
interested in reducing the associated costs (power and raw materials), 
compensated with efficient waste management and recycling processes, which 
are in addition easily measurable in traditional accounting systems and Boards 
of Directors’ reports. 
 
From an institutional and international perspective, more relevant to us, the Commission 
wants European enterprises to integrate CSR within their commercial and development 
policies, extending its use to other international scenarios and contexts. Already 
recognised obligations under international human rights law are not under discussion 
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because of CSR recent developments. Companies have to be aware of this fact whether 
they operate in Europe or in third countries even where human rights violations or 
corruption might be usual. Although the EU had already given importance to the OECD 
and ILO principles and norms, with the Green Paper a new commitment was expressed 
trying to push forward standards and regain some leadership in its interaction with other 
international organisations. As for CSR’s external dimension, networking plans were 
fostered towards the creation of private partnerships in line with common guidelines, for 
example, when looking for suppliers (supply chains easily become CSR “black holes” 
as they become more and more complex and global). It is in the relationship with 
customers where CSR has quite quickly developed (so-called “eco-friendly” products 
and services); not that much when dealing with suppliers. The reason is that consumers’ 
awareness is higher and demand such responsibility while, at the same time, benefits for 
companies and calculations are easily integrated in marketing plans457. In summary, the 
remaining problems (up to now) are the same: credibility, standardisation, measurement 
and information systems, monitoring and impact assessments (to detect the benefits for 
both companies and society).  
In this sense, the institutional role of the EU is potentially positive, if institutions dare 
developing these ideas. As preconized by the EU Parliament report on the Green Paper, 
it seems easy to call on the Council and the Commission to go one step further, starting 
with the liability of EU parent companies operating abroad also within EU Courts458 
(see Chapter IV, heading 2), or making CSR mainstream to any business and not only a 
voluntary “extra add-on” taking into account the actual influence of many EU-based 
transnational companies. The voluntary component of CSR would be the choice of the 
concrete way to implement and select the particular focus of the company, but not the 
fact of having a CSR policy.  The most audacious institutional player in the emergence 
of CSR in the EU has been the Parliament, but we need to balance all positions without 
forgetting the importance of the external dimension of CSR. The need to improve 
human rights respect in economically developing countries where EU-based companies 
operate is crucial. At the same time, the internal dimension of CSR shouldn’t be 
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neglected in order to maintain and preserve human rights standards in economically 
developed countries. The number of pending cases in ECHR suggests that Europe is not 
necessarily a paradise; it could be said that the EU Parliament excessively focuses on 
the external dimension459, even if we also need to put the above-cited Parliaments’ 
Report on the Green Paper in the context of pre-crisis politics and keep in mind that it 
constitutes a perfectly legitimate and well-founded political desideratum. In any event, 
the global approach of the Green Paper and the international concerns of the Parliament 
don’t seem problematic, but useful to foster CSR through an early global approach460. 
Finally, the Communication of the Commission issued in 2002461 importantly clarified 
the European frame on CSR. The new strategy was designed specifically thinking of 
private actors, in such a way that public authorities would only encourage it as a 
complementary way to contribute to sustainable development (together with other 
classic developmental policies). In summary, the proposal envisaged the following 
developments:  
a) The positive impact of CSR had to be disseminated, both inside and outside 
Europe, to the extent most of the companies are still not able to quantify its 
potential effect on productivity and neither consumers know to what extent it 
can benefit them. To that end, the exchange of information and experiences 
would be promoted between companies and Member States, especially within 
the same economic sector, to reach a common understanding on core CSR 
notions and to help the establishment of agreements that might reduce the initial 
cost of introducing CSR codes. This is based on the recognition of a long-term 
interest of companies, once the Commission realises that the Parliament was 
right when saying that CSR was no longer an “add-on” but had become a 
commonplace among corporations, despite the fact that its completely voluntary 
adoption is still defended by the Commission. 
b) A multilateral forum was proposed at a regional level to evaluate transparency 
and convergence of CSR tools and practices. 
c) Precisely for that reason, the Commission realised that an important work was 
needed towards convergence and transparency in order to build a reliable and 
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credible system to really reflect –internally and externally- the benefits of CSR. 
The EU could serve as intermediator and coordinator of these information 
systems, moderating the debates to make the advancements effective.  
d) CSR had to be integrated in all EU policies. This is an absolute novelty; it is true 
that the Gothenburg European Council already provided the insertion of social 
and environmental concerns in any European action, but the Commission took a 
substantial step forward mentioning expressly CSR as such in any EU policy, 
included the external action.  
As can be seen so far, after the first impulse of the different European Councils cited 
above, the inter-institutional dialogue has mainly taken place between the Commission 
and the Parliament. The Green Paper and 2002’ Communication undoubtedly 
constituted steps forward, but the Parliament issued a new report making some remarks 
to the Commission. The debate on voluntariness was closed and the Parliament admitted 
that CSR is necessarily voluntary, but the Parliament did not shy away from 
“emphasis[ing] that companies should be required to contribute to a cleaner 
environment by law rather than solely on a voluntary basis” 462, thus a bit frustrated with 
an essential aspect of the definition of CSR. We have noted in the general part of this 
work that CSR has evolved into a mix of hard and soft law, well beyond mere 
voluntariness, but by 2003 the EU was still in its way to reach that conclusion. In any 
case, the Parliament seemed to be satisfied in the overall with the Commissions’ 
approach, calling for an effective and quick implementation of the proposed measures, 
in particular the eco and social labels, the launching of the multi-stakeholder forum, and 
some new ideas such as a register of blacklisted companies463, sadly forgotten 
afterwards. The Parliament’s report annexes the opinion of different Committees, of 
which we might highlight the Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy which 
demands a greater engagement within the WTO negotiations as well as launching a 
Global Convention on Corporate Accountability464. 
Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, we might say that 
CSR emerged and started to consolidate at a European level. The following initiatives 
didn’t add much to the previous corpus. Between 2005 and 2006, the Commission made 
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some efforts to recover the spirit of the European Council at Lisbon. For example, a 
new Communication in 2006 renewed the commitment with CSR, essentially repeating 
the wording and priorities, but advancing in the international or external dimension of 
CSR465, also tightly related to UN MDG’s and the work of the SGSR John Ruggie, 
newly appointed in 2005466. Again, the Parliament’s response is centred on the 
complementarity of compulsory and voluntary measures. The EP realises that the 
proliferation of codes of conduct without clear guidelines and common criteria can 
cause confusion, and that the European debate was stagnating and needed a “shift from 
‘processes’ to ‘outcomes”467, without giving away any of the previous considerations on 
the extraterritorial liability of EU-based companies as a complement to make CSR more 
effective.  
For those particularly sceptic on the potential of this work, even at this first stage before 
the decisive impulse after 2009, all this soft law permeated for example, timidly but 
clearly, in two Directives regarding the annual reporting of certain companies and 
financial institutions, which included unprecedented references to social aspects. It is 
said that “where appropriate, this should lead to an analysis of environmental and social 
aspects necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance or 
position”468 consistently with Recommendation 2001/453/EC.  In 2006 a Directive of 
the Commission reiterated this approach on “environmental and social aspects” and 
further required (amending Directive 78/660/EEC) that Companies may provide in their 
annual report with a corporate governance statement, disclosing the corporate 
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governance code to which they are subject, or the one to which they have voluntarily 
adhered, as well as the “corporate governance practices applied beyond the 
requirements under national law”, or in absence of all these, when “the company has 
decided not to apply any provisions of a corporate governance code […], it shall explain 
its reasons for doing so” (emphasis added)469. Despite the obvious interest of this early 
permeation into hard law instruments, we share only to a limited extent the view of 
many academics that are only interested in CSR in the EU because of its possible 
compulsory character ad futuram470; even its voluntary elements can contribute to 
complement legal obligations (provided these exist). We move somewhere between 
“complying” and “explaining” requirements. Perhaps there is a lack of clarity in the 
European corporate governance codes, and this initial regulation might be less 
demanding than in the US471, but we should keep in mind it is a highly complex on-
going process in which the Commission understandably leaves more room for the 
margin of appreciation of Member States.  
From this documentation we infer that the inter-institutional feedbacks have vivified the 
development of CSR in the EU. The terms of the debate between the Parliament and the 
Commission confirms the early global vocation of CSR in the EU at the same time it 
continued to be internally consolidated. In any case, social concerns and the potential of 
corporate responsible practices had a rapid reflection in civil society organisations and 
companies. The awareness on social and environmental impacts of the market economy 
quickly spread and, after this first institutional push, we might hypothesize that –again 
in the European history, private actors and civil society took over and has, for a long 
time, been ahead of the institutional initiatives. A good part of the progress made 
recently is thanks to the private initiative, particularly in social issues, environmental 
protection and respect for human rights, trying to contribute to sustainable development 
as indicated after Gothenburg, not only in Europe, but also in third countries in which 
companies operate  (mainly least developed countries). 
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In this first phase of emergence of CSR at a regional level, and despite the usual inter-
institutional battles and the lack of originality, the first European contribution is to have 
strengthened its link with general human rights issues and global development goals, 
while internally clarifying and progressively specifying its content. To sum up, the first 
phase of emergence and definition of CSR in the EU did not incorporated new 
components but interestingly evolved from a limited concern ad intra to a wider 
development goal.  
 
3.1.2. A new impulse after 2009 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 the debate on CSR 
slightly changes. For instance, article 2 of the TEU clearly settles the “values” of the EU 
in terms of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and justice. The global 
dimension of CSR finds support in articles 21 and 205 of TFEU extending these values 
to the Union’s external action. Particularly interesting is the accuracy and level of detail 
of item 1 of art. 21 TFEU referred to the “universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”, assuming by the way, at a Treaty level, the evolution and 
consolidated practice of international human rights law as we have studied previously. 
After 2009 the Treaties’ provisions are therefore consistent with CSR conception under 
which internal improvements have little sense if they are not accompanied by an 
international dimension, according to the Union’s external commitment to “consolidate 
and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law” (art. 21.2 TFEU). The mention to general international law is an open window, as 
argued with regard to trade and investment agreements472, to introduce human rights as 
a common interest of the international society. Besides, but not surprisingly, the general 
provision on the EU external action (item 2 art. 21 TFEU) provides us with a list in 
which we find both human rights and the promotion of economic development, if we 
read these articles together with art. 3 TEU enshrining the European social vocation and 
article 11 TFEU on the environment and sustainable development.  
As explained, after a few years of relative stagnation (2006-2009) or without significant 
news in this regard, one of the most interesting initiatives came in 2009 when the 
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European Commission launched a call for tenders to study ‘the legal framework with 
respect to human rights and the environment applicable to European companies 
operating outside the EU’, in order to know on what basis the work had to be done to 
join Ruggie’s efforts and effectively advance in that direction.473 The result was the 
Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to 
European Enterprises Operating outside the European Union, made by the University 
of Edinburgh in 2010.474  
It is also important to cite a second comprehensive study, entitled Responsible Supply 
Chain Management Potential Success Factors and Challenges for Addressing 
Prevailing Human Rights and Other CSR Issues in Supply Chains of EU-Based 
Companies (2011)475, carried out under the EU Programme for Employment and Social 
Solidarity (PROGRESS, 2007-2013). One of the differences after 2009 is that research 
funds are allocated to CSR issues, perhaps nurturing endless theoretical discussions 
without focusing enough on concrete outcomes, but also informing the institutions. Both 
studies have a very technical and legal approach, devoting much space and interest to 
binding aspects, but showing as well to a certain extent the interaction between soft and 
hard law and the way they complement each other476.  
Concreteness is precisely the spirit of the EU Parliament’s Report on corporate social 
responsibility in international trade agreements, together with the Committee on 
International Trade, issued in 2010477, where we find the proposal to incorporate CSR 
into the generalised system of preferences, CSR clauses in all EU trade agreements (as 
in the South Korean precedent), and make EU-based companies accountable for 
eventual breaches of human rights or environmental hazards when they operate abroad 
escaping European standards (again, according to a progressive interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention). The appointment of John Ruggie and his main contribution, the 
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UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (studied in the first part of this 
work), also renewed the interest in this subject at a European level.  
However, if the Parliament is always complaining and pushing for further 
advancements, it sometimes sins of impatience, as shows the example of Regulation 
(EC) 1221/2009 of 25 November 2009 on the voluntary participation by organisations 
in a Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS). EMAS was an important 
new tool in the area of environmental impacts, which constitutes a kind of voluntary 
collective self-control system with an institutional supervision including, basically, the 
obligation to provide sound information. By way of little criticism, we shall recall that 
the environmental protection in the EU and in International Law is in advance, so that 
such a mechanism –being a sign of hope– is still not likely to exist in other sectors. 
2009 is also a turning point as the 2007/2008 financial crisis, converted into a public 
debt crisis and finally a full economic crisis for more than five years, also raised the 
awareness on the human rights and social risks of globalisation following to the de-
regulatory enthusiasms since 1991. Europe 2020 Strategy reflects this situation, being 
EU institutions seriously concerned by the speed with which the recent economic 
growth was being reversed, the rising unemployment (becoming structural) and the lack 
of demographic relieve and the impotence of the financial sector. In essence, it seemed 
clear that recovery had two pillars: growth, certainly, but also social relieve (even 
though the structural reforms promoted by the Troika were initially centred on the 
alleviation of the debt crisis leaving aside many social concerns). Anyway, the fact is 
that the EU 2020 Strategy is peppered with social issues and the Commission declares 
its commitment towards a new updated approach to CSR, considered a “key element” to 
ensure a durable recovery, in addition to go on extending CSR codes and practices 
among businesses478. 
This statement of intent is singularly translated into the Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 
for CSR. First of all, the three-fold analysis proposed by Ruggie has been accepted in 
the EU, that is, the UN three level framework (to “protect, respect and remedy”) is read 
as “identifying, preventing and mitigating” in this new approach to CSR: obvious is the 
State duty to protect, as the corporate duty to respect, and the need of effective 
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remediation mechanisms (judicial or non-judicial). CSR is founded on this basic 
understanding, but is no limited to that as it goes beyond. 
The Renewed EU Strategy for 2011-14 gives us a new definition of CSR: it is no longer 
the voluntary incorporation of social concerns in the business activity, but directly the 
“responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”479, underpinning all Europe 
2020 objectives, always respecting the international frame where the Commission adds 
references to the latest instruments (the UN Guiding Principles and the Global 
Compact). Moreover and not less important, there is a shift in the wording: it is no 
longer a ‘framework’, but a ‘strategy’, including self and co-regulation procedures, 
consultation to all businesses (extended to SME’s), shareholders, stakeholders (mainly 
CSO’s and NGO’s) aimed at launching a specific agenda for action. Finally, it is our 
understanding that the Commission was not wrong when giving such a crucial role to 
information on CSR and reporting measures to serve as solid foundations to continue 
working. 
 
 
3.2. CSR: mainstreaming EU Policies 
The Commission released in March 2014 an implementation table480 that needs to be 
clarified and updated, partly thanks to a more recent Staff Working Document481. The 
table identifies up to eight areas in which the CSR agenda is being implemented: 
enhancing visibility and disseminating good practices; improving and tracking trust in 
business; improving self and co-regulation processes; enhancing market reward 
(through public procurement reforms, consumption patterns and investments); 
disclosure of social and environmental information; CSR in training and education; 
national and sub-national CSR policies; and a better aligning of EU and global 
approaches (principles, guidelines, other international organisations and third countries). 
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Instead of using the categories chosen by the Commission to present the different 
initiatives undertaken so far, we rather propose a functional criterion to divide them into 
three different items: a) information on CSR and its promotion; b) institutional and 
international initiatives; and c) actions with an eventual or already effective impact on 
EU Law. Without obviously undervaluing the first two areas of action, we will pay a 
greater attention to the latter, as it will indicate the extent to which CSR should be taken 
seriously, even by sceptics. We will first analyse the informative and promotion actions, 
followed by the institutional and international approaches, before considering the legal 
spill-overs, in order to put some order into widely dispersed initiatives. 
Is CSR a new policy in the EU? The following analysis shows, on the one hand, that 
CSR has emerged as a strong crosscutting concern and, in this sense it would deserve to 
be considered as a new policy in its own right, especially after 2009. On the other hand, 
more than a policy as such, the wide dispersion and sometimes disconnection between 
the different actions suggest that it has become a new governance tool that has emerged, 
meant to mainstream almost any EU policy, hailing from development and cooperation 
programmes to commercial policies, public procurement regulation, company law or 
trade and investments.  
The CSR precedents might confirm this definition as a mainstreaming governance tool 
rather than a policy per se, since CSR issues can be traced back even before it received 
that name and was properly labelled, starting with three basic origins: the environment 
and work and consumers’ policies. EU institutions have “long been renowned for their 
“implicit CSR” much before the concept of CSR was even discussed in an explicit 
manner”482. There is no difficulty in making emerge CSR when it comes to consumer’s 
protection: suffice it to say that, as early as 1984 a Council Directive addressed 
misleading advertising,483 which later has become a typical CSR related issue, 
combining hard regulations and the industry self-control under the name of unfair 
commercial practices484. An unlabelled and implicit CSR can easily be traced in a 
number of early directives concerning the environment and related issues, even public 
contracts, comprising reporting requirements, public disclosure and access to 
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information, due diligence measures and previous impact assessments485. More recently, 
the common agricultural policy, the fisheries policy and transport policy have also 
implicitly incorporated this approach in their actions and objectives. As an example we 
could cite the increasing importance given to the safety of food and to protection of the 
environment in the CAP and its slow but constant liberalisation. In addition, we will 
have to pay special attention to the environmental policy, the development cooperation 
policy, the commercial policy and the neighbourhood policy. In summary, the wide 
dispersion of the initiatives on CSR and, ultimately, the relative “confusion is perhaps 
due to the fact that the EU did not wait for the advent of CSR to deal with diligence 
obligations of organisations or companies with regard to their environmental, social or 
societal responsibility”486.  
Whether a new policy or a transversal governance tool, the fact is that the Commission 
has turned CSR into a new instrument to go on fostering the integration of the internal 
market, convergence and transparency, mainstreaming many policies in line with 
sustainable development and human rights goals as a general interest of the 
international society (and, as explained elsewhere in this work, a priority confirmed 
with the Treaty of Lisbon).  
 
3.2.1. Implementation of the CSR agenda: information and promotion 
After 2009, the EU rightly realised that any effort to foster CSR had an inescapable 
starting point: information and promotion. Sound information, dissemination of good 
practices and exchange of experiences are the three pillars of an active publicity, which 
sometimes includes reporting mechanisms. Obtaining and disseminating information 
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(through reports, working papers, surveys and studies) is an essential step to promote 
CSR. 
The Commission has focused on obtaining the best available information on CSR in 
order to disseminate and promote good practices. The informative and institutional 
efforts of the Commission are then tightly related to the promotion of CSR. The 
philosophy could be simply summarised in a sentence: before assessing the state of play 
we need to know the playing field. 
A comprehensive Eurobarometer survey on CSR, undertaken in 2013487, showed that 
local businesses and SME’s apparently do a better job than large companies. Moreover, 
in the context of the crisis, 39 % of the 32,000 respondents consider that companies do 
not take seriously their impact on society whereas almost exactly the same proportion of 
respondents (40%) thinks the opposite. Citizen’s view on CSR is positive in the overall, 
as it is said to contribute to get out of the crisis, even though the crisis would erode it 
and discrimination in employment remains a concern in public opinion488.  
More interestingly, the extent to which the work of the EU and other international 
organisations has permeated business practice seems still low. A study on 200 randomly 
selected large companies reveals openly improvable results489. Even if 68% of 
companies refer to CSR (or similar definitions) and 40% cite at least one internationally 
recognised CSR instrument, the sample indicates two major limitations: first of all, a 
very shy third of the sampled companies comply with the Commission’s request to refer 
to at least one of the main instruments (the UN Global Compact, OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises or ISO 26000); but secondly, only five companies (2’5 % of 
the sample) do cite the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, very 
illustrative percentage that shows the lack of a consolidated human rights approach to 
CSR, to overcome the strong inertia to consider it a mere marketing strategy.  
Besides, in contradiction with citizens’ perception shown by the above-cited 
Eurobarometer (more doubtful about the engagement of larger companies), according to 
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this study on 200 enterprises it seems that those over 10,000 employees would 
paradoxically be three times more likely to refer to different international standards, in 
comparison with smaller companies (between 1,000 and 10,000 employees). The 
Commission interpreted that smaller companies needed a particular guidance and has 
issued a number of documents addressed at SME’s in 2013, that range from the 
handbook “My Business and Human Rights” (very correctly emphasizing the centrality 
of human rights in CSR490), to the publication of a six pages study of five SME’s –of 
questionable usefulness- entitled “De-mystify Human Rights for Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises”.  
Without contesting the importance of fostering CSR amongst SME’s, which constitute 
the majority of EU’s business fabric491, we do not consider it a problem of 
“mystification”. The Commission’s focus on SME’s is right, but the statistics showing 
their apparently lower level of engagement might have in fact a different origin, 
especially if citizen’s perception is the opposite. A simpler explanation should take into 
consideration the logically lower accounting requirements for SME’s and their reduced 
communication strategies, what does not necessarily mean that SME’s are actually less 
committed or socially responsible at a local or community level492; bigger companies 
are usually keener and much more interested in communicating their CSR thanks to 
structured media and information departments. In 2014 the EC finally noticed this 
“fallacy”493. 
The informative and promotion strategy in the form of studies and reports is, in many 
cases, the output of networking events organised by the Commission, who has the 
capacity-building know-how and the institutional structure to make them possible. For 
                                                          
490
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: My Business and Human Rights. A guide to human rights for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, Brussels (March 2013), 28 pp.  
491
 According to the latest available data of 2013/2014, 99’8% of all companies in the EU are SME’s, 
responsible for the 66’9% of employment, while large companies constitute 0’2% and employ 33’1 % of 
the active population. In terms of total value added at factor costs in the EU, SME’s are 16’2 percentage 
points above large companies. EUROPEAN COMMISSION: A partial and fragile recovery. Annual 
report on European SME’s 2013/2014, Brussels (July 2014), p. 15.  
492
 C.D. DITLEV-SIMONSEN, H. von WELTZIEN HOIVIK and O. IHLEN: “The historical 
development of Corporate Social Responsibility in Norway”, in S.O. IDOWWU, R. SCHMIDETER and 
M.S. FIFKA (Eds.): Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe. United in Sustainable Diversity, 
Switzerland 2015, Springer Ed., pp. 177-196, at pp. 190-191.  
493
 “At the same time it must be noted that it is a fallacy to assume that SME’s and micro-companies 
necessarily have a lower awareness of CSR issues. With their close ties to their local communities such 
small businesses often have a heightened awareness of their social responsibility in the local context, 
whether or not any initiatives taken are officially labelled as CSR or not”. EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 
Corporate Social Responsibility. National Public Policies in the European Union, Compendium 2014, 
Brussels 2014, p. 14.  
161 
 
example, still on the subject of SME’s, a handbook for advisers was published in 2013 
after a meeting held 11-12 June 2012 attended by 100 advisers494. 
We can observe that meetings with stakeholders, CSO’s and experts usually lead to the 
publication of studies. A good example is the report “Helping consumers make informed 
green choices and ensuring a level playing field for business”, which was the result of a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue presented at the European Consumer Summit in March 
2013. It gave us some clues on the evolving Commission’s opinion on unfair 
commercial practices in relation to environmental standards: the so-called “green-
washing”, misleading advertising, the reliability of eco-labels and the self- and co-
regulation problems. Also under the initiative of the DG SANCO (Health and 
Consumers), there is work in process to extend the range of products covered by these 
studies, such as non-food products, second hand cars, electricity or children and the 
internet, always through several multi-stakeholders dialogues on environmental claims 
that may delay their publication.  
In a different area, meetings have also been very frequent with “CSR Europe”, one of 
the most prominent business-lead organisation in the EU with 70 corporate members 
and 41 national CSR organisations495, leader of the private programme Enterprise 2020 
aimed at completing the Europe 2020 Strategy with the point of view of entrepreneurs 
after two meetings with Commission’s representatives in September and November 
2012, to be added to its participation in the numerous multi-stakeholders dialogues 
organised in Brussels. Also important, but for the moment less active in the EU, is 
UNPRI496, an investors’ initiative on Socially Responsible Investments (SRI’s) in 
partnership with the UNEP Financial Initiative and the UN Global Compact, who is 
more and more involved in negotiations and dialogues with the Commission. 
Networking events have covered a variety of matters, like the CSR dimension of youth 
and employment497 or active ageing and mental health at workplace. In cooperation with 
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“CSR Europe”, the Healthy Aging Conference led to a 20 pages study completed in 
May 2013 and co-funded by the Commission, and –interestingly enough– it warns that 
the environmental concerns need to be completed with labour issues in CSR policies498. 
We have already noted that the environmental protection has traditionally been ahead 
with respect to general human rights and CSR; nevertheless, we have to keep in mind 
the risk that the environment monopolise CSR, which is evidently a quite wider field.  
Apart from statistics, surveys and short studies following to these networking events or 
experts’ meetings, the Commission further allocates funds for research to obtain more 
rigorous information upon which it can build a more credible promotion of CSR. We 
have already cited, because of their prominence, the Study of the Legal Framework on 
Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating 
outside the European Union, made by the University of Edinburgh in 2010499 and the 
study on Responsible Supply Chain Management Potential Success Factors and 
Challenges for Addressing Prevailing Human Rights and Other CSR Issues in Supply 
Chains of EU-Based Companies (2011)500, carried out under the EU Programme for 
Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS, 2007-2013).  
Other co-funded research projects have a more practical vocation, such as the European 
Apparel and Textile Confederation and Industry-All (a European Trade Union) tool to 
assist SME’s and, in general, the textile industry when operating abroad: it consists of 
country-by-country assessments, including mathematic and qualitative factors inspired 
on the ISO 26000, to inform on the main human rights risks for the textile industry, 
particularly chemicals and pollution. After a period of refinement, it is aimed to be 
made available as an online tool at the end of 2016501. Also very pragmatic was the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
includes the project “CSR in Europe: Prince, Merchant and Citizen as one”. The latter consisted of a 17 
months project to disseminate CSR among youngsters: it finalised in 2013, was adjudicated to several 
organisations and CSO’s with experience in youth issues, comprising workshops, seminars, courses that 
took place in Italy, Poland, Turkey and Portugal, all financed by the Commission.  
498
 We refer to the SWOT Analysis Report “Joint Action on Mental Health and Well-Being. Mental 
Health at the Workplace”, 20 pp, at p. 16. Available at: www.mentalhealthandwellbeing.eu 
499
 Available at : http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/business-human-
rights/101025_ec_study_final_report_en.pdf  
500
 This was a very comprehensive research including up to 12 case-studies. 
http//ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/business-human-rights/final_rscm_report-
11-04-12_en.pdf  
501
 SWD (2015) 144 Final, 14 July 2015, on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights –State of Play, p. 12.  
163 
 
approach of a more general project, financed under the Seventh Framework Programme, 
to assess the impact of CSR, in quantitative and qualitative terms502.  
Further resources have been allocated to the European Multistakeholder Platforms on 
Corporate Social Responsibility in relevant business sectors, which have been 
adjudicated for instance in the fruit juice, machine tools and social housing sectors, 
besides a specific DG Connect platform called “ICT4Society” to coordinate CSR issues 
in the ICT.  
Other sectors have also been covered: to foster the so-called “socially responsible 
investments” (SRI’s) the Commission co-funded with the UN Global Compact and 
UNEP, a capacity building project on the integration of non-financial information into 
investment decisions, lastly published in February 2013 by UNPRI –a private investors 
initiative on SRI’s503.  
Finally, the Commission commissioned the publication of three sector-specific 
guidelines: on employment and recruitment agencies, information and communication 
technology and oil/gas companies, to better inform on the implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles adapted to the particularities of these types of companies, always 
after large consultations504. Even if there is no innovative approach and the EU keeps on 
recognising the leadership of the UN principles and guidelines, the contribution again is 
its unwavering human rights approach and its dissemination and promotion efforts.  
Networking meetings and conferences, co-funding research projects and their output in 
the form of reports, in sum, reliable information, is the very cornerstone of the EU’s 
promotion strategy of CSR. As we have seen, the Commission has played a leading 
role, culminated with the organisation of the first “CSR Awards” in 2013, to round off 
this informative and promotion work, while raising its visibility. 
                                                          
502
 See www.csr-impact.eu. Unfortunately, apart from general information, the website has been emptied 
once finalised the project so that there is no public access to documents and conclusions.  
503
 Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative –ESG Integration Working Group: Integrated 
Analysis. How investors are addressing environmental, social and governance factors in fundamental 
equity valuation, 27 pp. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/pgqbdds 
504
 Shift and the Institute for Human Rights and Business were commissioned to write all three guidelines 
cited: EUROPEAN COMMISSION: Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, Brussels (June 2013), 91 pp.; Id.: Employment and 
Recruitment Agencies. Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, Brussels (June 2013), 96 pp.; and Id.: ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, Brussels (June 2013), 98 pp. All three are available for free at 
http://bookshop.europa.eu.  
164 
 
 
3.2.2. Implementation of the CSR agenda: international and institutional aspects 
The information and promotion initiatives are further articulated by an institutional 
commitment outside the EU, confirming the global and developmental dimension of 
CSR after 2009. No need to repeat the institutional willingness ad intra, behind all 
consultations and initiatives studied in the previous section (informative and promotion 
strategies), to which we shall only add, because of its institutional importance ad extra, 
the creation of the Council Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM) to monitor the 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2012-2014), principally addressed to the 
EU institutions themselves and Member States, annexed to the more general EU 
Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy adopted in June 2012. The main 
task of COHOM is to coordinate and ensure the consistency between the external and 
internal actions of the EU, carrying out an important bilateral and multilateral work but 
also, inside the EU, encouraging Member States to adopt national action plans. 
Everything suggests that human rights will continue to mainstream, more or less 
effectively, the institutional work of the EU and, obviously, with regard to business and 
human rights in its external relations505. 
From a formal and political perspective, business and human rights have been fully 
incorporated into the agenda of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights in 
bilateral meetings, particularly with Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador), Asia (China and Indonesia) and Africa (especially South Africa). In the EU 
relations with third countries, it is worth citing the EU-US Human Rights Dialogue in 
2012, which considered the implementation of the UNGP’s. The EU has similarly 
addressed CSR in the first meeting of the EU-Korea Committee on Trade and 
Sustainable Development, or on the occasion of other bilateral meetings, such as the 
EC-Turkey sub-committee on Industry and Trade and the EU-Chile Association 
Committee meetings. 
It is worth stopping a moment at the EU-Chile Association Agreement, which states that 
“The Parties remind their multinational enterprises of their recommendation to observe 
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the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”506. Despite its inclusion as a 
political declaration of difficult enforcement507, annexed to the Agreement itself, its 
significance is undeniable in the consolidation of a corpus of soft international norms. 
In any case, most of the literature passes over the fact that the Agreement itself includes 
a clear reference to CSR, even if it does not use this term, but a circumlocution when 
art. 18 c) mentions “transparency, good regulatory practices and the promotion of 
quality standards for products and business practices”, apart from more typical explicit 
human rights references in articles 1, 12, 16 and 44. Article 44 is particularly 
noteworthy, since it covers social cooperation with elements that are now considered 
part of the definition of CSR508.  
Bilaterally speaking, trade and development are now intertwined in the EU negotiations. 
The trade and development policies, highly bureaucratised, have suffered some changes 
in the same direction, i.e., including unprecedented dialogues and strategies with third 
countries, with which CSR is being consolidated as a recurrent item on the agenda. The 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights included in its 2012 and 2013 
Action Plans the promotion of trade unions and social dialogues in third countries. It is 
since 2012 that the Commission issued a Communication in which it started to take into 
account CSR and private actors in the development and trade policies to stimulate 
responsible business practices509. The Council’s reaction to the Commission’s 
Communication was very prompt agreeing with the “crucial role of the private sector” 
and the importance of “partnerships between the private and public sectors” and 
“dialogue with civil society”, therefore supporting the inclusion of innovative green and 
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social criteria in trade and development policies as part of the EU’s external action510. 
The Council reiterated the same idea just a few months later and, if there was any doubt, 
it explicitly mentioned the promotion of CSR511.  
In this context, the Commission’s new modus operandi in development policies has 
definitely incorporated CSR amongst the conditions to be taken into account when 
negotiating an agreement, thus institutionally fostering CSR expansion beyond the 
EU512. In the EU relations with third States, we note the increasing importance of 
ratifying international human rights instruments, labour and environmental standards, 
fight against corruption, besides the promotion of CSR programmes in these partner 
countries, “encouraging public-private policy dialogues […] to try to increase 
willingness among governments and local authorities to engage in open discussions 
with private sector representatives”513, with a particular focus on disadvantaged groups. 
A practical and relatively successful example is the SWITCH-Asia Programme towards 
sustainable production and consumption patterns, especially addressed at SME’s to 
extend good practices and codes of conduct, besides institutionalising the EU-Asia and 
intra-Asian cooperation. This model has been copied to other regions without the same 
success for instance (SWITCH-Africa Green, SWITCH-MED for Mediterranean 
countries, a middle-east partnership with EAP-Green). Their main contribution is the 
acknowledgement that changes need to be stimulated also in the demand sector 
(consumers), to render more attractive the productive efforts to comply with CSR 
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standards, so promoting market rewards for CSR-friendly companies while 
consolidating civil society and human rights awareness in developing countries.  
In parallel, the European Investment Bank, a major international investor in 
development, has updated its Environmental and Social Handbook by the end of 2013 
to integrate the UNGP’s among the standards to be considered when making investment 
decisions514.  
In addition to the EU relations with third States, there is an utterly important multilateral 
dimension of this institutional and international work on CSR, remarkably intertwining 
trade, development and human rights.  
At the level of other regional integration organisations, we could start citing the EU-
African Union (AU) Human Rights Dialogue held in November 2013, a specific EU-
AU Business and Human Rights conference was scheduled for September 2014, taking 
advantage of the already organised UN Conference on the same issue in Addis Ababa. 
As for the European role in Africa we shall highlight the importance of a shift in 
language to overcome allegations of paternalism, fair or not, and the traditional scheme 
of conditionalities, which is in part behind the fact that many African countries have 
turned their attention to China and other new partners. China’s investments are not 
subject to the stricter European standards515; we consider that a wider debate and 
dialogue on “business and human rights”, making it clear that they are compatible, can 
soften these relations and improve and revitalise the European role in the African 
continent (without rejecting basic conditions and similar formulas for EU aid or 
investments).  
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A different problem arises when we face many States’ fragility, or even failure, which is 
also a predominantly African problem516 on which the EU could further warn and assist 
TCN’s. The Commission is aware that “specific approaches are required particularly for 
fragile and conflict-affected countries that are urgently in need of jobs and economic 
opportunities to restore social cohesion, peace and political stability”517, even though 
more technical and detailed initiatives in this respect are pending to move beyond 
institutional good intentions. In 2010 the Cotonou Agreement introduced a new article 
11.4 to address States’ fragility, with a general call for multilateral cooperation to 
“agree on the best way to strengthen capabilities of States to fulfil their core functions”, 
but without really concrete ideas. EU Delegations in third countries are supposed to 
advice EU-based companies in this regard as well as help them face the potential human 
rights’ risks following to the Delegation’s field experience. The EIDHR is deploying a 
network of focal points in EU Delegations, similarly to the OECD “national contact 
points”. Coordinated multilateral actions are essential to get closer to any solution. The 
international agenda has started with the AU, introducing business and human rights 
issues, but needs to be translated into concrete actions in the future.  
Indeed, as for the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, the several revisions 
of the Cotonou Agreement make it a promising text. The latest revision in 2010 has 
added sustainable development goals and further human rights provisions, recognising 
both civil and political and economic and social rights with a very positive level of 
detail518. Notwithstanding these improvements and new references to the role of private 
actors, the link between business and human rights is still under-developed. 
Moving to another regional integration organisation, there are on-going negotiations 
with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). There have 
been two EU-CELAC Summits (in Santiago –Chile January 2013 and in June 2015 in 
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Brussels). The first Summit ended up with a Declaration that formally acknowledged 
the importance of coordinating CSR strategies in the two regions. In Latin America 
CSR was interestingly linked to the fight against corruption (and the further ratification 
of the UN Convention against Corruption)519, in addition to more classical issues as the 
support of the Rio +20 agenda, the collaboration to build up a renovated post-2015 
engagement520, and to promote socially and environmentally responsible investments 
between the two regions521. In fact, two senior official seminars were organised to 
follow up in October 2013 and September 2014 with a view to extending the 
development of national action plans in both regions, as explicitly reaffirmed in June 
2015 within the Brussels Declaration following to the II EU-CELAC Summit522.  
The institutional cooperation, initiated with the AU, ACP States and CELAC, is likely 
to be extended, if possible in similar terms, to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)523 and maybe other international organisations at a regional level.  
In any case, multilateral initiatives are numerous: an example with major media 
repercussions on an international scale was the tragedy in Rana Plaza (Bangladesh), 
after which this country launched the “Sustainability Compact for Continuous 
Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-Made Garment and 
Knitwear Industry”, with the support of the EU, the ILO and the US.  
Also from this multilateral point of view, a comparable project takes place in 
Myanmar/Burma to “Promote Fundamental Labour Rights and Practices”, under the 
leadership of the EU and the ILO together with the participation of the US, Japan and 
Denmark. Myanmar’s trade and development story brings us the opportunity to raise a 
captivating case: being a frequent human rights violator, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (USA) adopted on the 25 June 1996 restrictive public procurement 
legislation against Burma-Myanmar, which indirectly affected any EU-based company 
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linked to that country (mainly due to trade relations or subsidiary structures). A year 
later, the EC brought a formal complaint before the WTO –probably under the pressure 
of companies– alleging a violation of articles VIII (B), X and XII of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement524. Opportunely enough, the Federal District Court in Boston 
annulled Massachusetts’ selective purchase Act so that the EC finally suspended the 
proceedings against the USA in Geneva, revealing Europe’s certain degree of cynicism 
and “inconsistency”525: at the same time of starting the dispute settlement within the 
WTO, the EU had renewed its sanctions against Burma and withdrew it from the 
General System of Preferences (GSP). 
This case leads us onto the subject of the EU’s international commitment beyond 
spontaneous multilateral projects after a disaster or the inter-regional level. It is crucial 
to analyse the voice of the EU in global multilateral fora like the WTO. Fortunately, 
Myanmar’s case is relatively out-of-date: the EU has realised that GSP can contribute to 
extend CSR globally. Beginning with a focus on labour law, the European GSP human 
rights requirements are wider and wider reform after reform. The European special 
incentive arrangements, including labour and environmental standards, have legal bases 
under the GATT Agreement (1994): despite the general Most Favoured Nation rule of 
Article I, the so-called Enabling Clause allows tariff preferences towards developing 
countries to help them meet their specific “development, financial and trade needs”526 –
it is worth highlighting that it is not restricted to trade and financial problems, but it is 
extended to more general development goals. 
A very important precedent-setting case brought by India against the EC provided the 
opportunity to clarify under which conditions European tariff preferences for 
developing countries comply with WTO Law (GATT Agreement in this case). The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled in 2005 that some anti-drugs provisions of the 
contested GSP (Reg. 2501/2001) were discriminatory and arbitrary: the Chapeau of art. 
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 According the norms of procedure of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the EC first issued a Request 
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 A. GATTO: “Corporate Social Responsibility in the External Relations of the EU”, in Yearbook of 
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“Enabling Clause” is considered part of the GATT Agreement in line with paragraph 1 (b) iv) of Annex 
1A incorporating GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement, including “other decisions of the Contracting 
Parties to GATT 1947”. 
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XX b) of GATT was not sufficient to justify a closed list of 12 beneficiaries in the 
Drugs Arrangement, apparently excluding other developing countries. In doing so, the 
Appellate Body (AB) upheld the Panel’s previous assessment527, but importantly 
nuanced the reasoning and reversed some of the Panel’s conclusions: the discriminatory 
nature of the Drugs Arrangement did not emanate from the fact that it was not granted 
to all developing countries without distinctions, in a restrictive interpretation of the term 
“discrimination”. Although agreements under the Enabling Clause do not annul the 
necessary respect of non-discrimination between developing countries528, the Enabling 
Clause itself also considers the possibility of distinguishing amongst developing 
countries under certain circumstances529. According to the WTO AB, paragraph 3 of the 
Enabling Clause envisages specific conditions to grant preferential treatment: the 
existence of objective criteria to justify different treatment, due to “development, 
financial and trade needs”, which “must be assessed according to an objective 
standard”. Such criteria can respond to the “[b]road-based recognition of a particular 
need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by 
international organisations, [which] could serve as such a standard”530. The EC Drugs 
Arrangement provided a list of 12 beneficiaries without prerequisites, but it did not 
detail any positive and objective criteria by which a developing country may qualify for 
preferences, so that the EC failed to demonstrate the non-discriminatory nature of the 
regulation (the absence of criteria makes it impossible to show it is not discriminatory). 
Therefore, WTO law allows distinctions between developing countries: the EC Drugs 
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Arrangement was not discriminatory because of that, but because it did not include 
‘objective criteria’ on ‘development, trade and financial needs’. The most crucial 
progress is the mention of other international organisations to justify the objective 
criteria behind preferential treatment systems in terms of “development, financial and 
trade needs”.  
Anyway, this precedent is essential to lawfully unite development, human rights and 
trade in EU Law. Although the EC lost this case, the European GSP schemes were 
paradoxically reinforced in terms of international trade law in order to legitimately and 
legally cover development concerns, clarifying under which conditions. GSP schemes 
can include CSR clauses and requisites, according to internationally recognised 
standards, to help raise human rights in developing countries531. More recently, the EU 
has actually included sustainable development and (explicitly) corporate social 
responsibility in the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (2009) and with Colombia 
and Peru in March 2010, so we can truly speak of a “merger of Corporate Social 
Responsibility into the EU Common Commercial Policy”532. The WTO Agreements 
have several open windows to which we already referred in the general part of this work 
(in this case, the Enabling Clause and art. XX of GATT). The EU can put them into 
practice, actually opening those windows, provided that certain legal conditions are met 
–which don’t seem colossal or unmanageable.  
The EU international commitment to foster CSR and business and human rights 
principles can have two major consequences: first, to increase the level of consensus in 
this regard within the international society; secondly, to effectively impact the 
interpretation of the already available International Law to make changes possible, 
without necessarily have recourse to new instruments. 
Finally, the UN fora are also a good scenario for more political than technical 
statements, also useful if they contribute to advance the state of opinion of the 
international society. The EU has always participated with high level representatives to 
                                                          
531
 A similar conclusion on the human rights’ potential of the India vs. EC case but by different means: A. 
GATTO: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights. Obligations under EU Law and International 
Law, United Kingdom-USA 2011, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., pp. 246-252. 
532
 O. QUIRICO: “The Merger of Corporate Social Responsibility into the EU Common Commercial 
Policy”, in European Company Law, Vol. 9 (2012) No. 2, pp. 93-100, at pp. 94-95. According to the 
author, Parliament’s Resolutions 2009/2201 and 2010/2103 advocate to incorporate, respectively, CSR 
and climate change into the CCP. However, even if they point in the same direction, we would be 
cautious as to what extent the Commission will effectively put them in practice.  
173 
 
support the implementation of the UNGP’s, particularly in all annual Forums on 
Business and Human Rights in Geneva (Switzerland). Within the framework of the UN 
OHCHR, the EU is collaborating with the project “Accountability and Remedy” to 
increase the available information and advice for States on access to justice in cases of 
human rights violations involving TNC’s533. Still pending is the cooperation or 
adherence to the UN Principles for Responsible Management Education. Despite its 
originality as an international organisation, the EU has also acted as such when it 
supported the “Montreux Document on pertinent legal obligations and good practices 
for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed 
conflict”, which is an highly topical problem, encouraging this way up to 23 EU 
Member States to adhere to that document. Moreover, the EU as such has become 
member of the Working Group on the International Code of Conduct Association, born 
in 2013 in Geneva.  
At a totally political level, in June 2015 and during the preparatory meetings of the G7 
under the German Presidency, the EU apparently advocated for the inclusion of CSR 
issues in the final Declaration534. It is important to note the explicit support of the 
UNGP’s and the agreement to “urge private sector implementation of human rights due 
diligence”535, placing strong emphasis on supply chains and labour standards (a specific 
fund is foreseen in cooperation with the ILO, maybe extended to the G-20 
participation). 
Sustainable development, the MDG’s, the post-2015 agenda, and human rights are, in 
conclusion, the rails of the EU’s institutional actions both inside and outside the EU, but 
especially when engaging with third countries and other international organisations or 
fora. All in all, there has been an international and institutional implementation of CSR 
with an important role played by the Commission, albeit the challenge remains to make 
a real impact in the field avoiding leftovers or loose ends. 
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3.2.3.  Implementation of the CSR agenda: impact on EU Law 
On top of the information/promotion initiatives and the international commitment at an 
institutional level, we also find a good amount of actions with a clear impact on EU 
Law, sometimes already in place and, in some other cases, with a remarkable potential 
ad futuram. In other words, the implementation of the CSR agenda is having important 
legal spill-overs in different law-fields. 
A number of scandals (WorldCom, Tyco, Enron, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, and very 
recently Volkswagen) together with the financial (and then economic) crisis since 
2007/2008, have both favoured a relative reversal of some of the previous neo-liberal 
trends. This context explains why corporate governance has been one of the first areas 
in which transparency and CSR have emerged. By way of introduction, we find an 
unprecedented value judgement in recital 62 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the Parliament 
and the Council: “Remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk-taking 
behaviour can undermine sound and effective risk management of credit institutions and 
investment firms”536. The debate is assured.  
A characteristic corporate governance debate lies behind this problematic: modern 
capitalist societies have witnessed an increasing separation between owners and 
managers, at least in large companies. The power balance between them is a central 
issue of corporate governance537, particularly centred on the protection of shareholders. 
We can basically study corporate governance from three perspectives: company law, 
capital market law and labour law. The evolution apparently shows a monopolisation by 
capital market law, a “marketization” of corporate governance whose main criticism 
may be the relegation of workers’ rights to vaguer social issues, with blatant examples 
in the occasion of takeovers538.  From this rather critical view, in interpreting corporate 
law “the ECJ has legally reinforced the four freedoms, bypassing a political debate on 
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the subordination of social policies and rights to capitalist freedoms”539, “within the 
broader context of deepening financial market integration in the EU and the dominance 
of financial market imperatives”540. 
Being partly correct, it seems to us a rather exaggerated conclusion, in light of recent 
EU Directives that head to compulsory transparency measures with a wider range of 
addressees: “Mandatory reporting in that area can therefore be seen as an important 
element of the corporate responsibility of institutions towards stakeholders and society” 
(not only shareholders)541. The EU has perfectly taken note of the traps behind 
voluntary codes when analysing the misconduct of the financial sector before the 
crisis542, and even encourages Member States to go beyond the European incipient 
regulations543. In the area of corporate governance, the so-called Accounting Directives 
have suffered similar changes544: Directive 2013/34/EU marks a turning point as it 
establishes that undertakings considered of “public-interest”, i.e., admitted to stock 
markets in the EU, have the obligation to elaborate corporate governance statements. 
This information should include the applicable corporate code of conduct, any code 
voluntarily adopted and practices “over and above the requirements of national law”545, 
confirming that CSR already has a place under the sun and consists of going beyond 
legal obligations. It also covers control and risk management systems and details on the 
management and supervisory bodies.  
In addition to this, we also find in Directive 2013/34/EU546 a very innovative measure 
that obliges the extractive industry (minerals, oil, natural gas, deposits and other 
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materials as well as active in the logging of primary forests) to report on payments to 
governments over €100,000 within a financial year, in money or in kind including tax 
exemptions, royalties and dividends, licence fees or payments for infrastructure 
improvements547. The negotiation of this aspect has been tough and long, for evident 
reasons: the Commissions’ proposal was dated October 2011 and the aforementioned 
Directive wasn’t adopted until mid-2013, undergoing in this regard some important 
modifications. In particular, it should be noted that the legislative proposal made by the 
Commission548 was even more restrictive and did not include any payment out of 
control (the €100,000 limit). 
Here the US’s influence is clear: precisely in January 2010 and with bipartisan support, 
the US adopted in a joint session of the Congress and the Senate the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, to enhance transparency and financial 
stability. Under its section 1504, an addendum (letter Q) is made to Section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act (1934), to oblige the extractive industry to report on payments 
to governments, in very comparable terms to those used –later– in the EU. The US Act 
commissioned the SEC to detail in a further regulation the quantities, types of payments 
or projects and other operative provisions549. In August 2012 the SEC issued the final 
rule limiting it to payments over $100,000 (aggregate or individually), exactly the same 
symbolic amount established in Directive 2013/34/EU in June 2013. However, 
following to a suit filed by a coalition of industry groups (leaded by Exxon Mobil, 
Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell and BP), the SEC rule was annulled in July 2013 by the US 
District Court in Washington DC and will have to be reviewed. In September 2014, 
after the 270 days deadline, Oxfam America filed a new suit to put pressure on the SEC 
to approve a final ruling, which is not likely to be ready before spring 2016.  
                                                          
547
 Ibíd., Chapter 10, articles 41-46 (at pp. 52-53).  
548
 COM (2011) 684 Final, of 25 October 2011, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of 
certain types of undertakings, pp. 61-62. 
549
 “Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, the Commission shall issue final rules that require each resource extraction 
issuer to include in an annual report of the resource extraction issuer information relating to any payment 
made by the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or an entity under 
the control of the resource extraction issuer to a foreign government or the Federal Government for the 
purpose of commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals, including: i) the type and total amount 
of such payments made for each project of the resource extraction issuer relating to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas or minerals; and ii) the type and total amount of such payments made to 
each government”. CONGRESS OF THE USA (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 5 January 2010, Section 1504, H.R. 4173 pp. 845-847, at pp. 845-846, article Q, 2 (A). 
Emphasis added.  
177 
 
In any case, the European Directive was passed in the meanwhile (2013), with a clear 
American influence, despite the current problems and delays to be finally implemented 
in the US. The Directive’s level of transposition into national law by Member States is 
very low despite the relative margin of appreciation, and the scarce national 
implementing measures generally do not include this requirement for the extractive 
industry550. In spite of all, it constitutes a benchmark as it openly recognises the 
importance of non-financial information from a social and environmental approach551, 
particularly addressed at the extractive industry, which is frequently the target of human 
rights defenders. 
Directive 2013/34/EU, in turn, has been significantly amended by Directive 
2014/95/EU in order to further reinforce CSR requirements, extending non-financial 
reporting to large companies (more than 500 employees), whether they operate or not in 
the stock markets.  Directive 2014/95/EU also changes the content of corporate 
governance reports and stipulates that they will comprise “as a minimum, 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption 
and bribery matters”552. This amendment maintains the provision on reports of 
payments to governments by the extractive industry, but constitutes a crucial 
improvement of Directive 2013/34/EU. It recognises, in a legally binding text, the 
centrality of human rights in CSR. Guidelines on non-financial reporting are expected 
by December 2016, the same deadline for transposition, so that the first reports shall be 
issued for the financial year 2017. 
Through this initial legal work, the EU further assumes the “multidimensional nature of 
corporate social responsibility”553, indirectly recognising the usefulness of social 
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coercion implied by soft law approaches554, which has begun with disclosure 
requirements. Indeed, “non-financial transparency is therefore a key element of any 
CSR policy”555; the EU works on transparency issues since the last decade but, 
combined with CSR within the framework of corporate governance, it can improve both 
the internal market and respect for human rights556. 
Perhaps less ambitious at first sight than the above-cited Directives, the protection of 
retail investors has received particular attention in terms of transparency and social 
responsibility, what is by the way very important taking into account the large number 
of individuals and families who had purchased toxic assets before the financial crisis, 
including complex financial products that embedded derivatives, without due 
information. In this respect, a recent Regulation557 has laid down new simplified 
disclosure obligations and standardised leaflets to duly inform eventual retail investors; 
from now on, they can apply for compensation if they succeed to demonstrate that 
losses result from the reliance on that “key information document”. In view of the 
complexity of many financial products from the perspective of retail investors, the 
Commission had proposed the reversal of the burden of the proof558. But the Council 
finally rejected it and further stated that the manufacturers of such products “shall not 
incur civil liability solely on the bases of the key information document” (article 11 of 
the Regulation), unless the documents are clearly misleading or inaccurate. To some 
extent, the reversal of the burden of the proof has become a fashionable legal tool, also 
in human rights law, but its abuse isn’t either advisable and does not necessarily bring 
the solutions to the problems. In this sense, we think that this Regulation is a new 
element towards integrating CSR in corporate governance, in the belief that 
“[i]ncreasingly, retail investors pursue, along with the financial returns on their 
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investment, additional purposes such as social or environmental goals”559. Accepting 
that there are no “one-size fits all” solutions, the CSR legal spill-overs are taking the 
form of “comply or explain mandates” to start enhancing disclosure of non-financial 
information, also in the area of energy and pollution560.  
Notwithstanding these improvements in the area of corporate governance, when the 
Commission has tried to move forward with more precise actions beyond disclosure 
requirements, it has encountered some barriers. This is what happens to the project to 
regulate “supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, 
tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas”. In 2010 the EP asked the Commission to imitate (again) the US –the above-cited 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (in this case, Section 
1502)561, built upon the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. The Commission’s proposal 
consists of a hard norm, which would serve as a framework for self-regulation 
(certifications and good practices) to foster responsible supply chains in this highly 
sensitive trade of minerals. The public competent authorities would help to implement 
self-certifications and provide with the structures for review, reporting and claiming, 
being thus a more daring initiative. The Commission advocates for a mixed hard and 
soft approach, in which companies partly manage a self-certificate as “responsible 
importers” but, once in, they must fully comply with the OECD guidelines and accept 
supervision and reporting. Another option would be to make it compulsory to join the 
system, so that the number of Companies would be higher, but the requirements would 
eventually persuade them to leave certain risk areas looking for an alternative sourcing, 
to make it easier to comply with the standards. This would probably generate serious 
market distortions when abandoning already weak countries, in which companies would 
not source anymore. What is more, by leaving these conflict-affected or high-risk areas, 
at the end, nothing would point to improvements on the ground. Since 2010, after the 
approval of Dodd-Frank Act, it has been assessed a drastic reduction of exports and 
increase of informal trade networks in DRC and neighbouring countries of the Great 
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Lakes Region where, again, we face the problem of failed States (DRC). This negative 
impact562, according to the Commission, could be minimised if the Regulation 
maintains the half-voluntary character of this self-certification system, so as to avoid 
worsening the problems at source by simply abandoning these areas.  
The fact is that the EP called on the Commission to regulate this matter in 2010, again 
inspired by the USA’s Dodd-Frank Act (here Section 1502), but the proposal was not 
drafted and published until 2014. The outcome is still unclear. Politically speaking, the 
Commission united to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy to put pressure on the Council and the Parliament, stressing 
the development and human rights coherence of adopting such a regulation, in the 
exposed terms, consistently with the values that should inform EU’s external action563. 
For instance, the Parliament’s reaction has been a profusion of amendments adopted on 
20 May 2015, even asking for a tougher regulation and accentuating the human rights 
aspects564. Although the negotiations seem to be delayed sine die, sooner or later it will 
certainly impact EU Law, probably in a positive manner if it succeeds in balancing, to 
the extent possible, the necessary requirement of responsible imports with the 
development needs of those areas.  
Finally, a complementary way to promote CSR through legally-binding instruments is 
the recent and innovative public procurement reform, which facilitates at the same time 
market reward to socially responsible companies. The EU has enforced new provisions 
that establish, as a general rule, that Member States’ public contracts shall comply with 
the “applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law 
established by Union law, national law, and collective agreements or by the 
international environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X”565. For 
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that purpose, labels can be used to evaluate candidates so that more economically 
advantageous tenderers might be rejected for those reasons 566.  
We find equivalent measures in Directive 2014/25/EU, specifically addressing public 
procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors567: article 36.2 
lays down the same labour, social and environmental principles, also evaluable through 
the appropriate labels (art. 61) and provides with a list of international agreements in 
Annex XIV. However, Annex X of Directive 2014/24/EU and Annex XIV of Directive 
2014/25 /EU completely forget two basic international human rights instruments: 
neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are apparently part of the EU 
“environmental, social and labour” standards dealing with public procurement, 
according to these Annexes, despite correctly citing many ILO and other environmental 
conventions. The Commission could easily correct it, for example, adding the above-
mentioned Conventions to Annex XIV of Directive 2014/25/EU, as a delegated act 
expressly foreseen by art. 76.8 of this Directive, given that all Member States have 
ratified both the ICCPR and the ICESCR568. In sum, despite improvable details, the 
public procurement reform has introduced new CSR criteria to award public contracts.  
To recapitulate, CSR has firstly been introduced in corporate governance, initiating an 
unprecedented role in legally binding texts. Its incipient impact on the financial sector 
led to the control of credit and investment institutions, including risk-linked 
remuneration policies within management boards and gender balance (Directive 
2013/36/EU). This was followed up with the protection of retail investors against 
misleading and aggressive practices, including new social and environmental 
considerations (Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2014). CSR has been extended also to non-
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financial disclosure requirements from a human rights approach (Directive 2013/34/EU 
and its partial amendment in Dir. 2014/95/EU), what applies to large companies in 
general terms (a potential of ca. 6000 EU Companies). Also Directive 2013/34/EU sets 
innovative reporting obligations for the extractive industry on payments to governments 
above €100000, what is likely to become an utterly interesting instrument to increase 
control on this industry as well as in the fight against corruption in developing 
countries. As can be seen, CSR has firstly penetrated the European Corporate 
Governance Regulation, which has become an “extremely versatile, comparative and 
transnational legal field”; in the overall, we detect positive aspects to the extent “both 
hard and soft norms governing particular elements of corporate governance, accentuates 
the degree to which European Corporate Governance Regulation has come under 
pressure to facilitate quasi-neutral, ‘best’ practices in ‘good’ corporate governance”569.  
In the end, we have seen that a comprehensive public procurement reform has added 
new CSR contracting requirements to be further regulated by Member States (Directives 
2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU). Then, the pending regulation on responsible supply 
chains of minerals appears a promising initiative, once more combining hard and soft 
norms, while the Commission seems to bear in mind the need to address human rights 
problems at source. We therefore note that the implementation of the CSR agenda has 
incipient legal spill-overs, which are far from negligible; it does not seem unreasonable 
to predict that this tendency will continue. 
 
3.3. National initiatives in the EU 
3.3.1. Member States’ role: challenges and opportunities 
The importance of Member States in ensuring the implementation of any EU policy or 
piece of legislation is beyond any doubt and the diverse levels of compliance have for 
long received the attention of the literature. It is too soon to make any study on the 
transposition of the CSR-aspects of the Directives analysed above; once possible, i.e., 
after the expiration of the deadlines for transposition or even slightly later, such a 
research might be of interest to confront it to the state of the art. For instance, the 
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deadline for transposition of Directive 2013/34/EU expired 20 July 2015 and no 
Member State has yet transposed into national law the aspects related to the disclosure 
of payments to governments by the extractive industry (arts. 41-46 of the Directive, 
which were not modified by Dir. 2014/95/EU so that the transposition deadline was not 
postponed in this regard). The transposition deadline for Directive 2014/95/EU, 
strengthening the CSR reporting requirements for large companies, expires 6 December 
2016. It happens the same with the public procurement reform (2014/24/EU and 
2014/25/EU, deadline 18 April 2016) so that they might be applied for the financial year 
2017, even though States like France, the Netherlands or Finland include similar 
provisions in their public procurements well before the appearance of these Directives, 
as we will illustrate below. Again, it is too soon to draw any conclusion on national 
implementing measures. Likewise, it would be premature to fully evaluate to what 
extent the EU succeeds in effectively mobilising Member States; only some preliminary 
comments might be done with the limited value of an early assessment. 
The limits of Member States’ discretion is a more than usual EU Law issue: if 
Directives impose obligations of results without predetermining the means, one can 
imagine to what extent soft law and CSR leave an ample room for manoeuvre. 
Harmonisation seems easier with soft law under the OMC (despite its imperfections, as 
discussed elsewhere in this work570) and it can be sometimes even more suitable, for 
example, to leave space for experimentation when national business systems and other 
national constraints widely differ. At the national level, the UN Guiding Principle 3-b) 
invites States to “provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect 
human rights throughout their operations”, at the same time they ensure the human 
rights-consistency of their legislation (UNGP 3-a)). This is the basis of Member States’ 
role. 
The EU has taken over the responsibility to promote compliance with the UNGPs 
among Member States. The famous Renewed EU Strategy 2011-2014 for CSR already 
asked Member States “to develop or update by mid-2012 their own plans or national 
lists of priority actions to promote CSR” 571, within the broader context of several peer 
reviews to exchange information and experiences. The Commission has undertaken 
seven of such peer reviews in 2013 to study the best policy options at a national level. 
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In June 2012, the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for 2012-2014, issued 
at the same time of the EU Strategic Framework on the same subject, foresees to 
“develop National Action Plans for EU Member States on implementation of the 
UNGPs”, ideally by 2013572. The Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy has 
been updated for the period 2015-2019 but the need to “develop and implement 
National Action Plans (NAPs) on the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles” 573 
is repeated. The current Action Plan then reiterates the necessary commitment at the 
national level and extends the deadline to 2017. 
Indeed, at the time of writing, only five Member States have developed such NAPs on 
“business and human rights”, thus implementing the UNGPs: Finland, the United 
Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Italy (a preliminary version considered 
valid). The COHOM is supposed to stimulate their adoption and monitor the state of 
implementation, apparently without much success in view of the modest number of 
NAPs on business and human rights.  
Nevertheless, up to eighteen Member States have specific NAPs on CSR (nineteen if we 
add the United Kingdom, with a longer tradition in this regard). Perhaps CSR has 
become a more attractive denomination (19 NAPs) compared to the “business and 
human rights” label (5 NAPs), despite their obvious closeness and the insistence of the 
EU to endorse the UN approach. Member States might be reluctant to intensify the 
human rights language within CSR, forgetting that the most effective way to approach 
the latter is through the UNGPs.  
Concerning NAPs on CSR, there are also a number of ways to adopt them: according to 
the latest available information574, only Cyprus and Bulgaria detailed the approval by 
the Council of Ministers, which seems the most authoritative option given the complex 
interaction between legal force and political power in our topic575. But the most usual 
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procedure consists of more or less informal governmental publications (a memorandum 
in Latvia, preparatory documents in France, non-binding policy papers issued by 
commissions or committees such as the Danish Council for CSR or the 
Interdepartmental Commission on Sustainable Development in Belgium –governmental 
bodies without real legislative powers). Screening all EU Member States, we further 
note that the Czech Republic has decided to add the UNGP’s within the already done 
CSR plan, and Malta is considering the same possibility for their NAP on CSR under 
development. That raises the question as to what extent two separate action plans are 
really necessary (one on CSR and a second one on business and human rights).  
For the time being, NAPs on CSR rarely lead to legislative actions; on the contrary, 
most of the time policies propose awareness raising and promotional activities, the 
softest options. To cite only a few examples: the usual eco-labels in Nordic countries; 
the Dutch online-tool to provide Companies with country assessments of human rights’ 
risks in third countries; a Polish CSR capacity-building program for SMEs; the Austrian 
toolkit for gender equality; the Estonian CSR label; the Irish “Business Working 
Responsibility Mark” to certify responsible and sustainable businesses; a CSR 
dictionary in Croatia; the Danish Partnership for Public Green Procurement; the Finish 
website “CSR Compass” to guide on CSR within public procurement; etc.  
Harder or softer, consolidated or recent, the fact is that 19 Member States have NAPs on 
CSR while only five on the UNGP’s. As stated, this is of course an additional aspect to 
complete a wider picture of the national initiatives in the EU. There are other 
differences among Member States caused by simpler factors: political tradition, the 
maturity of the civil society and quality of democracy, plus the diverse understandings 
of market coordinated economies. In this sense, the enlargement eastwards has 
incorporated countries with a less enthusiastic attitude towards any eventual hardening 
of CSR, since the attraction of FDIs constitutes there a priority and there is some 
historical fear to reintroduce politics in the economy.  
Economically speaking, the key factors that explain national differences in the EU are 
the greater or lesser exposure to international trade and supply chains, the importance of 
exports and the balance of payments, the relative weight of SMEs in the GDP, the major 
sectors of the economy, the number of MNC’s headquarters, and the macro- and micro-
economic situation in the overall. 
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As for the economic situation, many European NAPs on CSR include measures that 
actually respond to the crisis since 2007/2008, to tackle structural unemployment, 
youngsters and elderly people, and other internal problems (mainly in social affairs). 
Suffice the example of the Spanish label to acknowledge companies that take part in the 
“Strategy for Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment”. The crisis has generated a 
series of human rights challenges in some EU Member States: of course, one of the 
objectives of CSR is to enhance preventive measures to promote human rights’ 
horizontal effects, while actively involving private actors, with two dimensions, external 
and internal. But an excessive focus on the internal aspects may distort the sense of 
CSR. The obligation to respect core human rights treaties already existed for EU 
Member States, so that the predominance of internal social affairs is somehow 
unfocused, despite being a perfectly understandable priority. In this regard, it is basic to 
keep a distance and remain critical: we do not think that the contingent character of this 
crisis-motivated and internally-oriented approach to CSR is likely to bring about 
durable and positive changes, neither for society nor for companies themselves.  
In sum, national initiatives need to be contextualised within a broader analytical 
framework. On the ground, 39.83% of companies included in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index are located in EU Member States. We can list the EU countries in 
order: United Kingdom (second position; 12.57% of companies incorporated to the 
DJSI are British), Germany (4th position; 8.14%), France (5th; 6.75%), Spain (8th; 
3’65%), Netherlands (10th; 3.10%), Italy (12th; 2.79%), Denmark (13th; 1.42%), Sweden 
(15th; 1.02%), Finland (20th; 0.20%), Portugal (23rd; 0.15%) and Belgium (25th; 
0.04%)576. It must be noted that Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom 
and Italy, all having both NAPs (on CSR and on the UNGPs) do not necessarily have a 
higher number of companies within the DJSI compared to countries that only have 
NAPs on CSR (Sweden, France, Germany and Belgium), or compared to those with 
none of the two NAPs yet (Spain and Portugal, under development though). Moreover, 
these results need to be interpreted in the light of offshoring processes by which the 
dirtiest industries or production phases have been moved from advanced economies to 
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other parts of the world577, improving OECD countries’ performance in environmental 
and social matters. 
This reminds us the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: twenty-four EU 
Member States have adhered578, obliging themselves to establish National Contact 
Points with three main functions: CSR promotion, enquiries and research tasks, and the 
establishment of non-judicial dispute mediation mechanisms in some cases of alleged 
non-compliance with the Guidelines. Luxembourg or Austria have no NAPs yet, but 
they have adhered to the OECD Guidelines, and both established in 2000 their 
respective National Contact Points within the Ministry of Economy. 
In view of all that has been set out above, the presence of NAPs on CSR or specifically 
on business and human rights, or both of them, is not necessarily correlated to a better 
CSR performance. It will only be a sign, an indicative element that needs to be assessed 
through political, legal and economic filters.  
Denmark and France are good examples to complete this picture and reveal some grey 
zones: the Commission has not always been the torchbearer. Denmark has published its 
NAP on CSR in 2008 and on the UNGPs in 2014, but as early as 2008 an amendment to 
the Danish law on Financial Statements added new CSR requirements well-above the 
Directive applicable at that time and even more stringent than the current ones, with 
effects on companies above 250 employees (while the EU stated 500 employees). This 
constitutes an innovative and visionary introduction of CSR in Danish Company Law, 
with a clear human rights language; while specific CSR actions are up to the companies, 
the obligation is clear on the reporting side, marking a “gradual jurification of societal 
expectations of companies”579, extrapolating international standards and leading the way 
in the EU.   
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France has been far in front of other countries in continental Europe too: well-before the 
publication of the preparatory document for the French NAP on CSR (January 2013), 
and well in advance of Directives 2013/34/EU and 2014/95/EU, the French Grenelle 
Law of 2001, reformed in 2010 precisely to reinforce its CSR aspects, already 
established quite stringent non-financial disclosure requirements for companies. That is, 
three years before any EU directive was contemplated. The so-called Grenelle II Law 
(2010) did not just affect corporations operating in the stock markets, but also large 
companies in general terms as well as investment companies580. Investment funds and 
asset management companies have, since 2010, to prepare annual reports on the criteria 
concerning «le respect d’objectifs sociaux, environnementaux et de qualité de 
gouvernance». Furthermore, article 225 of the Grenelle II Law importantly clarifies 
their content:   «Il comprend également des informations sur la manière dont la société 
prend en compte les conséquences sociales et environnementales de son activité ainsi 
que sur ses engagements sociétaux en faveur du développement durable […] sur la 
société elle-même ainsi que sur l’ensemble de ses filiales […] ou les sociétés qu’elle 
contrôle […]»581. This French Law has another cutting-edge aspect: the creation of an 
independent monitoring body, tasked to verify the soundness of corporate reports and, 
as of the year 2016, empowered to issue an opinion («un avis motivé») on the sincerity 
of the content («la sincérité des  informations»)582 –a bit ingenuous in Foucauldian 
terms583.   
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Naturally, the Commission’s compendium on national public policies recognises the 
uniqueness of the early French initiatives in this regard584. Interestingly enough, it must 
be recalled that the Commission did not always praise France for this pioneering social 
and environmental progresses: at the request of tenderers in 1998, the Commission 
brought an action before the ECJ to declare the French failure to fulfil its obligations 
under Community Law because it had included social clauses (a campaign against 
unemployment) among the criteria to award public works contracts585. The Directives 
governing public procurement at the moment were almost exclusively centred on 
economic criteria, and the Commission initially played an unclear role in the potential 
extension to social and environmental issues. The ECJ followed a quite progressive 
interpretation to support some EU Member States that were already including social and 
environmental clauses in public contracts; not only in the above-cited case of the 
Commission vs. France, but also in three important preliminary rulings regarding the 
Netherlands586, Finland587 and Austria588. We have come a long way since that action 
against France; now the Commission actively supports further explicit CSR clauses in 
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 The Court concluded that the Directive then in force “does not preclude all possibility for the 
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particular the principle of non-discrimination flowing from the provisions of the Treaty on the right of 
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Directive if it has no direct or indirect discriminatory effect on tenderers from other Member States of the 
Community. An additional specific condition of this kind must be mentioned in the contract notice”, Case 
31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV, Judgement of 20 September 1988, para. 37 iii).  
587
 In this case, on the environmental requirements for a city-bus service contract in Helsinki, the ECJ 
decided to recur to the Treaties stating, more innovatively, that environmental concerns had to underpin 
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award a contract to the tenderer who submits the most economically advantageous tender it may take into 
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documents or the tender notice, and comply with all the fundamental principles of Community Law, in 
particular the principle of non-discrimination”. Case C-448/01, EVN AG, Wienstrom GmbH, Judgement 
of 4 December 2003, para 33.  
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public procurement589 but it should be born in mind the role of some EU Member States 
that took a step forward and how the ECJ found the legal way to support it.  
As is apparent, the promotion of CSR at a national level in the EU has several facets; 
NAPs are insufficient to evaluate the real role of EU Member States. In some cases, 
Member States have been more advanced than the Commission. NAPs (on CSR or, at 
best, on business and human rights) are only another element, to be added to the 
endorsement of the OECD Guidelines, the prompt and complete implementation of the 
CSR-aspects of recent EU Directives, other purely legislative measures, even the daily 
administration, to mention just a few. Many studies excessively focus on NAPs: we 
must see the wood, not just the trees.  
Leaving aside concrete examples of what is happening at the national level, it is now 
relevant to make some theoretical comments. To explain the diversity of national 
responses to the CSR agenda, from our institutional perspective that studies both 
political and legal factors, we need to take into account the national business systems 
and different varieties of capitalism. The concept of “implicit” and “explicit” CSR, first 
proposed by Matten and Moon in 2008, deems to be very useful to shed light on the 
current European initiatives and explain the spread of NAPs on CSR among EU 
Member States, as well as a previous “hidden CSR” at a national level. To some extent, 
it could be guessed when we explained the more or less remote origin of CSR in the 
EU, even before being labelled as such. The concepts of implicit and explicit CSR are 
worth a longer citation:590 
“[C]orporations practicing implicit CSR might conduct practices similar to those of 
corporations practicing explicit CSR. Implicit CSR, however, is not conceived of as a 
voluntary and deliberate corporate decision but, rather, as a reaction to, or reflection 
of, a corporation’s institutional environment, whereas explicit CSR is the result of a 
deliberate, voluntary, and often strategic decision of a corporation. Many of the 
elements of implicit CSR occur in the form of codified norms, rules and laws but are 
not conventionally described explicitly as CSR. It is the societal norms, networks, 
organizations, and rules that are explicit, rather than their implications for the social 
responsibilities of business. It is in this sense that CSR in these systems is implicit. 
Where corporations comply with the law and customary ethics but do not claim 
distinctive authorship of these practices, they are nonetheless acting responsibly 
[…]”. 
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According to Matten and Moon, some differences between the US and the EU can help 
explain the evolution of the several policy options of EU Member States. For instance, 
the power of the State is lower in the US and there is a greater corporate discretion in 
this matter (CSR), on which the US government has been less active. The enhanced role 
of private actors in the US is also visible in more evident differences concerning the 
education, labour and cultural systems, added to a lower public confidence in, and 
credibility of, the government compared to Europe. In finances, the US has rather 
focused on shareholders whereas there have always been wider concerns in the EU, 
where public authorities have historically been friendlier to the concept of 
‘stakeholders’. This has marked two different paths towards CSR: in Europe, through a 
consolidated institutional concern on public participation and stakeholders, and in the 
US via a higher exposure to stock markets and dispersed ownership that would have 
obliged to put in place earlier transparency measures to attract investors and consumers. 
Moreover, in Europe corporations tend to be controlled by a smaller number of large 
investors, among which banks and financial institutions predominate, apart from 
depending more on the State as an economic actor.  
Matten and Moon’s analysis concludes that the US, being a more liberal market 
economy, has traditionally been closer to explicit CSR: companies freely choose how to 
proceed and explicitly express their own original CSR, in a flexible and voluntary 
manner, sensitive to a variety of corporate needs and interests before deciding how to 
interact with more general societal expectations regarding business responsibility. 
However, in the EU, a less liberal economy, Member States traditionally have an 
“implicit CSR” on a number of issues, a CSR before CSR, which in our view continues 
to condition Member States initiatives and, sometimes, their scepticism since implicit 
CSR schemes look nearer to hard law approaches. In one way or another, explicit or 
implicit, it is all about corporate responsibility. The concept can also be extended to the 
EU: as we have seen, an implicit CSR has existed in many policies before the explicit 
one emerged.  
Famous corporate scandals (Parmalat in Italy, Elf Aquitaine in France, Ahold in the 
Netherlands, etc.), alongside the increasing privatisation of public goods and services in 
the EU, plus the impact of the financial crisis and general globalisation trends, have all 
together risen social awareness of private actors and might jointly explain the recent 
spread of a more explicit CSR among EU Member States. The public opinion is 
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suddenly to many unexpected limits of Nation-States to face these problems: the 
European implicit CSR, despite its traditional emphasis on hard regulations, deemed to 
be insufficient after these recent developments, thus “encouraging a more explicit 
CSR”591. The deficiencies of traditional regulations in the EU have been noted during 
the crisis, when we discovered the link between remuneration systems and excessive 
financial risks. The historical trend persists to some extent: for example, the general 
lack of workers matters in the European CSR is the result of a long historical labour law 
tradition that takes for granted an “implicit CSR” on the subject, relying on already 
existing norms. In our opinion, this trend might change following to the labour system 
reforms undertaken, in the heat of the crisis, by some liberal and conservative 
governments in the EU, in order to “flexibilize” –as they claim– the labour market, what 
could in the future make necessary a stronger explicit CSR also in this area (if the 
former implicit one is really weakened and impossible to be restored). However, 
workers matters are at the core of CSR in US companies.  
Whatever the case, if the implementation of the CSR agenda has (promising) legal spill-
overs in the EU, it is because of a typically European historical and constitutional 
preference for hard law, which is likely to become one of the main European 
contributions to global CSR (with the exception of the United Kingdom as a common 
law system with a longer and more liberal understanding of CSR).  
EU Member States have a crucial role to build a wider consensus, which is needed both 
inside and outside the EU to effectively boost CSR. We notice a great number of risks 
and problems when we come down to the State level, more accentuated in highly 
decentralised countries. In summary, the main problematics we have detected concern 
the different speeds and understandings with respect to CSR, which is shaped by 
structural political and economic factors. In general terms, Member States simply 
follow the EU institutions. Of course, no anti-CSR attitude is detected, but there are no 
big enthusiasms or particularly original initiatives either, even in those countries that 
show a stronger commitment. 
A possible way to face many of the aforementioned challenges is to task the already 
existing National Human Rights Institutions with the coordination, on-going evolution 
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elsewhere in this research. Ibíd., p. 415.  
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and implementation of the CSR agenda. The potential role of NHRIs has been somehow 
underestimated or simply forgotten when dealing with business and human rights592. 
We can further elaborate on the advantages of NHRIs in this respect. For instance, it is a 
public authority, functionally independent from the government (sometimes even 
handling individual complaints), with the know-how and experience in the field to adapt 
better to the EU national diversity, including legal aspects. Secondly, this would allow a 
proper recognition that human rights are an essential ingredient of the definition of 
CSR, as the latter would be incorporated into the areas of action of a proper human 
rights institution, thus consolidating the human rights language within CSR. By the 
way, the creation of new institutions (in the form of committees, interdepartmental 
bodies, etc.) is not a very pragmatic solution either, provided that NHRI’s capacity to 
act in their former competencies is not weakened by adding this new responsibility. 
Thirdly, it can solve the usual mistrust that looms any negotiation to establish 
monitoring bodies: despite being public, its functional independence according to the 
Paris Principles would never be to the governments’ total satisfaction, since NHRIs 
could also control public authorities and state-owned companies, or participated by the 
State or providing public services. Of course, in this new capacity, NHRIs would not be 
the ideal option for many companies either, as many are still advocating for the 
predominance of self-regulation, without realising that the current tendency seems 
hardly reversible and tends to combine self-regulation with both co-regulation and, also, 
proper regulations –at least to frame the first two ones. A larger degree of regulatory 
coordination between Member States is needed to make CSR work, perfectly 
compatible with its voluntary nature593. 
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Lobbying activities comprise by the way private self-certification systems –the 
proliferation and marketization of certificates is a not very desirable development, but a 
real possibility within the consultancy sector. The problem of CSR standardisation and 
certification systems at a national level has materialised in the Netherlands following to 
the ISO 26000. Since the ISO did not support any kind of certification, the Dutch 
private-led “CSR Performance Ladder” identified a market need to adapt and change the 
ISO 26000 into a certifiable system, arguing that both customers and businesses need 
publicly recognisable standards which imply reputational consequences to facilitate 
market rewards for responsible companies594. In our view, private and for-profit CSR 
rating agencies remind us –setting aside obvious differences– the recent role of private 
rating agencies during the debt markets crisis. In relation to this, NHRI’s new 
competencies on Business and Human Rights could include the management (definition 
and award) of CSR labels and certificates, on a non-profit basis to avoid their 
privatisation and multiplication (likely to generate confusion), thus contributing to their 
credibility. However, to finish with standards and certification systems, we wonder if it 
would be preferable to have European labels rather than national ones, such as the EU 
eco-Flower, managed by the Commission, as they would be more attractive than 
national labels for different reasons: mainly, the dimensions of the common market and 
the capacity of the EU to create widely recognised and credible logos that would 
increase their reliability.  
At the national level, NHRIs can, in sum, actively contribute to the implementation and 
supervision of the international framework, within which a high degree of voluntary 
actions would be maintained. NHRI’s have the potential to address many of the 
practical challenges in Member States to overcome the predominance of information 
and promotion strategies, pushing for more concrete developments. Therefore, the role 
of Member States is essential. With a few exceptions, it can be said that EU States tend 
to work reactively rather than proactively –most of the power of initiative still stays 
with the EU (particularly, the Commission). In some aspects such as public 
procurement Member States, however, were initially more audacious than the 
Commission. The current spread of NAPs on CSR, in five cases specifically on the 
UNGPs, only constitute the first step towards building a stronger international 
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consensus, development for which Member States deem to be of an utmost importance, 
even over the EU institutional role. Finally, Member States can build on their previous 
experience, their implicit CSR, to intensify without fear the human rights language in 
CSR as well as caring of its external/international dimension in relation to development 
policies (as it now happens at the EU level). The implementation of the CSR agenda is 
therefore conditioned by a number of problematic factors that influence the outputs at a 
national level, even though there are identifiable opportunity niches. 
 
3.3.2.  National guidelines and main initiatives595 
NAPs on business and human rights are being elaborated at a very lower speed than 
NAPs on CSR, but they seem a more comprehensive option or, at least, a better decision 
since it emphasises the centrality of human rights in this topic. For the time being, only 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Italy have published their 
NAPs on business and human rights. Acknowledged the fact that Member States’ CSR 
performance depends on many other factors, and that the need of two separate NAPs is 
discussable in view of the debate above, the fact of being the first five countries with 
NAPs on the UNGPs can be a pretext for studying more in detail their policies.  
This five NAPs strictly follow the three-level structure of John Ruggies’ Framework 
(protect, respect and remedy). The contents, however, are more OECD-informed while 
the WTO and ILO have a very limited presence. They can be defined as policy papers, 
the result of ministerial working groups. The main institutions involved at a national 
level are: 
- In Finland, the strategy is governed by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. Within this Ministry, the Committee on Corporate Social 
Responsibility is an independent advisory body composed of government 
authorities and CSOs’ representatives; its tasks comprise the evaluation and 
development of CSR policies. The same Committee functions as the Finnish 
NCP of the OECD Guidelines596. The NAP, published in October 2014, is 
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196 
 
the result of a Government Resolution published in November 2012, in 
which the involvement of other Ministries is foreseen, in particular, 
Finances, the Environment, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs.  
- In Denmark, the Danish Council for CSR597 leads the way. Its President is 
elected by the Minister for Business and Growth while the rest of its 
members are independent representatives of CSOs such as trade unions, 
industrials, Amnesty International or the national Red Cross. Apart from the 
Ministry for Business and Growth, the Ministry for Trade and Development 
is also involved. However, the Danish NCP for the OECD Guidelines is a 
separate secretariat, the “Mediation and Complaints-Handling Institution for 
Responsible Business Conduct”, also under the same Ministry for Business 
and Growth, but within the Danish Business Authority. The strong point of 
the Danish NCP is to be the only established by law598 and with ex officio 
powers of investigation, although this capacity has not been used so far. The 
Danish institutional building is the strongest point of their CSR, despite the 
fact that the NCP could be part of the CSR Council (like in Finland). In any 
case, Denmark is probably the Scandinavian country where the 
Government’s role has been larger in promoting CSR, to discipline 
businesses “without forcing the issue” and a powerful agenda-setting power 
as well as influence on societal expectations599. Maintaining the voluntary 
character of CSR regarding its contents, Denmark seems to support a 
government-driven framework, unlike Finland or Sweden –less 
enthusiastically active– and more similarly to Norway, where “the 
government does not seem inclined to accept the ‘retreat of the state’ 
thesis”600.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 (composition). Available at: 
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- In the UK, the Ministry for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was 
responsible for the Plan and the Minister presented it to the Parliament in 
September 2013601. The technical direction is provided by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, within which we find the British NCP to 
monitor the implementation of the OECD Guidelines. However, in contrast 
to Denmark, the British NCP is made up of civil servants supervised by the 
Steering Board. Despite this, the British approach seems a good combination 
between the internal and external dimension of CSR.  
- In the Netherlands we also find a similar emphasis on the international 
vocation of the NAP, precisely published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which also houses the Dutch NCP (created in 2007 and extended in 2011). 
The Government clearly rejects the idea of the NCP having ex officio 
powers602; however, according to a case study published by OECD Watch, a 
recent complaint involving Royal Dutch Shell would have raised important 
doubts about the NCP’s guarantees in terms of transparency and 
predictability603. In June 2014 a new government decree only strengthened 
the NCP competence to conduct wide researches and regular consultations 
sector by sector, apparently without news about the complaint mechanism604.  
- The Italian “Foundations of the Italian Action Plan on the UNGPs” are, as 
its name indicates, a preliminary policy paper that should not be judged 
according to the same criteria. Otherwise, it would be difficult to justify its 
length (80 pages) and rhetoric style. In any case, it constitutes a prime 
example of a problem against which we warned in the previous section: 
excessively crisis-motivated and internally-oriented NAPs that ultimately 
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distort CSR, including details around completely off-topic issues such as 
religious minorities, railway system, poverty, fight against drug addiction, 
etc. (as if it was a general report for a UN monitoring body). As explained, 
CSR is not about complying with already existing human rights treaties 
ratified by EU Member States; it is rather about preventive and horizontal 
strategies to foster human rights in their particularly complex interaction 
with business activities. This unfocused approach is confirmed by the 
presence of the Italian NCP within the Ministry of Economic Development, 
who governs the incipient CSR policy in Italy. 
Problems of understanding, however, are not exclusively Italian. The British NAP is 
proud to enumerate the different international human rights conventions ratified by the 
UK, but it forgets that it has not ratified any of the Optional Protocols of the Civil and 
Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenants605, which are 
essential to ensure the vertical effects of human rights, in other words, States’ 
accountability vis-à-vis the respective UN Committees. Denmark, to give another 
example, has ratified the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, but not that of the ICESCR, 
obviously relevant in terms of business and human rights. It is curious to read in the 
Danish NAP a reference to how they “actively tak[e] part in the Universal Periodic 
Review process of the United Nations”606, which is largely identified as the weakest 
human rights monitoring mechanism since it is an inter pares procedure607 with a more 
than doubtful significance in terms of business and human rights. The only link with the 
UNGPs is that, even at the first level of Ruggie’s Framework (on States’ duties), basic 
failures –or omissions– are still visible, undesirably within the EU. 
The common objective of all NAPs is to present some actions undertaken, without 
many details on legal issues, and the future developments foreseen. The participation in 
incident-based programs, with the recurrent examples of Bangladesh and Myanmar, are 
a commonplace that does not, in substance, add anything new. The lack of technical and 
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legal details makes us think of general policy papers or political statements rather than 
true ‘action plans’ with objectives and deadlines, whereas the different strategies 
designed by the Commission were far more concrete. 
All five countries insist on their active engagement in the negotiations and decision-
making processes in the international fora and in Brussels, but not always in the same 
direction: Finland expresses a clear disagreement with the on-going discussion on the 
need of a new international treaty on business and human rights608, within the 
framework of the UN Human Rights Council. The Netherlands stress that “there is too 
little international support for an international, legally-binding instrument”609. Only 
Denmark seems more supportive of extraterritorial obligations for companies and, 
interestingly, proposes that the leader of this negotiation should not be the UN or the 
EU, but the Council of Europe610. Both the UK and Netherlands insist on more liberal 
understandings of CSR, private grievance mechanisms based on mediation and 
facilitation, encouraging their companies to apply the same domestic standards in third 
countries, but with no supervision or consequences. At the same time, all countries 
except Denmark recall the debate on the definition of “due diligence”. In our view, 
when academic discussions make their appearance on the political scene, it is likely to 
reflect the lack of political will rather than a genuine International Law concern. Of 
course due diligence is an indeterminate legal concept611. The problem of clarifying the 
concept of ‘due diligence’ is repeated by the Netherlands, the UK and Finland; we will 
just leave an open question: in terms of CSR, is it more appropriate to wonder “What is 
sufficient” rather than “How much can be done?” 
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The existing NAPs on the UNGPs further show that it is now quite commonplace in the 
EU to refer to the social responsibility of state-owned companies or controlled by the 
State. To this day, state-owned companies constitutes a relatively limited concept: it 
should be considered to extend CSR to ‘State-participated’ companies, not necessarily 
with the majority of the shares, and even to companies in charge of public services, 
which is an increasing reality in the EU (and at a global scale). In this sense, the British 
NAP on the UNGPs is the most complete when it declares its commitment to “review 
the degree to which the activities of UK State-owned, controlled or supported 
enterprises, and of State contracting and purchasing of goods and services, are executed 
with respect for human rights”612, what could have an inspiring role.  
In spite of all the limitations described so far, we have also found useful initiatives 
shared by some countries: both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with a high 
exposure to international trade and supply chains, have developed instruments to 
provide the private sector with country assessments concerning the main human rights 
risks depending on the regions and sectors. In practice, the Dutch “CSR Risk Check” is 
an online tool, analytical and visual, to show this risks in function of diverse criteria 
(child labour; pollution; discrimination and gender issues; etc.). Similarly, the British 
“Overseas Business Risk (OBR) Service” gives the same type of information on the 
most usual problems detected in countries where the UK trade and investment has a 
presence, adding another interesting “Business and Human Rights Toolkit” specifically 
addressed at officials. The UK has also funded an online hub in six languages to 
promote the UNGPs. Similar sector risk analysis are planned or under development in 
Finland and the Netherlands. 
Related to this, a Dutch legislative proposal contemplated guarantees on access to 
information for the general public, making it compulsory for companies to answer any 
request regarding the origins and production phases of their products or services613. 
Technically feasible, it remains in abeyance as the Dutch government considers it 
should not be enacted yet: “the government does not feel that this is the right time to 
enact such legislation”, in part due to its high costs. Regardless of the final decision, the 
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 Emphasis added. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND: Good Business. Implementing… op. cit., p. 11. 
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 The so-called “Production and Supply Chain Information (Public Access) Act (WOK). MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Netherlands): National Action Plan…, op. cit, p. 31.  
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proposal has a clear potential to increase transparency and strengthen the interest of 
companies to implement CSR and avoid serious reputational damages.  
Finally, the UK has also passed the Bribery Act in virtue of which companies are held 
responsible for acts of bribery regardless of the country in which they occur, showing 
the important links between business activities, corruption and human rights614. 
Transparency, access to information and accountability are key drivers of the fight 
against corruption, which is recognised to be linked with human rights abuses in 
developing countries and, therefore, should not be neglected in the intertwined design of 
public/private and internal/external strategies of CSR.  
In conclusion, alongside the delays, challenges and divergent opinions among Member 
States, we have detected interesting policy options too. Sometimes, Member States have 
been more audacious than the Commission, which has taken over after 2011 with its 
Renewed Strategy. The following table summarises the most progressive initiatives 
detected at a national level.  
 
Table No. 2: National Policies in the EU: screening the best initiatives 
 
                                                          
614
 OHCHR: Good Governance Practices for the Protection of Human Rights, New York – Geneva 2007, 
United Nations Publications (HR/PUB/07/4), pp. 59-79.  
 
MAIN ISSUES OF NATIONAL POLICIES      
 
BEST POLICIES IDENTIFIED 
 
 
Definition of CSR 
All endorse the Commission’s definition and the 
UN and OECD texts. Only the UK explicitly 
clarifies that “it is not the same as philanthropy or 
social investment”. (All lack of ILO and WTO 
related aspects). The UK and Netherlands more 
heavily rely on private-led initiatives.  
 
 
 
Guidance for Companies 
Netherlands: “CSR Risk Check”, tool including 
comprehensive country assessments on human 
rights’ risks in third countries, sector by sector.  
UK: Similarly the “Overseas Business Risk 
Services”; the “Business and Human Rights 
Toolkit” (for officials); funding online hub in 6 
languages (share companies experiences and inform 
on the UNGPs).  
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Grievance mechanisms and NCPs 
Denmark: NCP established by law and with ex 
officio investigation powers. President appointed 
by Minister for Business and Growth, but the rest 
of members are independent experts from NGOs 
and CSOs. The Danish “Mediation and Complaints-
Handling Institution for Responsible Business 
Conduct” is a non-judicial but state-based 
institution governed by law.  
Finland: the fact that the same Committee on CSR 
constitutes the Finnish NCP, avoiding the 
multiplication of institutions.  
 
Extraterritorial obligations 
Only Denmark supports the negotiations and 
shows an opened attitude, advocating for the 
leadership of the Council of Europe.  
 
Public Companies 
Only the UK goes beyond the restrictive concept 
of State-owned companies and plans to introduce 
CSR into “controlled or supported enterprises, and 
of State contracting and purchasing of goods and 
services”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementing EU initiatives on CSR 
(early assessment) 
 
- Non-financial reporting requirements: France 
initiatives following to the “Grenelle II Law” 
(2010). Transposition deadline of Dir. 2014/95/EU 
expires 6 December 2016. 
- UK Bribery Act: British companies are liable for 
acts of bribery committed anywhere in the world 
- All EU Member States have transposed 
Directive 2013/36/EU on remunerations and 
gender balance in financial institutions. 
- 19 EU Member States have NAPs on CSR; only 
5 specifically on the UNGPs. Almost all EU 
Member States have several information and 
promotion initiatives (partnering, forums, etc.) 
- 24 Member States have adhered to the OECD 
Guidelines on MNEs. 
- None of the EU Member States have transposed 
arts. 41-46 of Dir. 2013/34/EU obliging the 
extractive industry to report on payments to 
governments. 
- Public Procurement Reform pending: deadline 
18 April 2016 (Dirs. 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
The potential of the EU’s contribution to global CSR 
 
 
4.1  The potential of soft law in the EU 
 
4.1.1.  The initial guidance of the ECJ: introducing the debate 
In assessing the potential of the EU initiatives on Corporate Social Responsibility, it is 
fundamental to undertake an analysis of soft law instruments in the EU. There is a broad 
range of such instruments: from Recommendations and Opinions, more widely used, up 
to a plethora of Declarations, Resolutions, Action Programmes and Plans, Guidelines, 
Communications of the Commission, Conclusions of the Council, and inter-institutional 
arrangements, as we have seen in chapter III related to the emergence of CSR in the EU. 
It is well known that soft law is not limited to CSR but has spread to all EU law fields. 
Recommendations and Opinions are the only soft instruments provided for by article 
288 TFEU, adding that they “shall have no binding force”, what reveals to be a rather 
insufficient description given that there is a good number of other unmentioned acts 
(like guidelines) that would also fall within the scope of that article. 
As it happens with CSR, we lack of systematic and general studies on soft law in the 
EU. The available literature agrees in maintaining Snyder’s early definition (1993) so 
far as it conforms to the initial guidance of the ECJ: “rules of conduct which in principle 
have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects”615, to 
what we can add that, obviously, it goes further than mere ‘rules of conduct’, 
comprising political aspirations, interpretations of hard law provisions and a wide range 
of other situations that we classify below. Snyder already noticed the “hardening” of 
soft law once it passes through the filter of the ECJ, when the Commission takes it back 
to apply it. 
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 F. SNYDER: “The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques”, in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 56 No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 19-54, at p. 32.  
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The starting point of this debate has some unavoidable benchmarks very recurrent in the 
available literature on the subject, generally obsessed with measuring the legal force 
from positivist paradigms rather than gauging its value from a pragmatic and realistic 
approach, closer to what happens in the field. This is why we introduce the debate on 
the potential of soft law taking the initial guidance of the European Court of Justice as 
our starting-point. There is no doubt on the importance of Grimaldi, where the ECJ 
accepted that soft law had to be taken into consideration to inform national Courts 
decisions. Without giving further details on how this can be done, the Court 
distinguished at first sight two functions of soft law, to complete and to interpret:  
“The national Courts are bound to take recommendations into 
consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular 
where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in 
order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding 
Community provisions”.616 
Another off-cited example is Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (PTC), a polish phone company 
that challenged the imposition of new regulatory obligations following to 2002 
Guidelines concerning electronic communications networks and services. The question 
of this preliminary ruling was if such guidelines could be relied upon against 
individuals, even if they hadn’t been translated into polish. In our view, the reasoning of 
the Court has three steps. Quite surprisingly, the ECJ basically explains that there is no 
“general principle of EU Law under which anything that might affect the interests of an 
EU citizen must be drawn up in his language in all circumstances” 617, so we understand 
the lack of translation is not allegeable to preclude the application of soft law 
instruments (which most of the times are not available in all EU languages). The ECJ 
secondly states that the guidelines under discussion are not reliable upon against 
individuals because their intended recipients are national regulatory authorities (NRA). 
However, at the end the Court concludes that nothing prevents the polish regulatory 
authority referring to those guidelines in a decision “by which that NRA imposes certain 
regulatory obligations on an operator”618. This solution was reached only after a textual 
analysis that in no case precluded the possibility that Guidelines have legal effects.  
                                                          
616
 Emphasis added. Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, Judgement of 13 
December 1989, para. 18.  
617
 Case C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cifrowa, Judgement of 12 May 2011, para. 38.  
618
 Ibíd., para. 39.  
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In other words, the Court implicitly acknowledges that soft law might have legal effects 
in some cases. These instruments might be unlikely to generate direct obligations 
allegeable against natural or legal persons, but they can indirectly and lawfully affect 
their rights and obligations (for example, through national enacting institutions), 
regardless of available translations and publication. In PTC, the Court did not shed 
much more light but therefore clarified a key difference between ‘legally binding force’ 
and ‘legal effects’, the latter including in practice “legally binding effects”619. The 
practical translation, again, is that the legal situation of natural and legal persons can be 
affected in terms of their rights and obligations, but mostly through indirect 
mechanisms.  
Dansk Rörindustri et al. against the Commission is another seminal and recurrent case 
in the literature on this subject. We face nine companies operating in the district heating 
sector that produce or market pre-insulated pipes for that sector, who challenge a fine 
for anti-competitive conducts imposed by the Commission according to the ‘Guidelines 
on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 and 
Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty’. The Grand Chamber reaffirms, one by one, in an 
exhaustive and exceptionally long judgement, the arguments held by the Court of First 
Instance. Relevant to us is the criteria followed to determine the legality of those 
‘Guidelines’: “in setting out in the Guidelines the method which it proposed to apply 
when calculating fines imposed under Article 15(2) of Regulation No. 17, the 
Commission remained within the legal framework laid down by that provision and did 
not exceed the discretion conferred on it by the legislature”620, what leads to the 
rejection of all pleas in law: against the legality itself of the Guidelines (lack of 
competence of the Commission), and against the pleas alleging a breach of the 
principles of legitimate expectations and non-retroactivity. However, these problems 
related to legal certainty persist and are not negligible, especially when soft law has an 
interpretative character of the current legislation, as well as the problem of available 
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 O. STEFAN: “European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide between Legally 
Binding Force and Legal Effects”, in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 75 (2012) No. 5, pp. 879-893, at pp. 
885-887. 
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 Joined Cases C- 189-02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri 
et al. v. Commission, Judgement of 28 June 2005 (Grand Chamber), para. 252.  
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translations621 and the due publicity of norms. Despite these pertinent doubts, the Grand 
Chamber absolutely defends such soft instruments provided some conditions: 
 “In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them 
that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in 
question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion […] It cannot therefore 
be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their context, such 
rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal 
effects”.622 
A close analysis of ECJ’s settled case-law is Stefan’s comprehensive thesis in the area 
of competition law and State aids, where soft law is widespread, in which the author 
shows that EU Courts use both hard and soft norms, very particularly to clarify the 
interpretation of hard law623. The scholarship’s interest has mainly targeted this 
phenomenon: how Courts confirm the interpretative character of soft instruments. 
Another way to express the same difference between legal force and legal effects would 
be to use the expressions ‘rules of law’ and ‘rules of practice’, reminding Snyder’s 
reference to ‘practical effects’. After Stefan’s quantitative and qualitative scrutiny of 
soft law in the field of competition law and State aids, it appears that there is some 
judicial recognition of the role of soft law in its interaction with classic norms, detecting 
feedbacks between them that better approximate the complexity and heterogeneity of 
any regulation in order to abandon monolithic visions of law. We have seen that the 
ECJ essentially checks if “soft law instruments remain in the boundaries fixed by hard 
law”624, and at the same time, it can be beneficial to the extent soft law can detail 
previous regulations and thus reduce the Commission’s margin of discretion625, as we 
have also noted in Danks Rorindustri et al.. 
More recently, and moving to a different law-field, the General Court has confirmed 
this approach: while ruling the annulment of an aspect of the Eurosystem Oversight 
Policy Framework published by the ECB. Once again, it was acknowledged that soft 
instruments emanating from EU institutions can perfectly have legal effects and 
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 The problem of available translations, an obligation rejected by the Court as we have seen since the 
PTC judgement for soft instruments, could be argued from article 4 item 2 of TEU (equality of Member 
States) together with the principles of democracy and legal certainty.  
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 Ibíd., para. 211.  
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 O. STEFAN: Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, The Netherlands 2013, Wolters-Kluwer Law International, 367 pp., passim. However, the 
limitation of Stefan’s work is that it mainly focuses on soft law when it has an interpretative function of 
hard norms, leaving aside many other manifestations of soft instruments.  
624
 Ibíd., p. 142.  
625
 Ibíd., p. 179.  
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subsequently be under the Court’s scrutiny: “[A]n action for annulment is available in 
the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, 
which are intended to have legal effects”626. A meticulous textual analysis was 
undertaken to assess the context, the level of specificity, the wording, ultimately, the 
content and scope of the policy framework to finally conclude its originality with regard 
to the regulation it was supposed to clarify and, above all, the unlawful addition of a 
requirement absent in the parent-regulation (to be located in a Member State party to the 
Eurosystem for central counterparties involved in the clearing of securities). This 
additional requirement surpassed the boundaries of hard law, then suggesting some kind 
of hierarchy in their interaction. The Court is consistent with its previous case-law even 
if it seems an innovative approach to the extent it expressly “take[s] into account the 
perception of the Policy Framework”627. This rather psychological or anthropological 
way of thinking of the Court is perfectly legitimate and understandable to overcome the 
white and black logic of legal positivism, despite the eventual unease of lawyers, in 
view of the increasing complexity of EU integration. Soft law, if reasonable and within 
the hard law limits, may have unquestionable effects, even if indirectly. Whenever it 
deems to be necessary, the ECJ has pronounced itself on soft law. The ECJ therefore 
supports our pragmatic view under which substantive criteria have to be considered 
beyond purely formal ones when assessing the potential of these new instruments, 
reducing the prominence of rather classic nomen iuris discussions628. It seems logical 
that material reality prevails over formalities: any legal order takes place in a social 
setting in which coercions can be institutional, but also practical, if we assume the 
contribution of legal anthropology: social and market coercions are not to be 
neglected629.  
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 Emphasis added. Case T-496/11, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European 
Central Bank, Judgement of 4 March 2015, para. 30.  
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 Ibíd., para. 42.  
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 Settled case law to reaffirm the ECJ judicial review of any act with “legal effects” regardless of its 
formal denomination has its origin in case 68/86, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v. the Council, Judgement of 23 February 1988, as commented by U. DRAETTA: Elementi di diritto 
dell’Unione Europea. Parte Istituzionale, ordinamento e struttura dell’Unione Europea, Milano 2009, 
Giuffrè Ed., pp. 278-279. Also see: G. STROZZI and R. MASTROIANNI: Diritto dell’Unione Europea. 
Parte Istituzionale, Torino 2011, G. Giappicheli Ed., pp. 296-300.  
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 F.M. ZERILLI: “The Rule of Soft Law, an Introduction”, in FOCAAL –Journal of Global and 
Historical Anthropology, Vol. 56 (2010) No. , pp. 3-18, at p. 11. The “Bologna process” to restructure 
higher education in the EU and adapt it to the “3+2 system”, is a very clear example given by the author 
to show how coercion exists beyond hard norms: the text signed in Bologna was a simple declaration that 
usually never leads to hard obligations. Ibíd., p. 5.   
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To relatively reassure lawyers and concerned civil society, some conclusions can be 
drawn out of this initial guidance of the ECJ. First, the Court seems to distinguish quite 
clearly between hard and soft law, putting them in context when required. Secondly, it 
seems that there is the possibility of judicial scrutiny of these soft law instruments if 
necessary (admissibility criteria are to be understood under this flexible substantive 
approach on legal effects without fearing formal considerations, so that soft law will not 
escape the control of the ECJ).  
Finally, while the “legal effects” of soft law are recognised, abuses have generally been 
annulled so we infer that soft instruments must operate within the framework of the 
existing legislation, refraining from going further. It is finally true that its effects can 
indirectly touch the rights and obligations of legal and natural persons, but rarely in a 
direct way. Notwithstanding the importance of the ECJ initial guidance, we need to be 
aware of its limits as it focuses on a very particular expression of the soft law 
phenomenon, its interpretative function which, albeit a significant part, it actually 
constitutes only one of its many manifestations. 
 
4.1.2. Consolidation and taxonomy of soft law in the EU 
To de-dramatize and expand the picture of this debate it is worth looking back at the 
origin and consolidation of soft law in the EU. As it has been stated in the general part 
of this research, soft law is nothing new neither to the EU nor to any international 
organisation. The EU law-making processes have considerably evolved, overcoming the 
Community method. The legislative procedures were already altered with the new 
cooperation procedures in virtue of the Single European Act in 1987, then with the 
introduction of the Co-decision (I) following to the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), 
completely rearranged with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (so-called Co-decision II). 
The legislative role of EU institutions correspondingly changed, while the EP was 
gaining power.  
The definitive boost of soft law in the EU comes in the 2000’s after the aforementioned 
Lisbon Council: the Open Method of Coordination marks a before and an after, 
formalising soft law procedures through flexible strategies and programmes, 
implementation timetables, developing both qualitative and quantitative indicators, and 
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completing the overall with periodic peer reviews as a sort of monitoring mechanism 
via reporting commitments630. The OMC institutionalises what we would call ‘soft 
procedures’: Member States and EU institutions have to work together to identify 
common objectives and evaluate them through statistics, guidelines and indicators, and 
the Commission has a general supervision over the coordination to ensure the exchange 
of information and best practices, affecting mainly to education, employment and social 
policies in general, but later on extended to other policy making. It normally agreed that 
the output will rarely be a binding act (directives, regulations or decisions).  
Particularly thought for social issues and later extended to other policies, the OMC 
allowed maintaining an intense inter-governmental dialogue, while reaching some basic 
common understandings and apparently fluidizing the EU multilevel governance. 
Through the OMC, like a kid with a new toy, the EU definitely embraced soft law as 
new predominant tool for governance631. The White Paper on European Governance 
reinforced this mentality in the sense that the EU “must renew the Community method 
by following a less top-down approach and complementing its policy tools more 
effectively with non-legislative instruments”. It further explains that “legislation is often 
only a part of a broader solution combining formal rules with other non-binding tools 
such as recommendation, guidelines, or even self-regulation within a commonly agreed 
framework” 632.  
An Action Plan dated June 2002633 continued this trend, responding to a context in 
which the enlargement, the difficulty to manage the acquis and the profusion of EU 
Law, together with legitimacy concerns, were pointing to the need of improvements of 
the legislative procedures, reducing the quantity and raising the quality634. We leave 
aside the ideological debate around this “do less, do better” spirit and whether it is a 
reflection of a deregulatory neo-liberal choice or, simply, a recognition of the 
complexity of EU Law and the desire of making it more manageable.  
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We have to wait until 2003 to read the basic text, the Interinstitutional Agreement on 
better law-making, where self-regulation and co-regulation are finally defined: both 
involve private and public actors and the difference is to what extent. In the case of self-
regulation, the public role is smaller serving as a political inspiration without 
compromising the future stance of institutions, only at a very general level supervising 
its compliance with the Treaties or other general guidance and information of best 
practices635. On the other side, in the case of co-regulation public authorities provide 
with the legal framework –leaving room for concrete implementation but clearly within 
the margins of legislation, by way of complement. This agreement constitutes an utterly 
important step in the recognition of “alternative methods of regulation” and their 
usefulness, provided of course their consistency with EU Law. However, we shall 
highlight that “[t]hese mechanisms will not be applicable where fundamental rights or 
important political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied 
in a uniform fashion in all Member States” 636.  
The political background of the aforementioned documents is the EU looking forward 
to regaining social acceptance and legitimacy, as the key words of these documents are 
simplification, coordination, raising quality or reducing the volume of legislation, better 
implementation and transpositions, transparency and accessibility, etc. In any case, the 
boom of soft law precisely came since the 2000’s. A very common concern of EU 
institutions has been to enhance public participation in the decision-making processes, 
regarding both policy-making and law-making; the path is full of traps, of course, as we 
might realise that the most powerful and economically interested will be more likely to 
raise their voice. However, thanks to the new possibilities of the digital era, socio-
economic gaps can be less disabling in terms of access to information, public 
participation and formation of civil society organisations for particular purposes.  
In view of the success and extension of soft law instruments since the 2000’s, another 
problem is to determine its outcome, also in order to evaluate its potential. In some 
cases it is a pre-legislative soft law, such as the numerous Communications of the 
Commission or the Green Paper, where the institutional impulse is likely to introduce 
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the subjects into the political agenda637. On the other hand we find para-legislative 
initiatives aimed at supporting the pre-legislative agenda via the creation of a favourable 
environment based on the corporate awareness and extension of voluntary good 
practices. Part of this institutional work is likely to become, sooner or later, binding 
instruments as grows the international consensus in this respect (or at least, at a regional 
level).  
More systematically, we might divide soft law into three main categories following the 
early but absolutely accurate terminology of Prof. Daniel Thürer638. First of all, pre-law, 
as said before, is the most likely to crystallise into a legal act, but alongside its eventual 
preparatory character, it also has an informative function (such as many 
communications). We then find interpretative and decisional soft law, intended to give 
further details on the exact application of previous EU law, in this sense a sort of post-
law, with which the Court has dealt confirming it despite the risk of adding provisions 
absent of the parent-legislation, as we have seen above; c) thirdly we find para-law, 
always according to Thürer’s terminology, which expresses some kind of political will 
tending to create an agenda, a favourable climate of opinion, sometimes formally 
(recommendations, explicitly covered by art. 288 TFEU) and many times informally 
(declarations, conclusions, codes of conduct).  
The taxonomic efforts include a different perspective that well deserves some comments 
as it completes this functional perspective. Besides the ‘pre/post/para –law’ functions, 
we have three other variables to be taken into account: the type of norm, the type of 
obligation and the type of enforcement, in a way that any of them can be hard or soft, 
understanding law as a continuum. This enables us to discover some captivating 
categories. We find hard norms apparently including hard obligations that actually 
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derive into very soft enforcement mechanisms, such as the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance: in 2002-2003 Germany and France were not sanctioned 
for violating the debt and public deficit objectives, as the enforcement depended upon 
the arbitrary willingness of the contracting parties; enforcement mechanisms have only 
been strengthened after the 2012-13 reforms639. We also detect hard norms with no 
enforcement at all: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a corpus of 
legally binding acts (arts. 28 and 29 TEU) but compliance of Member States with the 
CFSP is –in most of its aspects if not entirely– excluded of the ECJ jurisdiction. This is 
an interesting invitation to demystify hard norms, from a formal point of view, as 
everything finally depends on the obligations and on the way they are intended to be put 
in practice. According to this taxonomy we also have soft law leading to hard 
obligations, for example when this soft law corresponds to a post-law function, i.e., 
interpretative and decisional. 
In summary, if we combine the classification based on the functions of soft law 
(pre/post and para-) and the analysis centred on the dialectic between types of 
obligations and enforcements, we observe that soft obligations with hard enforcement 
generally correspond to post-law functions (its interpretative character). Sometimes, soft 
law instruments with a post-law character might present hard obligations with hard 
enforcement mechanisms, but we have seen that these situations are more likely to be 
seen as an ‘abuse of soft law’ and to be annulled by the ECJ. In any case, the main issue 
when dealing with post-legislative soft tools is the way they are administratively 
hardened and, in this regard, relevant doubts on judicial review and guarantees might 
arise. We also face soft obligations with soft enforcement (the paradigm of soft law): 
these are more common in para-legislative situations (mainly for political objectives, as 
the OMC). In other cases we find supposedly hard obligations with soft enforcement, 
when a para-legislative function is again predominant to assure flexibility in 
anticipation of politically or socially fluid circumstances. Finally, when a preparatory 
character is at stake, the pre-law function is predominantly expressed through two 
combinations: ‘soft obligation / soft enforcement’ and hard obligation/ soft 
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enforcement. The table below summarises the predominant functions that correspond to 
the combination of both taxonomies related to soft law. 
Table No. 3: Taxonomy of Soft Law and CSR in the EU 
                                                          
640
 These examples are not exhaustive. All have been studied in detail in Chapter III, Section 2.  
641
 These examples are not exhaustive either. All have been mentioned in this section.  
642
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Type of 
Obligation 
Type of 
Enforcement 
Predominant 
Function 
 
CSR Examples640 (and 
type of instrument) 
 
Other Examples641 
(and type of 
instrument) 
 
 
 
Soft 
 
 
 
Soft 
 
 
 
Para-law or 
pre-law 
Green Paper (2001) (soft 
instrument) 
 
Renewed EU Strategy for 
CSR 2011-2014 (soft 
instrument) 
 
Articles 1, 4 and 9 of the 
Cotonou Agreement 2010 
(hard instrument).  
 
Brussels Declaration  of 
the II EU-CELAC Summit 
June 2015 (soft instrument) 
 
 
 
 
Open Method of 
Coordination (soft 
instrument of 
discussable 
effectiveness).  
 
 
 
 
 
Soft 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-law (or 
proper 
norms) 
 
 
Regulation 1221/2009 on 
the voluntary participation 
in the EMAS (hard 
instrument). 
 
 
Article 41-46 of Directive 
2013/34/EU (reports on 
payments to governments 
by the extractive industries) 
–hard instrument. 
In the infringement 
procedure642: the 
Com. “may bring” the 
case (art. 258 TFEU, 
soft obligation). But 
the Com. has “hard 
enforcement” 
mechanisms 
(preventive measures 
in the agricultural and 
fisheries policies) to 
make States comply 
with soft instruments 
(letters of notice).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-law or 
proper norms  
 
(higher risk of 
‘abuse of soft 
 
Regulation 1286/2014 on 
Key information documents 
for small and retail 
investors. Civil liability if 
the KID is “clearly 
misleading or inaccurate” 
(hard instrument).  
 
 
 
 
Location policy on 
CCPs included in the 
Eurosystem Oversight 
Policy Framework of 
the ECB. ‘Soft 
instrument’ annulled 
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In light of these characteristics we understand the success of the so-called theory of 
hybridity in EU Law, by virtue of which we cope with “hybrid constellations in which 
both hard and soft processes operate in the same domain and affect the same actors”643, 
which is an increasing reality. The presence of hard and soft norms governing the same 
policies makes us think of two convergent “routes” towards the same objective. This 
view synthesises rationalism and constructivism: the first because it still gives 
importance to formal nomen iuris distinctions, and the second because it sensibly 
accepts that both hard and soft instruments can complement each other and diversely 
contribute to improve compliance with socially responsible standards and, in general 
terms, with human rights (or with employment objectives or any other EU policy). Soft 
law, born of new governance modes boosted after the 2000’s, has a growing influence 
on law-making processes and taking into account their legal effects, it does not seem a 
reversible phenomenon in the EU. 
 
4.1.3.  Assessment 
Despite these classifications, we walk on an unstable ground difficult to systematise, 
where generalisations are strongly inadvisable and where experimentation is 
commonplace. It is delicate to look for “spill-over effects” between sub-categories of 
soft-law or between sectors in which soft law plays any role. The opportunities are as 
big as the perils in terms of democracy and legitimacy: soft law can perfectly be used to 
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 D. M. TRUBEK, P. COTTRELL and M. NANCE: “‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’ and European 
Integration”, in G. De BURCA and J. SCOTT (Eds.): Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, 
Oxford 2006, Hart Publishing, pp. 65-94, at p. 67.  
law’ if the type 
of instrument is 
soft) 
Directives 2014/24/EU and 
204/25/EU on public 
procurement: possible 
exclusion from public 
contracts (hard instrument). 
by the ECJ in case T-
496/11 (‘abuse of soft 
law’) 
 
 
 
Hard 
 
 
 
Soft 
 
 
 
Para-law or 
Pre-law 
 
 
European Investment Bank 
Environmental and Social 
Handbook (para-law –
‘internal code of conduct’, 
soft instrument). 
 
 
Articles 28-29 TEU 
compliance of 
Member States with 
the CFSP but 
excluded from the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction: 
hard instrument, hard 
obligation, but no 
enforcement. 
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circumvent the appropriate legislative procedures644. As any tool, the problem at the end 
is the user.  
We firstly would like to suggest that the Commission might be tempted to use soft law 
as a new arm to increase its own influence in the inter-institutional balance of power. 
Let’s anyway recall that the ECJ is prompt (and keen) to annul any eventual abuse of 
soft law, as already noted. Extensive debate is written on the inter-institutional battles, 
in which we do not enter, if not to suggest that the role of soft law has been forgotten. It 
is generally accepted that the change from co-operation to co-decision procedures 
increased the power of the EP ever since. The Parliament wanted to go further its 
agenda-setting power and it focused on the obtention of a full veto prerogative (after 
Maastricht). This traditional strategy of the Parliament to obtain a veto power, somehow 
underestimated the fact that the capacity of determining or influencing the agenda leads 
to a far from negligible political power, compared to the institution whose task is facing 
the proposals (despite its eventual veto); nothing new under the sun, it is the classical 
debate between presidential and parliamentary systems with respect to the legislative 
agenda. Quantitative studies demonstrate in the overall the greater acceptance of EP’s 
amendments with the co-decision system, in other words, an apparently increasing 
power of the Parliament. Without denying this fact, we must nevertheless draw attention 
to critics645 who have revised the available studies in this regard and, following similar 
quantitative and qualitative surveys, have also concluded that, at the same time the 
Commission seems to lose the battle, the EP is also loosing part of its influence on the 
agenda-setting despite its new ‘veto toy’646.  
This is fully consistent with our work on CSR in the EU, as most of the initiatives come 
from the Commission. A relative loss of influence in the agenda-setting might have 
been the price paid by the EP to get an unconditional veto power. And to some extent, 
apart from specific CSR issues, this dynamic could also explain the boost of soft law 
instruments since the 2000’s, as the new strategy of the Commission to exercise its 
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 There are many different positions on the relative “empowerment of the EP” and to what policies may 
apply that veto: S. HIX and B. HOYLAND: “Empowerment of the European Parliament”, in Annual 
Review of Political Sciences (London School of Economics), No. 16 (2013), pp. 171-189.  
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power and maintain a high level of influence over the two other institutions. The EP 
logically complained of being left aside in such initiatives, what bitterly shows this loss 
of influence and the importance it gives to them: the EP “considers the open method of 
coordination to be legally dubious” and “deplores the use of soft law by the 
Commission where it is a surrogate for EU legislation that is still necessary per se, 
having due regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, or were it 
extrapolates the case-law of the Court of Justice into unchartered territory”647. However, 
the Parliament does not defend an absolute ban of soft law instruments, but asks to be 
consulted and to establish a proper mechanism of inter-institutional dialogue leading to 
the adoption of soft law instruments648, a clear recognition of their potential importance. 
Is it a pure advocacy of democratic values or a new episode of inter-institutional battles? 
This is commonplace in European integration and, extrapolating the debate, we could 
also wonder if the law-making capacity of the ECJ isn’t in fact –to some extent– also a 
backdoor judicial constitutionalisation of the EU.   
A nuanced discussion would conclude that, behind the Parliaments’ and the 
Commission’s positions we find both sincere concerns in terms of legitimacy and 
democracy and, also, a part of institutional battles. At the same time, desirable or not, 
soft law continues to expand and some consider it a form of “delegalisation” of the EU: 
“t]he use of soft law, together with the application of new forms of governance and the 
relative decline of the Community method, would bring the EU closer to classical 
international organisations”, a sort of “normalisation” which could be both positive and 
negative for the future of the EU integration649. 
More broadly, depending on the purpose of soft instruments, they might present 
different advantages and disadvantages650. The reconciliation of a globalised economy 
and international human rights law needs to go through different paths at the same time 
and cannot rely anymore exclusively on vertical obligations and States’ responsibilities. 
Not always hard law is the paradigm of neither precision nor the panacea to human 
rights issues. Hard law’s tendency towards the fossilization of legal solutions is far from 
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the current needs of flexible and practical mechanisms to foster human rights horizontal 
effects, as we have already said, among legal and natural persons. Substantial changes 
in circumstances are more and more common, making it necessary to have available –as 
a complement– more flexible mechanisms of self and co-regulation, which are more 
easily amendable. It seems important to leave room for experimentation when we are 
still not sure on what is the best stance to be adopted and, therefore, it seems reasonable 
to avoid the difficult and slow modification procedures of hard law. In case of error, soft 
law instruments do not imply the major negative consequences that might derive from 
classic legislative initiatives. Moreover, effectiveness and coercion are not necessarily 
correlated; the participation of all relevant stakeholders may help them internalise 
conducts and practices before these “eventually” become obligatory, apart from taking 
conscience of their social responsibility. Stakeholders are both internal and external to 
companies and new technologies and cheaper communication networks can help to 
materialise more opened participation systems in the decision-making procedures, 
including the poor and voiceless. Finally, soft law approaches can also be more 
sensitive to diversity between Member States, especially as the lack of legal personality 
of transnational companies persists hampering their liability even in cases of human 
rights violations.  
Having said that, we are under no illusions that many legal doubts remain concerning 
these new governance modes and their impact or effects on EU Law. Most objections 
point to the fact that soft law can aggravate the EU’s democratic deficit because it 
doesn’t follow the normal legislative procedures and, accordingly, lacks of legitimacy to 
generate any legal effect, even indirectly. Sceptics blame it to be the new strategy of EU 
institutions to circumvent democratic legislative procedures. The proceduralization and 
administratization of European governance tends to forget that the decision-making 
process is not an end in itself, but a mean to achieve a goal. It is essential to continue to 
be vigilant in the final output and whether we are contributing to a sort of neo-feudal 
privatisation of law-making. The notions of ‘stakeholders’ and ‘public participation’ is 
perfumed with inclusiveness and transparency, but it can become a trap behind which 
European corporatisation hides the project of revitalising a lobbyist market-based 
European project rather than a rights-based Europe651. A calm and reasoned assessment 
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might recognise the risks but also acknowledge the opportunity to improve traditional 
participative democracy, completing it with new tools from the so-called deliberative 
democracy. However, according to detractors, in addition to these alleged formal 
illegality and ideological inadequacy, moving to what happens in practice, its voluntary 
nature and programmatic character are seen as insufficient to give rise to truly positive 
changes.  
Critics further claim that soft law undermines citizens’ legal certainty and causes 
confusion as for their legitimate expectations. Under this point of view the Commission 
exceeds its competences in a breach of the conferral of powers enshrined in art. 5 TEU. 
As soft instruments are formally not considered ‘legislative acts’, the Commission 
seems to be enabled to escape the provisions laid down in the Protocol No. 2 on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, such as the obligation 
to widely consult (art. 2) and inform national Parliaments and the other EU institutions 
(art. 4). We also noted earlier that soft law is usually not available in all EU languages 
what may rise problems under article 4 TEU on “the equality of Member States and 
their national identities’, besides the problem of publicising norms to contribute to legal 
certainty if we accept that soft instruments can perfectly have legal effects –as stated by 
the ECJ.  
No need of ambiguous legal jugglery: it is our understanding that these imperfections 
can be corrected, for example, amending Protocols No. 1 and 2 in order to include an 
article referred to ‘other initiatives with legal effects’ and not only ‘legislative acts’, 
what would be perfectly consistent with the initial ECJ case-law. The amendment of 
Protocols does not seem realistic, but an easier option would be an inter-institutional 
agreement to ensure information exchanges and consultation between EU institutions 
and between them and Member States when dealing with soft law, in view of its 
increasing importance and therefore preserving another core principle, that of sincere 
cooperation (art. 12 TEU). In doing so, the unsuccessful Open Method of Coordination 
would be relatively updated and adapted to the actual potential of soft law. In any case, 
we consider not completely fair the criticism based on democratic values and, more 
concretely, the supposed incompatibility between soft law and legal certainty or 
legitimate expectations. Soft law has also proved to have some potential regarding the 
limitation of the Commission’s margin of discretion in its work and, looked at from that 
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angle, it can contribute to clarify expectations and increase certainty, provided the 
correction of the above-mentioned imperfections. 
 
CSR and soft law 
In the case of CSR, we have noted from our previous research that most CSR soft 
initiatives would have pre-legislative and para-legislative functions and, therefore, are 
less problematic in view of this pros and cons discussion –as seen through the ECJ case 
law, most of the problematics arise with its post-law manifestation. Most of the CSR 
advancements so far could be classified within these pre- and para-legislative functions, 
less problematic as they are intended to prepare the field and involve all actors, while 
promoting concrete results and creating a favourable political and social environment 
for its further development. 
On another front, we understand that soft law has per se some potential, regardless of its 
eventual hardening, even if this should not be discarded. In fact, we are witnessing the 
gradual introduction and mainstreaming of CSR issues in post-legislative soft 
instruments of a variety of policies, and even a progressive hardening of CSR, though 
very incipient. ‘Hardening’ processes should not come as a surprise to anyone. Before 
2009, the Nice Charter has a number of similarities with an inter-institutional 
agreement652: the intervention of all institutions and Member States in the drafting, the 
importance of the consensus between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament 
and its final solemn proclamation, bringing it near to soft international declarations. Not 
only that, the main obligations fell to EU institutions, who committed to respect the 
Charter in their work. Despite these obvious limitations, most of the public opinion and 
politicians were pleased to welcome the Nice Charter and its potential was clear. Of 
course, as is well-known, its hardening came only after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, when the Charter was upgraded to the same legal 
value as the Treaties; but even before being granted this treaty-level, the ECJ has a 
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number of references to its provisions “on a quite number of occasions”653, as we have 
seen with many other soft instruments we cited.  
In chapter III we have already referred to some significant examples that it is worth 
recalling at this point to interpret them as a kind of CSR ‘legal spill-over’, the most 
important of which are the following: 1) Directives 2013/34/EU and 2014/95/EU on 
non-financial reporting requirements; 2) Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU which 
constituted a wide public procurement reform novelty including CSR conditions; and 
the current proposal for a Directive –under discussion between EU institutions– on 
responsible supply chains of minerals from high-risk and conflict-affected areas654. We 
start to observe CSR transfers: to post-law soft instruments but also to hard norms that 
start to include unprecedented provisions that invites us not to discard any potential 
hardening, even though the main function of CSR up to now has been preparatory and 
predominantly soft, what is absolutely not a demerit or a sign of uselessness. 
On a general note, it is understood that CSR consists of going beyond the already settled 
legal standards, but the possibility of adding new regulatory options enriches the 
situation and is likely to facilitate the attainment of corporations’ responsibility, 
involving them in the process, as important economic operators, together with civil 
society, social partners, non-governmental organisations and associations. Obviously, 
we do not discuss that without the sword of Damocles of hard law, soft law might lose 
part of its usefulness. The interest of this process is precisely the mixture of instruments 
and initiatives that well deserve the effort to put things in order so as to properly gauge 
the value of the on-going work. In this sense, most of the times we face soft and hard 
norms when dealing with almost any EU policy, so that their interaction marks the 
practical outcome, influencing the legal effects (directly for classic legislative initiatives 
or indirectly applied by Courts when dealing with soft norms). We even have cases, 
such as nanotechnologies655, in which the majority of legal instruments available are 
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soft, an emblematic field where the potential benefits of soft law are clear in terms of 
flexibility and adaptability to further developments. 
At the end of the day, even though the Rousseaunian myth of the noble savage is over, it 
would be too pessimistic to say that State’s coercion –by itself and taken alone– is the 
primary purpose or raison d’être of any legal system. We rather think that legal orders 
look forward to reaching relatively just and peaceful solutions to social problems or the 
achievement of certain public goods656. The need and usefulness of State’s 
responsibilities in terms of human rights is not discussable at all, ensuring the vertical 
effect of human rights. However, as explained in the general part of this work, at this 
stage of globalisation it seems naïve to totally rely on these vertical effects, without 
stimulating as well forms of human rights respect through their horizontal effects657, in 
the relationships among individuals and between individuals and corporations. It is in 
this field where soft law might make its main contribution, unlike those who say that 
only hard law can contribute to the achievement of human rights goals. We have already 
seen that international human rights treaties and other hard mechanisms are not the 
panacea. The unfortunately marginal role of human rights in CSR issues is due to this 
school of thought that only accepts the benefits of hard law and is not able to imagine 
the potential of strongly mainstreaming human rights into soft law so as to foster their 
horizontal effects. We tend to a teleological approach to the rule of law, why not 
including soft law instruments if they contribute to get closer to solutions and a better 
society, as a complement rather than a replacement of hard law. Finally, the interest of 
soft law is not only due to its eventual hardening, it actually has a potential per se.  
Obviously, to adequately use this tool, we should equally raise awareness on the traps 
behind this process. 
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4.2. Access to justice: an open question 
 
4.2.1.  Premises on corporate extraterritorial responsibilities 
Many of the official documents studied indicate that CSR policies and the incipient sets 
of rules are still under development and could have a stronger impact, especially if they 
were accompanied with effective mechanisms to investigate, punish and compensate 
eventual breaches, as recurrently noted by the EU institutions (in particular, by the 
Parliament). John Ruggie’s UNGPs attach great importance to access to justice in their 
third level, the remediation, in which it is said that effective judicial mechanisms are at 
the core of ensuring access to remedy as stated in Principle 25. Principle 26 further 
provides that “States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of 
domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, 
including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that 
could lead to a denial of access to remedy”, respecting the characteristics of due process 
in such a way that “States should ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent 
legitimate cases from being brought before the courts […]”658. In the dialectic between 
hard and soft law, the second cannot exist without the first one and access to justice 
looks simply unavoidable, but the definition on ‘legitimate cases’ remains unclear.  
To ensure a useful and positive implementation of CSR initiatives, access to justice is 
the necessary threat of hard law, as recognised by the UN, in this mixed CSR scheme. 
Alleged victims of transnational companies face multiple obstacles among which we 
highlight the lack of guarantees of many domestic judicial systems (in developing States 
or in fragile and failed States), general misinformation on access to remedies, 
difficulties in acceding to legal aid and unknown procedural barriers –mainly ratione 
personae and ratione loci. In general terms, we could summarise there is an inequality 
of arms between alleged victims and authors, in the absence of institutional support for 
legal disputes that, in fact, should be matters of general interest. 
It is utterly important to make some terminological distinctions to properly introduce 
this debate, starting with the essential difference between the private interest of the 
litigants and the public interests of the forum: there are many factors that need to be 
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balanced. In talking about remedies, most people immediately think of judicial levers. 
The UN International Law Commission distinguishes three types of jurisdiction: 
prescriptive (norms or legislative acts), adjudicative (judicial review) and enforcement 
(executive)659. All three might have extraterritorial expressions, but in CSR the debate is 
centred on ‘extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction’, as far as the other two possibilities 
(extraterritorial legislation and enforcement) are –prima facie– much more difficult to 
reconcile with art. 2.7 of the UN Charter. States have the possibility to exert an 
extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction; “[h]owever, a State exercises such jurisdiction 
in the interest of the international community rather than exclusively in its own national 
interest”660, indirectly recognising the existence of superior interests of the international 
society.  
Working on John Ruggie’s matrix on extraterritoriality, the initiatives to make 
companies ‘accountable’ should not be limited to judicial liability: there is a myriad of 
less problematic and not-less-important measures “with extraterritorial implications”661, 
particularly in public procurement, export credit agencies and non-financial reporting 
requirements: the EU has very opportunely understood this, as we have seen analysing 
the level of implementation of CSR policies. It is less problematic in terms of 
International Law because “the State is not exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, but 
simply its territorial jurisdiction with extraterritorial implications”. Indeed, 
extraterritoriality is not the “magic potion” to definitively solve human rights abuses by 
TNCs: corporate responsibilities are not limited to “liability”, which is only an aspect of 
their “accountability” to be added to reputational risks, stock markets effects, public 
contracts, etc.662  
This is not to deny the usefulness and importance of effective judicial mechanisms; it is 
only aimed at underlining that incident-based and judicially-limited strategies by home 
States of TNCs may eventually lack of long-term effects on the problems at host States: 
lack of governance, human rights structural weaknesses, and consolidated corruption. 
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There is a need for a pragmatic and holistic approach to extraterritoriality in order to 
abandon the idea it constitutes the final panacea. 
States have for the moment no obligation to adopt exterritorial human rights measures 
as far as, strictly speaking, each State is the sole responsible for the respect of human 
rights within its own jurisdiction. Obviously, the “business and human rights” studies 
have shown that the overreliance on vertical effects and State responsibilities fail to 
effectively address many human rights’ abuses by TNCs, since globalisation has created 
a governance gap. Under International Law, it early arose that what is not prohibited 
might be permitted663: the lack of an obligation does not necessarily mean it is unlawful 
to act, and has not impeded an increasing international opinio iuris and practice in this 
direction, starting with many General Comments and Concluding Observations of UN 
bodies664, though insufficient to speak of any customary obligation yet. 
Given that this consensus is under construction, it is again advisable to remain realistic 
and pragmatic. A further distinction has to be made between criminal and civil 
responsibilities, bearing in mind that many legal orders do not contemplate criminal 
offences for legal persons (companies). There are authoritative voices that advocate for 
the criminalisation of human rights violations, “including those that take place outside 
the EU”665, and there is no doubt that many international instruments in humanitarian 
law and international criminal law already include partial obligations for non-State 
actors666. Its origin is the Nuremberg trials under the US Military Tribunal and Control 
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Council Order 10, but “there is a risk of overemphasising the potential of international 
criminal law to bring about human rights compliance among businesses and to serve as 
an accountability mechanism for corporate human rights abuses”667. For instance, not all 
human rights violations can be considered ‘international crimes’. Secondly, criminal 
claims rely on the prosecutor’s role and, unfortunately, this is not always a good idea as 
we have checked in two important French cases. In the first one, currently under 
instruction, the French company then called Amesys was said to sell internet spying 
software to the Libyan regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. According to the 
information of diverse NGOs and CSOs, this software was behind the arbitrary 
detention and torture of five pro-democracy activists opposed to the regime. A claim 
was brought in France but the Paris Prosecutor’s Office steadily opposed the claim and, 
on several occasions, asked for its dismissal delaying the admissibility proceedings until 
January 2013668. Also concerning France, a second case confirms the discussable role of 
public prosecutors: one of the largest timber traders, the Danish company DLH, and 
particularly its French branch, were said to import through the port of Nantes allegedly 
illegal timber coming from Liberia and apparently behind the financing of Charles 
Taylor’s faction in the civil war. The public prosecutor of Nantes transferred the case to 
Montpellier and, after two years without any news, Montpellier’s public prosecutor 
informed the plaintiffs that he would not open any preliminary inquiry669. In sum, public 
prosecutors are generally unexperienced (if not unwilling) to deal with these cases 
because of their complexity, sometimes their political sensitiveness, and the lack of 
resources. 
In view of the difficulties around criminal proceedings, civil liability should not be 
neglected; in colloquial terms, there is a Spanish expression that goes “lo que les duele 
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es el bolsillo”670. Many critics correctly claim that civil trials are not possible under 
International Law. Indeed, pragmatically speaking there is no need to discuss the 
criminal liability of TNCs: it is about the civil consequences of human rights breaches. 
For example, most internal orders have some kind of secondary or subsidiary civil 
liability when criminal offences run parallel to civil claims, in line with the Roman 
adage that says “societas delinquere non potest”. Pragmatism leads us to believe that 
civil claims are the most interesting option, in so far as it entails tangible remediation 
measures, without rejecting eventual criminal responsibilities if individuals are 
identified and the legal order at stake allows it. 
In any case, civil actions are not without problems. Several polemic cases brought 
before UK Courts, finally settled out of court, can give an idea on the cons of civil 
claims. In two cases, South-African individuals claimed damages for mercury poisoning 
when working at a factory of a wholly-owned subsidiary of an English company (Thor 
Chemicals Holdings Ltd). Both cases of 1997 and 2000671 were quickly aborted with 
multi-million dollar settlements and “no admission of liability”672.  
In 2009 nearly 30.000 claimants from Ivory Coast filed a suit against Trafigura Ltd. for 
the alleged dumping of toxic waste, having caused related diseases among the 
population living by the coast673. Once the case was declared admissible and having 
started the probative phase before the English High Court674, Trafigura decided to pay 
$1.500 to each alleged victim and no further inquiry was done, since civil proceedings 
only function upon request by a party. The settlement, however, led to a second lawsuit 
referred to the costs and delivered in 2011: according to the Judge, costs alleged by the 
claimants seemed disproportionate even though an item by item assessment had to be 
done, from witnesses, security, to experts, medical investigations, media and 
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information, lawyers retribution or even extra-territorial costs (for research in other 
locations like Malta, Amsterdam, Lagos or Norway). The Judge partially recognised the 
claimant’s bill, while he clarified that “it is not open to me to decide whether those 
witness statements were i) admissible; and or ii) of any probative value in relation to 
any of the issues in the case, since there has never been a trial”675. Again, “the 
defendants settled with a denial of liability”676, but for the judge the settlement itself 
“effectively prevents any argument that the proceedings should never have been brought 
because they would be bound to fail”677, as the defendants argued to disallow the costs 
of the alleged victims. Trafigura almost became a judicial saga because it operated from 
the port of Amsterdam: a € 1 million fine was imposed to the company in the 
Netherlands, considering it a “co-perpetrator” indirectly responsible and “knowing that 
they [the toxic substances] are harmful to life or health”678. One year later, the Court of 
Appeal confirmed the fine under the same Dutch Environmental Acts679. 
The third example of settlement involves Shell activities in the Niger Delta, a very 
problematic oil-producing site that has led to numerous lawsuits in different courts of 
the EU and the US. In this particular case, Shell decided to compensate the alleged 
victims via an extrajudicial agreement only after the Judge had delivered a preliminary 
ruling on eight issues, answering that claimants were entitled to compensation in respect 
of 2008 oil spills, even though spills caused by sabotage and illegal activities were not 
imputable to the company680. The full trial was planned for 2015 and Shell paid £ 55 
million divided as follows: £ 35 million for the individuals (aprox. £ 2,200 each, circa. 
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33 times the monthly minimum wage in Nigeria), and £ 20 million for the Bodo 
Community681. 
Therefore, the other side of the coin of civil claims is the eventual risk of ending up in 
out of court settlements that, ultimately, might shed little light on human rights 
concerns, even including anti-suit clauses and non-liability declarations that the victims 
have to sign to reach the agreements. At least in the EU, an arbitration agreement is not 
sufficient to prevent an EU Court from hearing a case, even if the agreement includes an 
anti-suit clause682, because one of the parties would be deprived of judicial protection683. 
With its pros and cons, we still consider that the civil litigation looks more attractive 
and practical than criminal proceedings, also following to the foregoing general 
considerations on extraterritoriality and liability. 
Having said this, the debate on corporate extraterritorial responsibilities can therefore be 
reduced to the following question: to what extent an extraterritorial adjudicative 
jurisdiction can be exercised to judge extra-contractual civil responsibilities in cases of 
human rights violations by TNCs. 
By way of premise, most of the problematic aspects will turn around the admissibility 
criteria to exert such extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction and obstacles ratione 
temporis can also arise because of victims’ misinformation on procedural requirements 
and, even ratione materiae, to duly translate human rights issues into internal civil 
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responsibility claims. However, as said before, the hardest nuts to crack will be ratione 
loci and ratione personae. 
 
Ratione loci 
Apart from the debate on extraterritoriality itself, it is not evident to reverse the general 
rule that offences have to be judged in the place where they occur (lex loci delicti). The 
forum non conveniens doctrine insists on the importance of the ‘natural forum’ because 
access to evidence and witnesses will be easier, and it will always be difficult for a 
Court to apply an alien legal order (that of the place where the violation took place), 
including probably different standards for reparation if the violation is finally proved. 
This doctrine generally corresponds to common law systems. Many authors defend its 
usefulness to “level the playing field” and prevent “a plaintiff from compelling 
litigation in a forum where the defendant will have great difficulty in obtaining evidence 
vital to the defense”684. Moreover, tax payers might be reluctant to welcome the “glut of 
foreign plaintiffs suing for injuries inflicted abroad”685. In our view, this reflects a rather 
disproportionate concern and care of TNCs’ defence: the problems for litigation in 
terms of access to evidence will be the same for alleged victims and authors if an 
external forum accepts jurisdiction and, if there is any significant and usual inequality 
of arms, it will rather undermine the victims. According to the famous and amusing 
concurring opinion of Judge Jackson in a US case, back in 1942, he put forward the 
exaggerated “protective doctrines in terms of sheltering defendants against vexatious 
and harassing suits […] behind a rather fantastic fiction that a widow is harassing the 
Illinois Central Railroad”686. This is the equivalent to say that, in some cases, the public 
interest would prevail, which is not an uncontroversial conclusion.  
A milestone to clarify this doctrine on jurisdiction ratione loci is the so-called ‘Spiliada 
test’, a twofold scheme foreseen by the House of Lords (UK): firstly, the defendant has 
to demonstrate that not only the UK is not a suitable forum but that there is another 
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natural and clearly more appropriate Court, notwithstanding the fact that, in the second 
phase of the reasoning, the Court may declare itself competent if, “established 
objectively by cogent evidence, […] the plaintiff will not obtain justice in the foreign 
jurisdiction”687. This helps to handle the forum non conveniens doctrine in favour of 
human rights litigations if the alleged victims succeed to show that the difficulties in the 
natural forum “would amount to a denial of justice”, as in the off-cited case Lubbe v. 
Cape688. This is even compatible with the sceptics view against any ‘public interest’ of 
courts: it can be seen as a way to balance the private interests of the litigants so that, in 
applying the ‘Spiliada test’, “questions of judicial amour propre and political interest or 
responsibility have no part to play”689. The burden of proof is shared: the defendant has 
to argue the suitability of another forum, but the plaintiff has the obligation to clearly 
show that “substantial justice cannot be done in the appropriate forum”, to convince a 
UK Court to take over –‘substantial justice’ meaning that claimants will have to accept 
normal differences between legal systems, perhaps less “generous” than the British690. 
As we will argue in the following section, the EU has tackled the problem ratione loci 
differently; let’s note for instance that exceptions to ‘local remedies’ are not new in 
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international human rights law: the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies are generally 
justified if there are unreasonable delays or lack of judicial guarantees691.  
While this may sound strange, forum shopping is also possible in human rights cases, 
and sometimes perfectly legal and legitimate. The forum non conveniens doctrine has 
been refined through the jurisprudence to evaluate and limit the best fora, especially in 
common law systems, but still leaves room for human rights litigation under the 
conditions explained above. To some extent, forum shopping is also a legitimate 
practice for human rights litigators when, in representation of alleged victims, they have 
to choose the most advantageous court, provided a choice is possible and under concrete 
conditions (lis pendens, ne bis in idem, and other procedural aspects that each tribunal 
lays down). Generally speaking, human rights lawyers pay little attention to the election 
of the correct forum, compared to other fields of law. In the EU, there are two available 
options: the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (Council of Europe) or the 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (EU), so that human rights lawyers will have 
a delicate work -and many times neglected- even before starting the proceedings. In 
Latin America, a case might be more suitable for the UN Committee on Human Rights 
rather than the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, or even in some cases the 
Special Procedures branch of the UN Human Rights Council deems to be a more 
effective and practical shortcut (tough less juridical). 
 
Ratione personae 
The first problem is that of the legal personality of TNCs and the difficulty to trace a 
direct or indirect causal link with alleged human rights abuses in third countries, taking 
into account the complexity of business structures. In Private International Law, 
“connecting factors that go beyond old-fashioned territorial limits”692 are more and 
more usual, at the same time that companies are considered, to some degree, right-
holders, for example in the protection of international investments. According to the 
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International Court of Justice, it deems to be sometimes necessary to “prevent the 
misuse of the privileges of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, 
to protect third persons […] or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or of 
obligations”693. The lifting of the corporate veil might be justified in certain “special 
circumstances”694, why not in the interest of internationally recognised human rights 
obligations. Despite the fact that only States and International Organisations are the 
primary subjects of international law, the recognition of TNCs does not mean that they 
might start appointing ambassadors, but to recognise that, in fact, they should have a 
“limited personality”695 within the framework of their rights in order to allow parallel 
responsibilities.  
Perhaps the expression ‘lifting the corporate veil’ only represents a particular facet of a 
broader phenomenon in International Law: the gradual piercing of legal personality, to 
which human rights have greatly contributed while gradually recognising a limited 
locus standi of individuals. We have therefore to “rethink jurisdiction” in the light of 
recent developments after which the “idea of jurisdiction as purely an expression of the 
rights and powers of sovereign states requires reconceptualization”696. The challenges 
derived from piracy, terrorism and transnational crime have International Law reeling 
against the ropes. Globalisation has also led to the multiplication of asymmetric 
transnational (but non-international) conflicts697, not to mention the complex human 
rights issues raised by the activities of TNCs. The concept of sovereignty has always 
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moved between “autonomy and responsibility”698, but these developments tend to 
increase the relative weight of the latter. This has to come with the understanding that 
there are no self-contained regimes in International Law, as argued in the first part of 
this work. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is not a consolidated doctrine yet, we rather support a 
functional definition of companies –consistently with other issues in this research. 
Otherwise, actions taken by apparently separate entities, distributed across associates, 
subsidiaries, branches and suppliers, can be legal individually taken, but the sum of 
them can amount to illegalities. In general terms, the complexity of corporate structures 
are probably not deliberately designed to violate human rights699, but they reveal to be 
very useful to avoid responsibilities once problems arise. In this sense, it is vital to keep 
close to what happens in the field in order to test merely formal separations based on 
legal personality.  
We can build on the experience in the area of international taxation law and money 
laundering, where there are instruments to pierce the corporate veil. There are sound 
reasons to do so in a variety of international and European standards. There is a solid 
ECJ’s case law that has empowered the Commission, in the area of competition law, to 
extraterritorially prosecute foreign parent companies, based on “the economic unit 
doctrine” and the “economic continuity test” (in cases of “succession of enterprises”) if 
there are enough elements “to shift the liability to the controlling entity”700. Therefore, 
in the area of competition law, the EU did not want to be the victim of merely formal 
separations based on legal personality, when subsidiaries in Europe were carrying out 
anti-trust activities under the orders of parent companies based outside the EU. In 
human rights cases the situation is exactly the opposite as the parent company is usually 
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registered in the EU, but we do not see why the same reasoning would not be 
applicable. 
The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises acknowledge that different 
enterprises operating abroad might be subject to different legislations, but “compliance 
and control systems should extend where possible to these subsidiaries” and “the 
board’s monitoring of governance includes continuous review of internal structures to 
ensure clear lines of management accountability throughout the group”701. Formally 
speaking, a subsidiary is controlled by the parent company when the latter owns more 
than 50% of shares or when it has the right to appoint or remove a majority of directors 
and managers, in terms of control and not only simple ownership. Control is presumed 
to be extended to the subsidiaries of subsidiaries: if subsidiary B controls C, but B is 
controlled by A, then the logical conclusion is that A controls C, and so on, as it 
happens in complex conglomerates that characterize multinational corporations in a 
generational structure702. EUROSTAT and the Seventh Directive went a step further 
stating that “if nobody holds the legal power to control B, but A has effective control 
over B, i.e., there is a presumption of a participating interest of A in B through the 
ownership by A of 20% or more of the capital of B, and A actually exercises a dominant 
influence over B, or B is managed on a unified basis by A”703, which is a functional and 
more realistic approach to determine the level of power over subsidiaries and, 
consequently, potential responsibilities. In fact, the main function of ‘Holding’ 
corporations is to control and direct groups of subsidiaries or associates (in the latter, 
the parent company is supposed to have between 10% and 50% of shares), in a building 
where branches are also a different form704. Besides, article 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention provides with a very useful definition of ‘permanent establishment’: “a 
fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly 
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carried on”, including “a place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a 
workshop and a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of 
natural resources”705, even though subsidiaries and parents may not be considered 
permanent establishments of each other, as the control is exercised differently. 
In conclusion, modern legal definitions of companies focus on control and power, and 
not only on ownership rights. The EU has established that “control also exists when the 
parent owns half or less of the voting power of an entity”, when it is proved to “govern 
the financial and operating policies of the entity under a statute or an agreement”706. In 
our view, such ‘agreement’ can also be tacit and demonstrated through the internal 
communications, for example, if evidence can be collected on instructions and 
decisions, of operative nature or on human resources, that are effectively taken by the 
parent company. The EU considers that a 20% of voting power justifies a presumption 
of “significant influence, unless it can be clearly demonstrated that this is not the 
case”707. In this context, it seems inappropriate to be blocked by old-fashioned and 
limitative formal definitions –which by the way would be inconsistent within the EU, 
where a Directive to avoid double taxation and lower the tax burden of companies, 
considers that a company can declare itself ‘parent’ of a ‘subsidiary’ by owning only the 
10% of shares of the latter, a requirement progressively reduced (after 2007 it was the 
15% and, before, the 20%)708. 
The lifting of the corporate veil in human rights cases can be supported by these 
international standards that increasingly accept a functional approach to complete the 
picture on effective control and power, to overcome the classic limited perceptions on 
‘ownership’ and ‘legal personality’. In other words, a TNC might claim its organic 
independence from its subsidiaries, but it can help the human rights litigator to show the 
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 OECD Model Convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital.  
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 COMMISSION Regulation (EC) No. 1126/2008 of 3 November 2008 adopting certain international 
accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament 
and the Council, Official Journal of the European Union L 320/1 of 29 November 2008, International 
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 Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive 90/435/EEC on the 
common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different 
Member States, Official Journal of the European Union L 007, 13 January 2004 p. 0041-0044, art. 3.  
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functional dependence in operative and economic terms709 with the goal of convincing 
the courts that, ratione personae, the parent company is also liable, similarly to internal 
orders where a distinction is made between intellectual and material authors of an 
offence (or at least, in terms of negligence if a lack of due control –or connivance– over 
the subsidiaries can be shown). 
 
The United States’ influence 
Yet the US jurisprudence is not the subject of this research, the debate on access to 
justice in the area of business and human rights has for long gravitated around the 
American Alien Tort Statute, with a notable influence in the European debate. It is also 
a good way to conclude these premises on corporate extraterritorial responsibilities, 
before detailing the current developments in the EU. Enacted during the First Congress, 
in 1789, the Alien Tort Claims Act remained in a lethargic state for two centuries. It re-
emerged in 1980 on the occasion of the judgment Filartiga v. Peña Irala revealing itself 
as a useful tool for transnational human rights litigation, allowing the admission of 
cases on violations of ‘the law of nations’ brought by aliens against other individuals 
and, in a second wave, against TNCs. The main advantages of the ATS in conjunction 
with some characteristics of the US system are these710: the ‘discovery’ facilities by 
which the claimants can ask for internal documents of the defendants are also available 
during the admissibility phase in form of a “jurisdictional discovery”; ‘class actions’ 
(collective claims) are easier and, sometimes, the absence of such possibility in the 
‘natural forum’ has been sufficient for a US Court to declare itself competent; many 
lawyers and law-firms accept these cases pro bono, without remuneration, sometimes 
only for the prestige or on “no win – no fee” basis (which in most European countries is 
even forbidden, except the UK); in many cases, Courts have accepted jurisdiction 
ratione personae over subsidiaries of TNCs, even when the latter had a rather slight 
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 Let’s note that an entity organically dependent can also be functionally independent; this has to be 
studied on a case by case basis. Obviously, the complexity of TNCs makes it impossible to find 
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clear-cut centralisation: J. BASTIANUTI: “Les dynamiques organisationnelles liées à la RSE. Le cas de 
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derechos humanos en EEUU: ¿el fin del ATS?”, in Revista para el Análisis del Derecho, 3:2011, 38 pp., 
at pp. 8-12. This work also includes an annex with the most relevant US jurisprudence in chronological 
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connection with the US; and finally, punitive damages are generally generous and alien 
legislation and compensation schemes can be more easily disallowed. 
After a few successes with significant international impact711, the US Courts have 
declared themselves competent on the basis of loose ‘connecting factors’ with the US, 
following the initial decisions but without examining in depth their fundaments and a bit 
erratically. The ATS suffered a first limitation in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): for 
the first time, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed a case by laying down 
three new criteria to accept jurisdiction on an alleged violation of International Law 
brought by an alien. It had to be “specific, universal and obligatory”712, which generated 
unexpected restrictions ratione materiae.  
Some conservative judges were also increasingly unease with the political dimensions 
of these cases, mainly due to the respect of foreign sovereignty and, last but not least, 
expressed concerns on eventual interferences of the judiciary with the Congress in 
foreign affairs by accepting new causes of action when, in fact, the ATS is only a 
jurisdictional tool and remains silent of substantive causes of action. Interestingly 
enough, foreign policy concerns and more serious doubts ratione loci only appeared 
when an Israeli filed a suit against the Libyan Arab Republic for a terrorist attack 
occurred in Haifa (Israel); the Court’s expectable dismissal constituted a premonition of 
more hostile views on the ATS713. The above-mentioned doctrine of forum non 
conveniens gained adepts while it became clear the potential of the ATS to sue TNCs. 
The controversy developed on the status of customary international law, how it is 
translated into the internal US legal order (if it becomes ‘federal common law’ and its 
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 For information purposes, an off-cited case is Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum: a single investor’s 
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 J. A. KIRSHNER: “Why is the US Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe? 
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty and the Alien Tort Statute”, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 259-302, at p. 272.  
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consequences), alongside the debate between ‘originalist’ and ‘modernist’ 
interpretations of the ATS714. 
As long as almost any TNC has some kind of presence in the US, the new corporate 
strategy to circumvent the generally liberal ‘personal jurisdiction’ of US courts, 
consisted of putting in question the admissibility ratione materiae (the subject matter), 
i.e., making manifest the lack of a sufficiently consolidated international practice to 
support a liability for damages against TNCs. The result is the famous Kiobel judgment 
(2013), which is the second and major limitation of the ATS. In that case715, the US 
Supreme Court decided to further step back and applied stricter admissibility criteria 
and started to require closer connections to the US. The ATS, according to the Court, 
was suddenly presumed to be non-extraterritorial, a presumption that has to be rebutted 
for a case to succeed if it “touche[s] and concern[s] the territory of the United States 
[…] with sufficient force”716, not being enough a mere economic presence of TNCs in 
the US. Many academics have argued that Kiobel represents a fatal restriction, though 
not total, of the ATS possibilities for transnational human rights litigation, while a 
historicist and limitative reading of the ATS seems to prevail at the moment717. It is 
important to note that, in virtue of the amicus curiae accepted in the US, the 
Commission submitted a brief in Kiobel, “acknowledging the possibility of universal 
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 Being drafted back in 1789, the debate has also taken the form of virtuosistic disquisitions of legal 
archaeology around the original and true purposes of the ATS like if the Law was a static reality. In 
summary, critics affirm that, unlike the situation in 1789, the current US legal order apparently does not 
foresee anymore the existence of international norms which are non-federal but still binding, so that 
jurisdiction ratione loci should also be narrowed as done in Kiobel: “The debate about the status of 
international law is more directly implicated by the argument that a cause of action should not be 
recognised for violations of international law by aliens abroad because recognising such actions would 
exceed the United States’ jurisdiction to prescribe. If customary international law is federal law, then it 
would directly pre-empt State causes of action that exceed the United States’ jurisdiction to prescribe. But 
if international law were not federal law, States would be free to recognise such causes of action and 
place the nation in breach of its international obligations”, C. M. VÁZQUEZ: “Alien Tort Claims and the 
Status of Customary International Law”, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106 No. 3 
(July 2012), pp. 531-546, at p. 546. 
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for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Businesses, December 2013, ICAR-CORE-ECCJ, pp. 27-
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717
 “una lectura historicista del ATCA, fosilizándola en el momento en que se promulgó”, F.J. ZAMORA 
CABOT: “Kiobel y la cuestión de la Extraterritorialidad”, in F.J. ZAMORA, J. GARCÍA CÍVICO and L. 
SALES PALLARÉS: La responsabilidad de las multinacionales por violaciones de derechos humanos, 
Madrid 2013, Ed. Defensor del Pueblo –Universidad de Alcalá, pp. 135-148, at p. 147. We want to take 
the occasion to warmly thank the author for his constant support and friendship and the invitation to the 
book presentation. 
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civil jurisdiction provided it was restricted along the same lines as universal criminal 
jurisdiction, including the procedural requirement of ‘exhaustion of local and 
international remedies or, alternatively, the claimants’ demonstration that such remedies 
are unavailable or their pursuit is futile”718, thus confirming the conclusion we reached 
before as for the forum non conveniens doctrine and its balancing to avoid a denial of 
justice.  
Even after Kiobel, the possibility for civil claims connected to human rights violations 
is still opened in the US, though under more restrictive admissibility criteria. Anyhow, 
the acceptance of civil jurisdiction under certain conditions (at least ratione personae) 
should not automatically mean that the applicable law changes: we understand that the 
applicable civil law should remain that of the place where the harm occurred, unless it is 
clearly incompatible with human rights or other basic standards. Activists usually 
request the application of the civil law of the new forum, but this is likely to ‘kill the 
goose that lays the golden eggs’ and give reasons to critics that wisely raise “unlawful 
assertions of universal civil jurisdiction”719. The increasing reluctance in the US about 
the ATS was partly caused by the less friendly administration of G.W. Bush720 and, 
somehow, by a reborn traditional “US suspicion of international laws” derived from the 
fact that their independence was built upon a reaffirmation of their sovereignty, while 
“Europe instead relinquished sovereignty to protect democracy”721. The EU is actually 
taking the baton of these developments and, as we will see in the following section, now 
is relatively opened to corporate extraterritorial responsibilities. 
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 U. KOHL: “Corporate Human Rights Accountability: the Objections of Western Governments to the 
Alien Tort Statute”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 63 (July 2014), pp. 665-697, 
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4.2.2.  Current developments in the EU 
In the famous Communication […] A Renewed Strategy 2011-14 for CSR722, we find the 
promise to advance in the area of access to remedies and take into account the 
conclusions of experts and forums. It is our understanding that allowing access to 
justice and remedies in European Courts would mark an utterly significant step forward. 
If there are signs of direct or indirect involvement of an EU company in a violation of 
human rights in a third country, reasonable measures should be taken to facilitate 
access to justice, to some extent inspired by the American Alien Tort Statute. In terms 
of new instruments, there are no big innovations within the EU; in practice, however, 
there are indeed very notable opportunities that it is worth explaining. 
In 2006, consistently with the approach outlined in the previous section, a French Court 
warned that “l’ordre public international s’oppose à ce qu’un employeur puisse se 
prévaloir des règles de conflit de juridictions et de lois pour décliner la compétence des 
juridictions nationales et évincer l’application de la loi française dans un différend qui 
présente un rattachement avec la France et qui a été élevé par un salarié placé à son 
service sans manifestation personnelle de sa volonté et employé dans des conditions 
ayant méconnu sa liberté individuelle”723. The EU has found its own way to balance the 
notion of ‘ordre public international’ with the necessary respect of foreign sovereignty 
and natural forums, but permitting national Courts of Member States to declare 
themselves competent in cases of verified risks of denial of justice724. 
At a national level, we have already referred to important decisions in the UK as a 
platform to transfer the ATS debate into Europe while British Courts nuanced and 
limited the forum non conveniens doctrine. We have cited above the seminal Lubbe v. 
Cape, where the liability of the parent company was established despite that doctrine725. 
The House of Lords acknowledged that, prima facie, England was not the natural 
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forum; nevertheless, at the second stage of the so-called Spiliada test, the Court found 
out that the costs of litigation and other serious difficulties for the applicants in South 
Africa would lead to an unacceptable denial of justice. If the Spiliada test became a 
useful tool to initially counterbalance the forum non conveniens doctrine, at the end the 
ECJ has declared the incompatibility of this doctrine with the Brussels Convention726. 
On the whole, the European answer has been a partial forum necessitatis, on the basic 
understanding that both article 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
article 6 of the European Convention on Human rights require access to effective 
judicial remedies, in principle without excluding third country nationals727. It is, 
similarly to the ATS, a possibility under development with mixed results. 
Under the umbrella of art. 82 TFEU, the general applicable regime in the EU is 
essentially governed by Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of December 22nd 2000 (the EU 
consolidation of 1968 Brussels Convention), concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial maters728, provided that the 
claimant is domiciled in a Member State (art. 4). In the Resolution dated 13 March 2007 
on “Corporate Social Responsibility: a new partnership”, the European Parliament 
referred to this Regulation and enthusiastically asked the Commission “to implement a 
mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can seek redress 
against European companies in the national courts of the Member States” and “organise 
and promote awareness campaigns and monitor the implementation of the application of 
foreign direct liability according to the Brussels Convention”729. It would appear that, in 
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the opinion of the Parliament, Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 would allow corporate 
accountability in the Courts of Member States; legally speaking, this is a very 
controversial statement. 
On one side, article 60730 on the domicile of legal persons offers a wide notion 
(statutory seat, central administration or principle place of business). At first sight, the 
obvious difficulty is, again, to link parent and subsidiary, so that article 60 does not 
seem very useful. Indeed, when the legal person is not based in the EU, the link to the 
parent company is of dubious helpfulness. In Vava and Others v. Anglo American South 
Africa Ltd the decisional influence and direction of Anglo American Group over its 
South African subsidiary was not seen as a solid connecting factor for the English 
judge: “The fact that decisions taken and policies and strategies adopted by AA plc in 
England influence, indeed strongly influence, the decisions taken by AASA in South 
Africa does not alter the position”731. The relationship parent-subsidiary might be 
insufficient to bring a case to the EU, even in the British jurisdiction732, if we must rely 
solely on article 60 of Regulation 44/2001. 
It is true that we find hopeful signs too: in Chandler v. Cape Plc the judge admits that 
parent companies have duties of care over subsidiaries, even if not wholly-owned, at 
least “in relation to what might be called high level advice or strategy”733 and 
demonstrated “that in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent 
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company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees”734, 
including harms occurred abroad as in the case at stake, given that the “evidence shows 
that the parent company has a practice of intervening in the trading operations of the 
subsidiary, for example, production and funding issues”735. This is by the way perfectly 
coherent with our functional understanding of transnational business structures. 
In Regulation 44/2001, there is no link based on the objet or content of the litigious, 
regardless of the domicile of the parties and its current interpretation is still unclear. If it 
is a collective claim or there is a number of defendants, article 6.1 of Reg. 44/2001 
foresees that the domicile of one of them would be sufficient to sue in that Member 
State, when there is a clear link concerning the content of the process in order to “avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgements resulting from separate proceedings”.  
Critics allege that Brussels Convention is only applicable between Member States, but it 
has become clear that, as a starting point, the fundamental article 2 was clearly though 
to regulate “relationships between the courts of a single Contracting State and those of a 
non-Contracting State, rather than relationships between the courts of a number of 
Contracting States”, as explained by the ECJ in Owusu v. Jackson736. With this in mind, 
we understand that the ECJ has justified joint hearings when “there is a connection of 
such kind that it is expedient to determine those actions together”737, in line with article 
6.1, and there is no need for the claims to have identical legal bases so that national 
courts will enjoy a interesting room for manoeuvre. The forum necessitatis doctrine, 
useful to avoid both denials of justice or irreconcilable judgments, has been upheld in 
two occasions by Dutch Courts, who explicitly put forward Member States’ margin of 
appreciation under article 4.1 of Reg. 4/2001: “In part in view of article 4(1) of the 
Brussels Regulation, this means that the question regarding whether the court has 
international jurisdiction in respect of SPDC [the Nigerian subsidiary of Royal Dutch 
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Shell]should be answered based on the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure”738. In that case, 
the Court adopted a progressive stance by accepting that “the corporate veil in group 
relationships may be directly or indirectly pierced, albeit under exceptional 
circumstances”739 and finally concluded that the claimants succeeded to prove “a 
connection to such an extent that reasons of efficiency justify a joint hearing of the 
claims against RDS and SPDC”740. On a later occasion affecting the same company, 
sued by a different plaintiff, a joint hearing of the parent company and the Nigeria-
based subsidiary was granted without any fear of “abuse of process”741. It must be noted 
as well that the same arguments were used to dismiss a third case against Shell in the 
Netherlands, because the District Court of the Hague was not convinced of the 
allegations of ‘negligence’ and considered that there was no concurrence of the 
“exceptional circumstances”742 necessary, as said before, even citing Lord Goff of 
Chieveley –the leading judge in the above-cited Spiliada case.  
This interpretation of articles 2, 4 and 6 of Reg. 44/2001 finds further support in a 
British case, where the domicile in England of the parent company was sufficient for the 
judge to issue a worldwide injunction to freeze assets of the parent company as “there 
was a real risk that Monterrico would not retain assets within the jurisdiction sufficient 
to meet any claim against it or Rio Blanco”743, being the latter its subsidiary registered 
in Peru and thus confirming the subsidiary civil liability of the parent company. 
Moreover, we shall highlight that the British judge justified its jurisdiction ratione 
personae citing the interpretation of article 2 of Regulation 44/2001 made by the ECJ’s 
in above-mentioned case Owusu v. Jackson744. In spite of all these promising 
developments, there are also some setbacks. For example, in a different case the ECJ 
decided that “Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning 
that it is not intended to apply to defendants who are not domiciled in another Member 
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State, in the case where they are sued in proceedings brought against several defendants, 
some of whom are also persons domiciles in the European Union”745, inconsistently the 
increasing case-law commented above.  
In sum, the interpretation of Reg. 44/2001 shows some possibilities for transnational 
human rights litigation even though its interpretation is unclear at some points. On the 
other hand, since human rights breaches would basically lead to extra-contractual civil 
responsibilities, the above-mentioned regulation has to be read together with Reg. 
864/2007 (Rome II746): though being separate and having different purposes, the ECJ 
has clarified that consistency between both regulations should be ensured747. Rome II 
clearly settles that the law applicable is that of the country where the harm occurs (art. 
4) as a general rule, but this is not an impediment to accept jurisdiction in case of risks 
of denial of justice or irreconcilable judgments, if the Court applies the foreign law at 
stake: as we explained before, the civil corollary of applying the law of the new forum 
could lead to an “unlawful assertion of universal civil jurisdiction”748 and might 
undermine the defendants’ fundamental rights. In general terms, we insist that accepting 
jurisdiction should not lead to a change on the applicable law, unless it is clearly 
incompatible with human rights or basic judicial guarantees.  
In fact, art. 5.3 of Reg. 44/2001 also enshrines the general rule that the law applicable is 
that of the place where the harmful event occurred. But the ECJ –contributing to the 
general confusion– has established that article 5.3 of Reg. 44/2001 “must be understood 
as being intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of 
the event giving rise to it, with the result that the defendant may be sued, at the option 
of the claimant, in the courts of either of those places”749. This should be valid also 
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when one of these places is not a Contracting State, in view of the interpretation of 
article 2 made at Owusu v Jackson. Besides, in cases of environmental damage, even 
Rome II provides that the claimant can “base his or her claim on the law of the country 
in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred” (art. 7). The exact meaning of 
‘giving rise’ and the situations to which it could be applied remains obscure: could it be 
extended to the operative decisions taken in the headquarters of TNCs that ‘give rise to’ 
eventual human rights violations in the field? Are human rights “overriding mandatory 
provisions” in accordance to article 16 of Rome II? Or perhaps human rights, as a 
common interest of the international society, might fit into article 26 referred to the 
“ordre public of the forum”? It is commonplace that the damages usually don’t take 
place in Europe, but the “place of the event giving rise to it” might constitute a 
possibility to show a link with EU-based parent companies, to be added to other 
opportunity niches in the current regulations. For example, article 7 of Rome II is an 
open window that many authors wish to see extended to cases beyond ‘environmental 
damages’750.  
To cite a more recent norm, the domicile of the defendant is still a key requirement in 
Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, in force since 10 January 2015. It could be argued that this 
territorial link should decline in exceptional circumstances, such as in cases of human 
rights violations. We might recall that the Commission in 2010 had a more ambitious 
proposal to improve this regulation751, even though a general rule on “related actions” to 
allow extraterritorial accountability of European companies wasn’t either considered, 
not even in exceptional terms in cases of human rights violations. All in all, the recast 
regulation 1215/2012 maintained the territorial link based on the domicile of the 
defendant, but in the overall respected and preserved a good amount of flexibility at the 
level of Member States and their own margin of manoeuvre, which is a strange option 
to the extent the European integration heads to uniformity and harmonisation. Perhaps 
the lack of political will and consensus is behind these mixed results and the discreet 
and ambiguous role of the Commission. Whatever the case may be, we have seen that 
there are interesting examples of this margin of appreciation that show a certain 
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potential for transnational human rights litigation, with the leading role of British and 
Dutch courts. 
It is early to know to what extent the margin of member States will be sufficient to cope 
with the deficiencies of Regulations 44/01 and 1215/2012 with respect to the direct or 
indirect involvement of EU companies in human rights violations in third countries. A 
different option would be to increase the relative weight of Reg. 864/2007 to 
counterbalance some unclear aspects of Reg. 44/2001. A case by case and a State by 
State scenario is, in our view, unlikely to create solid bases and, sooner or later, a 
revision will be necessary at the EU level (and well beyond a simple amendment). For 
different reasons, it doesn’t seem realistic to expect a modification in the near future. In 
addition to the technical difficulties, to accept new jurisdiction criteria (something like a 
“related action” connection to sue in European Courts) clearly requires a wider political 
will to support civil suits for human rights violations even when the facts occur in third 
countries or when there is not a person involved with a clear European connection.  
Finally, the obligation to provide with free legal assistance if necessary, as a 
fundamental tool to ensure an effective access to justice, derives from the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Convention does not explicitly envisage it in civil 
proceedings; but the ECHR has clarified that under article 6.1 of the treaty it can be 
considered as an element of the right to a fair trial, very particularly when exceptional 
circumstances arise becoming evident a high risk of inequality of arms between the 
parties in inter partes proceedings. In the case Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom, 
the European Court Of Human Rights stated that “the denial of legal aid to the 
applicants deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the 
Courts and contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms” which in turn may lead to 
the violation of substantial human rights such as, in that case, freedom of expression in 
terms of proportionality: “If, however, a State decides to provide such a remedy to a 
corporate body, it is essential in order to safeguard the countervailing interests in free 
expression and open debate, that a measure of legal aid rendered the defamation 
proceedings unfair, in breach of art. 6.1. The inequality of arms and the difficulties 
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under which the applicants laboured are also significant in assessing the proportionality 
of the interference under Article 10” (and we presume that many other articles). 752  
Also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in its article 47.3 states 
that “legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. The question is the practical 
degree of coverage: the aspects covered and if it is a right of any person trying to file a 
lawsuit in the territory of the EU regardless of his or her nationality and domicile. 
Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by 
establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes753 could help 
us answering these questions. There was no doubt for all Union citizens and third-
country nationals who habitually and lawfully reside in a Member State (recital 13 of 
the Directive) and, to comply with non-discrimination principle, article 4 provides that 
any member State will offer this legal aid to any Union citizen or third-country national 
with domicile in another member State. This condition significantly reduces the 
possibilities to sue, even more when it is not clear if the requirement is fulfilled once an 
application of legal residency is filed or only when it is approved. In sum, it is not a 
useful tool for our purpose as it is aimed at clarifying the right of Union citizen or third-
country national legally domiciled to have access to legal aid in any member State 
different from that of his residence or nationality. 
This solves many problems inside Europe, but doesn’t give an answer to our question to 
the extent the situations involving third States as scenario of the dispute or origin of at 
least one of the parties in the proceeding. The two Hague Conventions, that is, first of 
all Convention II (March 1954) 754 on civil procedure and Convention XXIX (25 
October 1980) on international access to justice basically obliges to provide in this 
regard the same national treatment to nationals of any of the parties to the Treaty. 
Convention XXIX of 1980 develops this idea and requires nationals of contracting 
States and persons habitually resident in a contracting State to be treated, for the 
purposes of legal aid in court proceedings in each contracting State, as if they were 
                                                          
752
 ECHR: Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom, Case 68416/01, 15 February 2005 (Final 15 May 
2005), par. 72 and 95. In the same direction see the Case Airey v. Ireland A32/1979 which also started to 
extend free legal aid to civil cases (in the case of an indigent).  
753
 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003, accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=1tnZJRCG7TQTQH98bM0vwbKFny1Tzv2RQjXZYtNvPSN7Q66
TjR2w!-1249367065?uri=CELEX:32003L0008 , Recital 13 read together with articles 1 and 4.  
754
 Ratified by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemboug, the 
Netherlands, Portual, Sain and Sweden.  
249 
 
nationals of and resident in that State. The Commission therefore indicated that it was 
highly desirable to extend the ratification of 1980 Hague Convention755 in order to 
advance in the solution of the problem and a proposal for Recommendation was 
drafted756. Well accepted by the European Parliament and by the Economic and Social 
Committee, it didn’t convince the Council of member States: the public debate focused 
on the extent to which non-European citizens would benefit much more than Union 
citizens from the treaty. The accession to 1980 Hague Convention on international 
access to justice might seem a good shortcut but is actually, in the light of our 
explanation, just a quick political fix without expectations of long-term success because 
of the technical problems. To sum up757, the regulation of access to justice by the 
Directive 2003/8/EC has two remaining loopholes: a) the eligibility criteria ratione 
personae and substantive admissibility, still unclear for third countries (we are far from 
some kind of “alien tort statute”); b) and secondly, article 3 of this Directive completely 
forgets legal persons.  
The Commission has somehow understood that we may dare expanding the traditional 
mould of admissibility criteria, among which we should reach a new balance in cases of 
human rights violations. This way, we would give better protection to the weaker party 
in these processes, especially when local judicial systems show structural deficiencies 
and, of course, provided there is a direct or indirect involvement of an EU-based 
Company. This is a logical a measure in a world of increasingly integrated economies 
and communications, but requires a clear political will. The EU has the opportunity to 
show the way and part of the work concerning access to justice (detecting the main 
issues at stake) is done. For the time being, the European initiatives in this regard have 
been shy but, as we have seen, the EU has discreetly preserved a sufficient margin of 
appreciation to allow Member States to go further. 
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4.3. The role of the EU and the post-2015 agenda 
 
Taking into consideration this specific analysis of CSR in the EU, it is clear that its 
contents are still under development. CSR grows somehow disorderly for different 
reasons: first, the interaction between EU institutions, since the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission have different priorities and working methods; because Member 
States themselves show diverse understandings and speeds; and because it has spread to 
different policies and law-fields, apparently without a logical storyline behind –we 
mean, hardly predictable –with good progresses alongside failures or omissions. 
Besides, we face a complex mix of hard and soft law, the question of access to remedies 
is still pending as well as its future interaction with classical human rights instruments. 
Only time will tell how the traditional ex-post and vertical human rights mechanisms 
can be completed by CSR, defined as a mostly ex-ante (preventive) and horizontal 
approach758. We started this research raising questions such as: What are the differences 
and similarities between the EU and other international organisations in promoting 
CSR? How has operated the interaction between them? To what extent the EU leads the 
way and in which aspects? What have been its successes and deficiencies, to evaluate its 
potential leadership in the international scenario? Since when and how is CSR inserted 
into EU policies? Could we make emerge CSR issues before it was labelled as such? 
Are there original aspects in the European CSR? What is the legal value of the diverse 
initiatives? In short, the five W’s of CSR, as a journalist would say: who, what, where, 
when and why, and of course, how –which is a transversal question.  
We have answered most of these questions au fur et à mesure. Provided certain caution 
and criticism advisable in any research, we do not find justified the excessive fears with 
regard to soft methods to complement the human rights regime: shall we recall, for 
example, that in the CFSP “si può tranquillamente affermare, ad esemplio, che il 
contributo alla pace dato dalla Comunità europea con i suoi mezi “soft” ed indiretti è 
stato molto più importante di quello dato sin qui dall’Unione con i suoi strumenti diretti 
di politica estera e militare”759. The following concluding remarks are aimed at tying 
up some loose ends on the role of the EU in promoting CSR. We divide it into two 
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different categories: institutional aspects that mark its development, and substantive 
contributions that might shed light on its potential. 
 
4.3.1.  The role of the EU: some institutional remarks 
As for the general principles and broad spectrum initiatives, it is evident that the first 
achievements fall on international organisations with universal scope (first part of this 
research). It seems in some measure (and for instance) that the EU has followed the path 
set out by those other organisations at a universal level and has, later, tried to lead the 
way with mixed results. The European strategy is explicitly built upon the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles, the eight core ILO 
conventions, and the ISO 26000, which remain the most important references. The EU 
readily acknowledges this inspiration but the Commission is keen to clarify that “[t]he 
EU role here does not duplicate the role of the UN Working Group or other existing 
mechanisms”760. 
Indeed, the EU is a unique organisation in the international scenario so that, intuitively, 
there must be institutional particularities with an influence on the development of CSR. 
The high degree of integration, now both economic and political, renders it more and 
more difficult to reach the equilibrium between a market-oriented and a rights-based 
Europe. CSR is somewhere in between. To the equation we have to add the hackneyed 
discussion on legitimate, democratic but efficient institutions. As we have seen, since 
2000 the EU institutions have embraced the so-called new modes of governance, a soft-
law fashion extended to many other policy areas after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009. Analytically and institutionally, the discussion hereafter refers to a 
variety of debates and subjects concerning the EU institutional building: at first sight, 
some might seem off-topic, but all have an impact on the way in which CSR has been 
developed, starting with an analysis of governance issues to continue with the complex 
interaction between the Commission, the Parliament, the Council and the ECJ. 
We have already signalled the pros and cons of soft law, in relation to CSR; soft law, 
however, has an institutional dimension: the current informal modes of governance. It 
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goes without saying that almost any kind of informal governance has been put in 
practice during the initial implementation of the CSR agenda, to supposedly increase the 
efficiency and democratic character of the institutions’ work. The alleged greater 
transparency and inclusiveness of the decision-making process has to be nuanced: 
nobody would be against hearing a myriad of stakeholders, but criteria on their variable 
selection are loose and obscure; no one would deny the political helpfulness of more 
flexible or even amorphous structures for negotiations but, as a consequence, we face 
more uncertain and unpredictable outcomes. The process can actually become slower, 
more expensive and even “reduce the quality of the decisions by driving those decisions 
to those that are the lowest common denominator”761. As with soft law, a particular 
product of informal governance, we already stated that problems are not the tools but 
the way they are used, the guarantees to ensure that these “devices” are effectively open 
and inclusive762.  
We might also argue that human rights precisely constitute an area in which the need of 
uniformity tends to discourage the adoption of informal modes of governance. After all, 
if we are speaking about democratic institutions and fundamental rights, we would all 
agree that they should be effective with the existing mechanisms, even in their 
complicated interaction with business activities. What are then the reasons for the 
success –or at least, growth– of these new informal governance schemes behind CSR?  
Three law-making changes have simultaneously developed in the EU: a horizontal 
bureaucratisation, a vertical Europeanisation and a lateral privatisation, which all 
together create a “3D governance space” 763 in such a way that the EU is somewhere in 
between with the potential of intervening in the three dimensions. This evolution has led 
to a “complex [that] may work more effectively, while still bestowing mediated 
legitimacy, by casting a hierarchical shadow over more (though never fully) 
autonomous lawmakers, instead of trying to steer them too heavily or too directly, for 
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which it anyway lacks the capacity”764. Being perhaps disappointing, in view of the 
challenges of globalisation and the factual power of MNCs, it is utterly important to 
realise this lack of capacity to defend human rights with traditional hard moulds in 
some cases, and rather take a pragmatic approach to work proactively and take the most 
of the available opportunities to influence on the new global order in defence of human 
rights. This does not mean to relinquish other mechanisms for the protection of human 
rights.  
The EU seems to have taken up this institutional role, abandoning positivist and 
theoretic fears on the procedures followed, despite the obvious risks that refer to 
democracy, legitimacy, inclusiveness and participation. 
We are far from reinventing the wheel concerning governance; we will only draw 
attention to the usual misunderstanding that semantically links it to types of government 
when, in fact, it has more to do with forms of policy making or exercising power. The 
study of CSR reveals linkages between public governance and corporate governance, 
which according to us have an unavoidable human rights component. In this sense we 
dare to propose a rather simple but pragmatic definition of governance: ‘the behavioural 
and procedural aspects of the institutional exercise of power, public or private, allegedly 
based on selected ethical values of the Community at stake’. In this way, we include the 
public and private dimensions, the human rights core ingredients and motivations, and 
the fact that CSR predominantly consists of practices (behaviours and procedures) to 
prevent human rights abuses.  
As it happens with soft law, it is difficult to take a scientific stance on to what extent 
informal governance exclusively responds to neo-liberal wishes or, to a certain extent, 
also to other factors like a historical elitist inertia in the European integration project 
(when doubts appear as to the degree of inclusiveness of decision-making processes). In 
this respect we warn on the usual confusion between political accountability and legal 
responsibility, very frequently mixed up for ideological purposes. The Commission 
herself makes an ambiguous mishmash of ex-ante and ex-post responsibilities 
“tend[ing] to blur accountability with issues of representative deliberation”765. 
Paradoxically, it is the success of the EU that has led to its increasing and 
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unprecedented administratisation. This takes us to the borders of the treaties: articles 
288 and 290 TFEU establish an apparently clear-cut distinction between legislative and 
non-legislative acts, their respective legal effects and the delegation of powers to the 
Commission, but they insufficiently address the operational tasks that need to be 
accomplished to deal with this increasingly specialised EU administration.  
In a very interesting precedent-setting case, precisely related to the cooperation in the 
social field (employment and working conditions) and migration policies, the ECJ 
clearly distinguished between competences and powers: while it declared void a 
Commission initiative to initiate a consultation procedure on migration policies because 
it lacked competences, it nevertheless dismissed the application of various Member 
States worried about the leading role and organisational tasks of the Commission in 
other social issues when it decides to start a consultation process (so usual in CSR). The 
ECJ strongly emphasised that “where an article of the EEC Treaty –in this case Article 
118– confers a specific task on the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision is 
not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission necessarily and 
per se the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out that task”766.  The 
understandable fear of Member States as to the level of actual influence of the 
Commission found no legal support but, as early as 1987, anticipated the problem of the 
relative power of the Commission only by coordinating consultations, despite the fact 
that, of course, it could not be proved to what extent the Commission would inform the 
final outcome, as it happens with soft law, soft governance and CSR. In other words, the 
informal but real power derived from the institutional role of the Commission, though 
merely procedural, does not seem a juridifyable matter for the Court, naively 
concluding that “[s]ince the Commission has a power of a purely procedural nature to 
initiate a consultation procedure it cannot determine the result to be achieved in that 
consultation”767.  
We insist that this administrative growth is the result of a relative success of the EU, 
even though it is a ‘double-edged sword’. Its combination with new governance modes 
has generated a plurality of networks and agencies and other bodies in such a way that, 
in no small measure, it develops into a soft administratisation. Informal governance 
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makes it easier to operationalise the increasing administrative needs of the EU, not 
bearable anymore by the Commission on her own because of their number, specificity 
and technical character. In sum, informal governance softens but allows the deepening 
of market integration up to ever higher levels that need a proper administration. 
CSR has to be contextualised in the wider framework of market integration. 
‘Responsible’ market integration has therefore to combine merely economic regulation 
with CSR-informed governance, in a relatively flexible manner that facilitates getting 
closer to an “ecosocial market economy”, in the words of Mrs. Ferrero-Waldner, 
European Commissioner for External Relations back in 2007768. Truly strict 
interpretation of the treaties would be likely to impede certain levels of harmonisation 
of the internal markets, partially achieved through soft law and new governance forms, 
most prominent among which are also agencies and networks. The enlargement 
eastwards has also had an influence since the negotiations in Brussels become tougher, 
making soft harmonisation more attractive. The Commission thus circumvents legal 
limits to its competences, as regards implementation, and has taken the opportunity to 
go beyond in certain policies –like CSR–, through soft strategies in view of the lack of 
proper powers under the treaties. Another example are EU networks of regulators with 
more or less informal characteristics: “lacking the legal instruments to coordinate 
policies in certain sectors, the Commission would primarily attempt to indirectly expand 
the range of issues that fall under supranational competences by coordinating networks 
of regulators”769. In the area of CSR, this can explain the emphasis of the Commission 
in apparently grey ‘coordination tasks’ that we defined as ‘information and promotion 
strategies’770. These information and promotion strategies bring the occasion to gather 
with and influence public and private regulators: informal peer reviews with Member 
States or other national authorities, along with private-led organisations with standard-
setting vocation and companies themselves.  
Certainly, CSR has interwoven a great number of stakeholders and specialists, 
allocating funds for research and policy papers. We have cited a number of reports and 
                                                          
768
 Cited by: V. BACHMANN and J.D. SIDAWAY: “Zivilmacht Europa: A Critical Geopolitics of the 
European Union as a Global Power”, in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 
Vol. 34 No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 94-109, at p. 103.  
769
 Moreover, the Commission profits from the fact that Member States have already delegated powers to 
their respective national institutions and, later, the Commission informally coordinates them with a clear 
influence on the outputs. M. ZINZANI: Market Integration through Network Governance: the Role of the 
European Agencies and Networks of Regulators, Cambridge 2012, Intersentia Ed., p. 25.  
770
 Refer to Chapter III, Section 2.1.  
256 
 
studies on different aspects of CSR, in which the external influence of ‘stakeholders’ 
and ‘experts’ is sometimes direct, as when the study is produced by external institutions 
like the University of Edinburgh (the Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights 
and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside the 
European Union) or Commission’s study on Responsible Supply Chains, tasked to a 
group of research projects under a services contract for the High Level Group on 
Corporate Social Responsibility. In some other cases, the external influence is indirect 
and less easy to be traced such as the meetings and networking events that precede, for 
example, the sectoral CSR handbooks published by the Commission. In sum, we have 
mentioned reports, strategies, frameworks and guidelines, being the most important the 
Renewed EU Strategy for 2011-2014.  
These documents were not without consequences, as we have seen a partial –at times 
audacious- implementation. We have even shown its permeation into proper EU Law. 
From the companies’ perspective, it starts to be risky to turn a blind eye to this incipient 
regulatory scenario and the future agenda. In this sense, we have observed that the 
Commission has moved from a framework phase to a more strategic and active phase 
after 2009. Precisely at this step it is necessary to wonder on the share of external 
influences. It appears almost impossible to gauge the real impact of stakeholders, 
experts and other informal actors about whom doubts persist in terms of legitimacy, 
conflict of interests, and supervision.  
It must be said that this institutional modus operandi is not limited to CSR; it reflects by 
the way a wider political dynamic in the EU. Recourse to experts and the agencification 
of the EU are explained by the above-mentioned specialised administrative tasks that 
the Commission no longer performs due to its number and technical character. This 
research is not centred on this particular phenomenon, although it deserves –en passant– 
a short comment since experts and other unknown actors have contributed to shape CSR 
in the EU. CSR is also, in part, the result of this cumulative technocratic 
administratisation of the EU, based on the passivity of Member States –rather than an 
active support: a “permissive consensus” or a “seductive formula of political 
abdication”771. The legal responsibility, in cases of breach of the treaties, is likely to fall 
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on the Commission as the most usual formal decision-maker; nevertheless, the political 
accountability will be vaguer and vaguer. Challenges will be insurmountable for social 
scientists eager to contextualise their researches in “their socio-economic terrains, [as] 
we risk not seeing how those who supposedly influence policies (experts) are 
themselves also influenced by material, ideational and institutional considerations”772. 
The objective is not to discuss the expertise of experts or the representativity of 
particular stakeholders, but to remain critical in terms of, respectively, their alleged 
scientific neutrality or full inclusiveness: the EU should establish some kind of 
“legitimacy test”773 or double-check procedure or administrative filter, even more 
important taking into account the international influence of the EU when it officially 
takes a stand. 
If we may be allowed to incur a short philosophical excursus, it is our personal opinion 
that soft governance, manifesting itself in the form of soft norms, with the concrete 
example of CSR, all shall be the materialisation of changing mentalities, a process that 
will have to be confirmed in the longue durée, in the words of the French historian 
Braudel. We have already cited another French thinker, Foucault, to warn on the 
discourses of truth and its political management774. The multiplication of experts, the 
super-specialisation, and their institutional reflection (bodies, agencies, 
multistakeholder forums, etc.) respond, in our view, to a general crisis of legitimacies. 
The end of the Cold War and the progressive achievements of welfare states have led to 
a partial de-politicisation of western societies. Postmodernism is also behind the 
questioning of almost any source of legitimacy, in particular in the political scene. Even 
democracy is suffering this crisis of legitimacies in the sense that its operative bases are 
under discussion: for example, “deliberative” formulas gain adepts in the era of internet. 
Only the scientific and technical legitimation seems to resist and might explain a 
scientificization or technification of politics (the “political abdication” to which we 
referred before). This is not to discuss the progress of sciences, today better than 
yesterday in the way they describe and explain nature; however, it seems a bit 
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illusionary to express it in ontological terms, as if we were ‘closer to truth’ and this 
being a self-sufficient and definitive authority to shape policy making: we forget that 
tomorrows’ science will also be better than todays’ and it is not a linear ontologically-
finalistic but an arborescent development that also entails uncertainty775.  
As is apparent, institutional soft governance may entail strong powers, with its lights 
and shadows. We have seen that a lateral question in this regard is the identification of 
the actual decision-makers. Networks and agencies share the same institutional 
problems: legitimacy, transparency, and supervision. These can perfectly be 
extrapolated to CSR policies, as it might seem that the real decision-makers avoid 
spotlights, escape accountability. There are reasonable doubts on who is really making 
decisions, on the share of the institutional input in the final guidelines, 
recommendations, communications and –more importantly- directives. It has been 
studied that “the activist role of the ECJ”776 has been fundamental to control the 
decisions made by agencies and this case-law finally crystallised in the current wording 
of article 263 TFEU that openly provides the review of “the legality of acts of bodies, 
offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties”. Article 263 TFEU repeatedly uses the expression “intended to produce legal 
effects”: this constitutes a further recognition of the ECJ case law in relation to the 
scrutiny of soft law, as explained elsewhere in this work, confirming that it is 
impossible to return narrow positivist positions based on formal legal distinctions. We 
have to adopt a more functional perspective to study the actual effects of institutions’ 
work, in a broad sense –the  term ‘bodies’ invites to a lax interpretation as for the 
European institutional building. Besides, article 290 TFEU (comma 2 a)) includes an 
extra precaution, the permanent threat of the European Parliament or the Council “to 
revoke the delegation” of powers to the Commission at any moment. These provisions 
therefore adapt the treaties to the growing administrative complexity of the EU in the 
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understanding that it is no longer a mere question of competences, but a problem of 
implementation and daily exercise of powers. At the same time, the ECJ seized the 
political opportunity777. The initial development of CSR confirms this role of the ECJ: 
firstly, to support positive developments made by Member States that included early 
social and environmental clauses in public procurement (cases against France, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Austria778); and secondly, to allow the judicial review of soft 
law regardless of formal nomen iuris distinctions before this was contemplated in the 
TFEU779.  
In any case, the ECJ will indirectly scrutinise soft governance through the eventual 
revision of soft law, if intended to have legal effects. However, this method focuses on 
the content, i.e., on the material product of the new modes of governance but not on the 
validity of the institutional procedures behind and, therefore, constitutes a very indirect 
and weak control of the institutional working methods. Diffuse and hardly identifiable 
decision-makers may generate confusion in a system where “not only is the demos 
absent but –like Kafka’s Castle perhaps– there is also no one in charge who can ever be 
held responsible”780.  
On another front, with this general institutional problematics in mind, it is well-known 
that the EU is not institutionally homogeneous: we have studied various documents 
emanating from the Commission (most of them), and also from the Council and the 
Parliament. Equally important has been the parallel ECJ case-law to reassure us on the 
eventual judicial review of soft law and soft governance. The institutional interplay 
inside the EU also determines its potential role and it is time to make some final 
remarks in this respect. For instance, the Commission is the protagonist in the 
development of CSR although we have to recall that this is the result of an evolving 
opinion influenced, in some particular cases, by the practice of advanced EU Member 
States or, last but not least, by some US initiatives.  
Again, as shown, the Commission has not always been the ‘torchbearer’. Nor is the 
European Parliament free of contradictions. In the overall, the EP looked like the most 
progressive EU institution in terms of CSR. The cited EP’s reports on CSR and its 
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proposals for amendments to the studied directives support a harder and justicialist 
approach, generally contrary to soft governance and technocracy. In the heat of the 
crisis, while CSR reports include pompous statements on the need to transparently 
regulate corporate governance, the EP “enthusiastically welcomed the ESFS [European 
System of Financial Supervision], discarding its long-standing opposition to further 
consolidation of EU technocratic governance, in particular by means of supranational 
agencification”781.  
As for CSR, the role of the Council should not be underestimated either. We tend to 
forget that the EU is, to a lower degree than years ago, but still, an international 
organisation composed of “High Contracting Parties”: “il metodo intergovernativo 
tende periodicamente a riapparire nella realtà della vita istituzionale”782. An obvious 
example of the remaining intergovernmental nature of the EU is the accession procedure 
settled by article 49 TEU which establishes that “the conditions of eligibility agreed 
upon by the European Council shall be taken into account”, a language that does not 
accurately show how important the Council is (let’s recall the Copenhagen criteria). The 
infringement procedure is a less obvious but perfect example of the remaining 
intergovernmental and classical international procedures within the EU: under the 
European Coal and Steel Convention, the High Authority “was obligated to pursue 
infringements [… whereas] the Commission enjoys full discretion in this respect”783. In 
comparison, the pre-litigation phase has therefore been softened and politicised. Article 
258 TFEU only states that the Commission “may bring the matter before the Court”. 
This evolution can also be explained in terms of governance: ‘soft’ ways of 
implementation and management of compliance, even including “means to put pressure 
on the Member States to comply with non-binding instruments, such as letters of 
notice” in the context of the “emergence of non-binding auxiliary enforcement 
procedures”, like preventive measures in the agricultural and fisheries policies784. The 
EU institutional architecture is hybrid so that hybrid legal results should come as no 
surprise as well as the influence of inter-governmental fora like the Council.  
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We detect abundant references to the Council Conclusions in the CSR initiatives 
undertaken by the Commission (communications, recitals of the Directives), especially 
the seminal European Councils at Lisbon (2000), Stockholm and Gothenburg (2001). 
The EU intergovernmental nature is an undeniable part of its institutional DNA and it 
should not be forgotten that the recourse to Council Conclusions “all’interno dell’iter 
legislativo può determinare uno sviamento di procedura”785 so that its role shall not be 
neglected. The Council provided the necessary political impulse to initiate the European 
CSR agenda when it invited (since it cannot oblige) the Commission to submit reports 
and communications in the topic at hand. The Commission’s Green Paper of 2001 and, 
more recently, its Renewed Strategy for CSR 2011-2014 are a response to this political 
will. The Renewed EU Strategy for 2011-2014 recalled that “The Council and the 
European Parliament have both called on the Commission to further develop its CSR 
Policy” 786, expressly citing the Environment Council of 5 December 2008, the 
Environment Council of 20 December 2010, the Foreign Affairs Council of 14 June 
2010 and two EP resolutions of 2007 and 2011, the institutional legitimation of the 
Commission to act despite being soft governance issues.  
These initiatives have more institutional weight when they are backed-up by the 
Council, which is also the main party in the CFSP and, accordingly, an indispensable 
actor to impulse the external dimension of CSR. Beyond the stereotypes on inter-
institutional battles (that –at times– occur), there is a good amount of political 
compromises and permissive cooperation, to take up and adapt the concept of 
‘permissive consensus’ to which we alluded above. And even, “on several occasions, 
the European Parliament has considered it useful to request, in the course of the EU 
decision making process, the inclusion of explicit references to European Council 
Conclusions in EU legislation to be adopted”787, with a clear intention to increase the 
political weight of the initiatives at stake and indirectly recognising that many Council 
Conclusions might be seen as political “mandates”788. We have referred to the EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2012-2014, 
precisely adopted by the Council (Council Doc. 11855/12), even though it has no choice 
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but to precise, in a footnote, that “decisions on specific steps to implement this Action 
Plan will be taken in accordance with the Treaties” and “does not affect the division of 
competence between the EU and its Member States”. The first initiative fell on the 
Commission’s Communication “Human Rights and Democracy at the heart of the EU 
External Action –towards a more effective approach”, dated December 2011, which 
mutated into the framework and action plan adopted by the Council in June 2012. In the 
2015 spring, again the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy took the initiative and issued a joint communication with the proposal of 
a renewed Action Plan for the Period 2015-2019, calling on the Council to adopt it. 
More rapidly that with the first action plan, only two months later, the Foreign Affairs 
Council adopts it illustrating this inter-institutional permissive cooperation and, to some 
extent, the bi-directionality of (soft) political mandates between the Commission and 
the Council.  
We shall make a final point on the Council. According to the EU’s own documentation, 
apart from private actors, CSR also concerns public authorities. The success of 
transparency requirements is one of its key-drivers so that the calls for more 
transparency have been extended to the EU institutions. The Grand Chamber 
consolidated the necessary openness and transparency of the Council vis-à-vis EU 
citizens with respect to decision-making processes, defining it as an “overriding public 
interest” clarifying the institutional work of the EU, based on the “democratic right of 
European citizens to scrutinize the information which has formed the basis of a 
legislative act, as referred to, in particular, in recitals 2 and 6 of the preamble to 
Regulation No. 1049/2001”789. In a second paradigmatic case, the NGO Access Info 
Europe challenged before the Court the decision of the Council to disclose the minutes 
of negotiations without detailing Member States’ positions. In appeal, the First Chamber 
upheld the General Court decision and dismissed the Council allegations on the 
supposed sensitive nature of the documents requested that would justify an exception to 
disclosure of information in virtue of art. 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001. By rejecting 
this argument, the ECJ understands that the exception needs to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis and was not sufficiently proved, therefore supporting the idea that the 
effectiveness of the Council’s decision-making process was not under threat because of 
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transparency. The ECJ indirectly confirmed, as alleged by Access Info Europe, that “it 
is precisely at the point when the procedure is initiated that maximum transparency is 
vital: by the time that discussions have already been held and compromise positions 
reached, transparency and public debate are no longer of any use at all”790. In sum, the 
Council has not been unaffected to these new governance modes, pushed by a minority 
of States led by Sweden that profited from the so-called permissive consensus, albeit 
“the permissive atmosphere from which the pro-transparency coalition long derived its 
power has declined”791.  
The ECJ seems to have taken on the profile of a face-saving referent in this complex 
institutional inter-play. It is true that the ECJ is not free from criticism either: once the 
Charter was upgraded to same level of the Treaties, the Court as a “human rights 
adjudicator” is limited to the application of EU Law and some argue that it lacks of a 
solid and opened comparative approach to international human rights law792.  
On the whole, it can be said that disappointments with regard to the Court’s role in 
defending human rights are caused by the fact that public opinion and many academics 
expect it to act as a constitutional court while it is an international tribunal, with its 
obvious particularities. The roots of this misunderstanding are created expectations, 
perhaps a desideratum, but not the Court’s clearly hybrid nature and characteristics. The 
ECJ has even empowered National Courts to review the measures of State executives in 
application of the Treaties: the off-cited Van Gend en Loos recognised under certain 
criteria the eventual direct effect of some provisions of international agreements793. This 
implicitly vested EU National Courts with complementary supervision powers with 
respect to Member States and, to some extent, also the control of EU institutions 
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themselves: we could say that the same criteria laid down in Van Gend en Loos would 
reasonably lead to the hypothesis that, in 2008, the “implicit threat of intervention”794 of 
National Courts encouraged the Grand Chamber’s decision in Kadi795, overruling 
nothing less than a UN Security Council Resolution (despite art. 103 of the UN Charter) 
and its translation into a Council Regulation. 
An institutional lesson can be drawn out for other international organisations on to what 
extent the interaction between international tribunals and national courts can contribute 
to control the legitimacy of the international organisation at stake when its international 
tribunal might be weaker (or less willing) as to the supervision of the international 
institutional itself. In any case, we have seen the ECJ’s transversal role in the area of 
public procurement, in general terms dealing with soft law, with the indirect 
(improvable) control of agencies, and with the Council’s transparency. This is how EU 
institutions partially bypass their inherent traps in terms of “overlapping jurisdictions 
resulting from layers and layers of agreements reached with a heavy emphasis on 
balancing [… and] pompous and empty rhetoric”796.  
The several peppered interventions of the ECJ encourage to describe it as a transversal 
curative actor in the institutional building: some deficiencies would otherwise 
dramatically reduce –if not annul– the institutional credibility of the EU in promoting 
CSR, human rights and good governance. In the area of CSR, if at any time there are 
unlawful results, there are good reasons to think that they can be avoided or annulled 
thanks to the ECJ, even though their institutional origin might remain unaddressed. 
Besides, the EU institutions may face legal and political responsibilities for contents and 
decisions taken by multiple actors. 
These institutional remarks confirm that the ECJ’s role has been positive in the overall. 
Furthermore, in terms of policy transfers, “the transfer potential of the ECJ is 
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consistently [but erroneously] ignored”797. Precisely in the area of CSR, inter-
institutional policy transfers are particularly important and weave complex relational 
networks: for example, from the US, the influence of the Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-
Oaxley Acts plus the Alien Tort Statute. In other cases, some early concrete initiatives 
that come from Member States have anticipated CSR aspects that were later 
incorporated into the EU institutional agenda –sometimes traumatically, through the 
ECJ judicial intervention–, resulting in potential policy transfers to other Member 
States. It goes without saying the crucial transfers from other international 
organisations: as for the UNGPs, the EU uses an external source and asks Member 
States to implement it ‘in coordination’ via national action plans in a sort of “facilitated 
unilateralism”798, a particular form of policy transfer that allows, in the meanwhile, the 
influence of EU institutions. Additionally, the interaction between EU institutions 
themselves: the Parliament, the Council and the Commission have all been supportive 
of CSR and, setting aside their diversity, they have differently shaped the 
materialisation of CSR. The EU also has transferred CSR issues to other regional 
organisations, as seen in chapter III. At the end of the chain, when EU based TNCs 
adopt Codes of Conduct there is a potential “private transplant of EU Law”799: a private 
bottom-to-bottom policy transfer or “legal transplant” given that private of Codes of 
Conduct can have an influence to extend EU law beyond the EU.  
Lastly, detractors say the EU’s institutional role in promoting human rights is built on 
shifting sand. We might agree on the fact that “Europe is a laboratory of a postmodern 
multiplicity of human rights protection and their interaction”800. CSR confirms it. This 
has to be seen against the institutional narrative on the EU, particularly insistent in its 
alleged teleological and ever progressing character. The crisis since 2008 might have 
broken this fairy tale promoted by EU institutions801, or perhaps its constitutive 
elements have been exhausted. The EU’s global institutional role is also a question of 
the self-image of authorised story-tellers, to use human rights as the cornerstone of the 
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EU’s “civilian power”802, using Duchêne’s terminology to distinguish it from Nye’s 
categories of hard and soft power.  
Be that as it may, despite the official narrative that proposes a step-by-step story in 
which the economic cooperation has led to wider political goals, finally adding a strong 
human rights commitment, Gráinne de Búrca has instead demonstrated that human 
rights were actually an essential, explicit and strong part of the European project back in 
1951-1954, as shown by the drafting process of the (failed) treaty for the European 
Political Community (EPC) and its surprisingly advanced provisions compared to the 
current human rights system in the EU. In this sense, human rights did not emerge, but 
re-emerged, during the European integration project (since the 1970’s and 1980’s, again 
with the active role of the ECJ), despite the fact that “Member States continue to resist 
submitting themselves to human rights monitoring by the EU, and the active assertion 
of human rights protection as a goal of EU foreign policy remains in sharp contrast to 
the unwillingness to declare human rights protection to be a general goal or a cross-
cutting objective of internal EU policies”803. The internal dimension of CSR might be a 
“third-way” to fill the gap created by this reluctance of Member States, precisely as a 
“cross-cutting objective of internal EU policies”, especially to the extent this 
institutional weaknesses can affect the “global normative leadership”804 of the EU. 
According to Jürgen Habermas, “in the light of a constitutionalisation of International 
Law”, the EU architecture should look forward to a more symmetric repartition of 
powers of initiative and legal capacity of its different institutions to overcome “the 
peculiar floating position of the Commission” and the “anomaly” of the Council805. 
Obviously, the insider’s view is always more aware of imperfections; notwithstanding 
improvable institutional aspects, the EU is still a quite successful experiment. Outsiders 
observe the actual “global regulatory power” of the EU and its international influence 
when it promotes the CSR agenda. Outsiders have no qualms about saying that “the EU 
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is already a superpower and, importantly, a superpower of a meaningful kind”806, albeit 
being aware of all these institutional determinants. 
 
4.3.2.  Substantive contributions and the post-2015 agenda 
After these institutional remarks, it is necessary to finish with some general conclusions 
on the substantive aspects of Europe’s role, without repeating the concrete 
implementation of CSR in the EU, studied in Chapter III. When undoubtedly well-
intended authoritative voices raise their hands in horror, sophisticatedly scandalised, 
because CSR and soft law appears to them too far away from their dreamed human 
rights regime, we should just wonder if, given all these institutional and legal 
determinants, it is reasonable to think that the EU could really act otherwise or go much 
further. It is commonplace to blame EU institutions for the lack of political will of 
Member States. Moreover, according to the definition of CSR proposed in the general 
part of this research, it becomes clear that it should not be aimed at replacing the 
available International Human Rights Law, but at complementing it with predominantly 
ex-ante and horizontal strategies to coinvolve companies. In fact, the first substantive 
originality of the EU is that ex-ante strategies and horizontal legal effects are not 
unexplored territory, marking the European contribution to global CSR. 
Indeed, ex-ante strategies are not new in the EU’s “market philosophy”, differing from 
other positions within the WTO system: “la filosofia di mercato europea è basata qui 
sui principi dello sviluppo sostenibile e della prevenzione dei rischi, oltre che del più 
generale principio di precauzione. La vigilanza sui prodotti è, almeno in parte, 
esercitata ex ante (prima cioè dell’immissione sul mercato) e non solo ex post”807.   
Nor is horizontality a novel problem in the EU. It is perhaps less obvious in human 
rights issues, since they are seen as binding only on States: however, that is to say it has 
to “permeate all areas of law” and, therefore, there is a State duty to prevent –and 
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remediate– third-party violations808. It is a well-established doctrine that the State’s 
failure to respect human rights can be determined by act or omission809, so that the 
failure to prosecute an abuse by a private actor can constitute a violation of the main 
human rights treaties (at least in terms of effective judicial remedies). In particular, the 
principle of non-discrimination has always been the spearhead of a progressive and 
indirect horizontalization of human rights obligations, including this principle in legal 
relationships inter privatos810. When the ECJ has balanced the right of free movement 
of goods and the freedom of speech and assembly (in cases of demonstrations), it has 
ruled the duty of the State to restrict fundamental freedoms, under certain conditions, to 
guarantee the fundamental rights of other private actors, “weighing the protected 
interests of the involved private parties”811. If restrictions to the freedom of speech and 
assembly are possible to ensure the free movement of goods, why the ECJ might find 
unlawful partial restrictions to the freedom of companies to make effective the State’s 
duty to respect human rights with regard to other private actors, provided they are 
proportional and justified? The way CSR is materialising in the EU seems close to this 
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 Building on German Constitutional Jurisprudence, it could be described as an “effect of radiation”: E. 
J. LOHSE: “Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors –Towards an ‘Indirect Horizontal Effect’”, in 
European Public Law, Vol. 13 No. 1 (2007), pp. 159-190, at pp. 169-170.  
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be positive obligations” –Case of Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 19 February 1998 (Grand 
Chamber), Application No. 14967/89, para. 58. This doctrine was confirmed by linking environmental 
cases to article 8 on private and family life, to the extent environmental damages can be assessed under 
this light, since the seminal Case of López Ostra v. Spain, Judgment of 9 December 1994, Application 
No. 16798/90, para. 51, 52 and 58. 
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 In particularly evocative terms, the ECJ has said that the prohibition of discrimination might be 
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the reason was nationality, all the more poignant within the EU). Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Assoc. 
Union Cycliste Internationale et al., Judgment of 12 December 1974, para. 21.  
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 The idea would be to extrapolate some of the conclusions of the ECJ in Commission v. France and 
Schmidberger as proposed by E. J. LOHSE (Ibíd., p. 183): “For the ‘infringer’ this not change anything: 
in order to fulfil its duty of protection the State has to restrict his/her freedom. However, states in the 
Community legal order are likewise bound not to infringe fundamental rights. It has been actively 
discussed if the state could take into account those rights of the private ‘infringer’, as in Commission v. 
France  the ECJ did not mention a possible fundamental right of the farmers to demonstrate which would 
probably have existed, although violent demonstrations do not enjoy much protection. However, 
Schmidberger established respect for the other private party’s fundamental rights as an acceptable 
justification for a ‘failure to act’ which resulted in a ‘pyramidal’ construction. In the particular case, the 
action of the state could be justified by the protection of freedom of expression and assembly, 
fundamental rights […] When weighing the protected interests of the involved private parties, freedom of 
assembly prevailed because there was a legitimate goal of the demonstration and the main aim was not to 
hinder trade (which would be an illegal exercise of a fundamental right) but to express an opinion. 
Applied to Commission v. France, a test of balance between the ‘freedom of speech’ of the farmers and 
the free movement of goods would have pointed in the opposite direction as here the main goal was the 
obstruction of trade and the fundamental right was exercised in a violent way not in accordance with 
national laws. Obviously, this reasoning is not restricted to the above-mentioned fundamental rights but 
applies to all fundamental rights on the Community level”.  
269 
 
balance between the protected freedoms of companies and the State’s duty to ensure 
human rights, also inter privatos by virtue of the ‘permeation’ or ‘radiation’ of human 
rights law to all spheres, resulting in a pyramidal construction between States and 
private parties. Yet it is not a consolidated development, there are sound reasons to 
consider, at least, “indirect horizontal effects” in the EU. 
In general terms and compared to other organisations, the EU reacted slowly to the 
emergence of CSR in the international agenda, but rapidly catched up and has even 
overcome the blocking dichotomy between pure voluntarism advocates and hard-law 
enthusiasts. As with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in the case of CSR, the EU 
is inspired by external sources to finally go well beyond those international influences 
in terms of precision and detail812. CSR ‘cake’ now looks harder and more toasted on 
the outside, and still soft and juicy inside: the substantive implementation of CSR shows 
an evolution in which the EU has reconciled the aforementioned dichotomy creating 
harder frameworks with soft contents. Before 2009, the first initiatives pointed to a very 
different result and the Commission was widely criticised for being more inclined to the 
so-called ‘business-case’ and merely voluntary formulas. The crisis since 2008 might 
have played a role in the re-balancing of CSR policies –perhaps switching on the oven 
instead of cooking a cold cake. Nobody knows what the result will be; it is an on-going 
process during which an increasing consensus among Member States might change the 
scenario –the temperature, in our metaphor. 
It is early to know to what extent we face a change of scenery towards ever harder 
initiatives. The relative hardening of CSR within the EU is consistent with two 
international developments that seem to go in the same direction. Firstly, in 2000 the 
OECD Council made it obligatory to establish National Contact Points for the States 
adhered to the Guidelines on MNEs, even though we have seen that NCPs widely differ 
as for their powers and structure. Secondly, the 2003 UN Norms on the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to human 
rights obligations also reflect a harder approach: “the [UN] Norms are the closest thing 
to an example of a hard regulatory approach to CSR that could be envisaged in 
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 “La Carta, fonte interna all’ordinamento dell’UE, è molto più precisa e dettagliata di quanto siano le 
fonti ‘esterne’ cui la protezione dell’Unione ha sin qui dichiarato di ispirarsi”. L. S. ROSSI: “La Carta dei 
Diritti Fondamentali dell’UE: una sfida costituzionale”, in L. S. ROSSI (a cura di): La protezione dei 
diritti fondamentali. Carta dei diritti UE e standards internazionali (XV Convegno della Società Italiana 
di Dirittto Internazionale –Bologna 10-11 Giugno 2010), Napoli 2011, Ed. Scientifica, pp. 19-22, at p. 
19.  
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traditional international law. They do not attempt to reconcile hard regulation and 
voluntarism” –in this light, their difficult enforcement through litigation is also a typical 
problem under traditional international law813.  
The EU is halfway and reflects this wider tendency towards hardening some aspects of 
CSR, while reconciling these positions. The EU’s substantive contribution is, also, this 
mixed and pragmatic approach adopted so far. A proof is the sustained effort to 
maintain a multi-stakeholder informative and promotion agenda even after the 
discouraging failure of the first EMS Forum, all of this combined with a parallel –
unexpected–  impact on EU Law (already commented upon in Chapter III) and its 
transfer to the institutional-international arena.  
In this respect, it must be emphasised that the substantive contribution of the EU further 
has a notable international effect. If the “de-pillarization caused […] a fuzzier 
demarcation between the external aspects of the AFSJ and other external 
competences”814, we think it has happened the same with other policy areas after 
Lisbon, to a degree that the internal dimension of CSR makes little sense without its 
external one, as it can be the case with almost any other policy. 
This is the result, from a substantive point of view, of an increasingly coordinated 
reading of diverse treaty provisions, in particular: articles 1 to 4, 9 to 12 and 13 of the 
TEU, jointly with articles 11, 21 and 205 of the TFEU. Besides, to jointly read all these 
articles might lead to clearer “substantive obligations, which must be followed up on in 
a different and more comprehensive way than they are today”815. The partial 
implementation of the CSR agenda has shown the incipient possibilities of jointly 
reading these treaty provisions: “EU Law then has the potential of taking the lead 
globally and turning the trend of short-term growth mania into a reflective, long-term 
sustainable development”816. 
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 L. S. ROSSI: “From EU Pillar to Area: The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the External Dimension of 
Freedom Security and Justice”, in C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN and L. S. ROSSI (Dirs.): La dimension 
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principle ad rule of EU Law”, in C. M. BAILLET (Ed.): Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective 
Regimes. From the Margins, Cambridge 2012, Cambridge University Press, pp. 254-280, at p. 267.  
816
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With its imperfections, articles 9 to 12 should be more widely used to scrutinise almost 
any action of the EU, as they are a significant “European lesson” for international 
organisations, as a viable and realistic supranational democracy instead of idealistically 
extrapolating XIXth -Century nationalist criteria on democracy817. By the way, it should 
not go unnoticed the unique European experience with regard to the penetrating 
international subjectivity of individuals, utterly important in human rights: very early 
the ECJ confirmed that “the [then] Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States 
but also their nationals”818. Equality and sovereignty, essential concepts in the theory of 
international organisations, have suffered many changes going through the European 
filter: from merely formal equality, we have walked towards a more substantive equality 
by sharing sovereignty819, mainly guided by human rights concerns820.  
Finally, it appears throughout this research that European initiatives have followed a 
rather specific and concrete style after 2009, reflecting this “substantive” vocation of the 
EU. At the same time that general principles were settled, there has been a parallel 
bottom-up process in which dispersed new CSR provisions in technicalities finally 
become a true cross-cutting CSR strategy –whilst other international organisations 
usually work the other way round (from the general to the particular, as we have seen). 
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272 
 
We have to acknowledge, in this sense, that the EU has the merit of a detailed approach 
able to show some very technical –but not less important– problems, as illustrated with 
the crucial issue of access to justice. The EU has essentially followed the work of other 
international organisations, but now has a potential leadership to define concrete 
solutions for these practical problems thanks to its previous and unique experience. 
Unfortunately, since the 2008 crisis began, unemployment has risen and labour is more 
and more considered as a cost instead of a factor of production so that a good part of the 
progress made has been reversed or simply left aside. The problems have been studied 
in detail by the EU institutions, with –not less important–contributions made by 
Member States. The path is opened; we shall not get left behind. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
I. Corporate Social Responsibility at a global level 
 
1. Against ontological and ideological incompatibilities 
‘Business and Human Rights’ studies would not exist if there was an ontological 
incompatibility between globalisation and fundamental rights. Starting out from this 
premise, the social legitimation of globalisation trends will depend on the definition of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and on its capacity to balance States’ power, societal 
expectations and global capitalism. The success of CSR will, in turn, depend on how we 
build the very concept of CSR, within which we must acknowledge the necessary 
centrality of human rights and the interplay between both hard- and soft-law 
instruments. There is also a need for a consensual, institutional, interdisciplinary, 
integrative, and human rights approach to this subject, in order to systematise the 
current initiatives and infer the eventual trends for the future. This is the way to 
overcome any apparently ontological incompatibility between business and human 
rights, between hard and soft law, between subjects and objects of IL, between 
ideologies on the market economy and any other pair of related concepts that, 
otherwise, would block any reasonable study of CSR. 
 
2. Definition and characteristics of CSR 
The practice of International Organisations at a global level and of the European Union 
at a regional level supports the definition of CSR that we have proposed: CSR is a 
complementary strategy to increase the horizontal effects of current internationally 
recognised human rights, mixing hard and soft-law instruments, in their particular 
interaction with the activities of all kind of business enterprises, with a predominantly 
preventive vocation. Our definition comprises all possible nuances and can be clarified 
sensu contrario: CSR is not corporate philanthropy or charity; it is not only about 
voluntary initiatives since it includes baseline legal requirements; it is not only 
preventive though being aimed at completing IHRL with mostly ex ante strategies with 
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regard to which traditional IHRL suffers from important gaps; it is not a substitute or 
alternative for treaty-based obligations, but a complement; it does not place direct duties 
on private actors for the moment, but develops and specifies indirect horizontal effects 
upon them, through the national implementation of existing International Law. In this 
line, we deduce three characteristic elements of CSR: 1) the close connection with the 
type of business and the inherent impact of its concrete operations; 2) a sustainability 
criteria focused on long-term effects rather than incidental responses; 3) and a clear 
purpose to respect human rights, which is its legal foundation. 
 
3. CSR and customary international law 
The interrelation observed between hard law and soft law hides a deeper dialectic 
between treaty law and the customary path in the development of CSR, which do not 
seem irreconcilable options. However, this work does not advocate for the creation of a 
new treaty or binding instrument on business and human rights, because we observe a 
historical inertia against new international treaties, especially after the 11 September 
2001 attacks. Suffice it to mention the General Assembly’s failure to finally adopt the 
ILC projects on the responsibility of States or on diplomatic protection. The ‘treaty 
curse’ adds arguments against an eventual treaty: its slow negotiation and risks of 
compromise solutions of minimum contents, and its slower ratification (distinguishing 
between signatures and ratifications). We shall add the possibility of hindering 
reservations; the time lag before the entry into force; the need of monitoring 
mechanisms for treaty implementation; and that the home countries of most TNCs did 
not support the creation of the UN Working Group to negotiate a binding instrument, 
which is not a good omen. Instead, the already initiated customary path shows the 
opportunity to progress more rapidly (there is not a time requirement) in the 
construction of a wider consensus. Of course, we do not idealise the customary way as it 
can be obscure in its contents and States might be ambiguous in explaining their 
practice not to risk future obligations. This is why our preference for the customary path 
should not be interpreted at the expense of existing treaty law, which has proved to be 
indispensable to frame and discipline the current CSR initiatives. But these initiatives 
have not reached a sufficient degree of normative maturity to act otherwise –in other 
words, we put forward the potential of the customary path seen as a light and drizzling 
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rain over time (if adequately channelled). The multiplication of national action plans 
contribute to move forward down the customary path. 
 
4. Soft law and the development of CSR 
CSR is an emerging normative system with subcategories, which vary in legal value, 
specificity and scope. Many of its components are soft-law instruments, within the 
framework of pre-existing human rights law. In this connection, soft law has three 
advantages that mark its contribution to the development of CSR: 1) it allows the 
introduction of new debates and International Law issues, such as the international 
subjectivity and eventual duties of private actors, at the same time it facilitates 
agreements leaving room to differences and particularities, therefore encouraging the 
progressive building of a global consensus; 2) it allows the interpretation of existing 
instruments in order to specify their implications and fill gaps with regard to the 
complex interaction between human rights and TNCs’ activities; 3) and in the long run, 
it is a useful tool to generate customary practices among States and IOs to further 
regulate the human rights’ impact of TNCs. In light of this, CSR has a potential per se, 
beyond its gradual ‘hardening’. In terms of regulatory processes, instead of creating ex 
novo instruments that only respond to our ideals in a deductive manner deprived of 
practical experience, CSR has evolved into a case-based, empiric and cumulative 
regulatory process. 
 
5. The role of International Organisations 
International Organisations have a prominent role to play in this regulatory process. 
First of all, IOs heavily influence the progressive development of International Law and 
can promote the effective implementation of existing human rights instruments 
alongside their progressive interpretation to gradually cover business practices and 
responsibilities. Secondly, IOs greatly contribute to expand and accelerate States’ 
practice in the same direction; in fact, the priority of the UN Working Group that 
followed Ruggie’s mandate is to foster national action plans on CSR. This is a far from 
negligible effort because the generalisation and universalisation of national actions 
plans is absolutely crucial for the normative consolidation of CSR at an international 
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level, in customary terms –even regardless of their effectiveness (this can come later). 
IOs also help ensure a greater degree of institutional coordination and substantive 
consistency of national action plans. 
 
6. Incipient crystallisation of CSR 
For the time being, two principles are the most advanced in crystallising at the 
customary level or, at least, enjoy a very promising degree of international legal 
recognition. We are referring first of all to the ever-growing acknowledgement of 
private correlative duties upon corporate actors in terms of human rights, as an indirect 
permeation of international human rights law. Even though we still lack of sufficient 
details on its contents, indirect horizontal obligations between private actors to protect 
human rights have gained much credit within the international society, as proclaimed by 
many soft instruments and, also, a good amount of authoritative interpretations of treaty 
bodies, arbitral mechanisms and even some national Courts that all point in the same 
direction. The second principle in its way to crystallise is the transversal character of 
human rights within general international law. This should not be understood in 
hierarchical terms but in line with the relational character of IL. Almost all IOs have 
accepted to incorporate human rights’ concerns into their daily activities regardless of 
their founding priorities, even economic organisations that were traditionally less active 
in this regard like the World Bank or the World Trade Organisation. At the States’ level, 
it starts to be commonplace to bear in mind human rights concerns when dealing with 
apparently unrelated issues and negotiations, far more often and in unprecedented 
manners in relation to trade and investments –though still improvable. The recognition 
of some kind of private correlative duties upon TNCs, indirect emanation of IHRL, and 
human rights’ institutional mainstreaming are –in the practice of both States and IOs– 
the most normatively consolidated aspects of CSR: they may obviously await further 
specification, but they already seem irreversible. 
 
7. The problematic of trade and investments 
As for human rights’ mainstreaming, the practice surveyed shows that the ICSID 
tribunals and the WTO dispute settlement bodies have had no prejudices or reluctance 
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to acknowledge the relational character of International Law and, indirectly, eventual 
human rights concerns. Related human rights issues have been addressed on a number 
of occasions. Their reasoning is twofold: the integration within general international law 
and, secondly, the eventual place of human rights. However, States generally fail to 
identify and benefit from the current opportunity niches for human rights’ protection 
within trade and investment disputes. States’ failure in this area is generally due to the 
inadequacy of hierarchical claims and maximalist wishes in favour of human rights over 
other international obligations, so that arbitral tribunals end up with their back against 
the wall, instead of reasonably arguing the relational character of International Law and 
the need to counterbalance concurring international obligations, which would be the 
strategy with greater chances to succeed. On several other occasions, States’ failure is 
caused –in summary– by a lack of good faith and coordination in the way they regularly 
cope with these concurring international obligations, unduly alleging human rights’ 
protection to hide internal problematics and inconsistencies. In fact, most disputes 
surveyed show that the first phase of the test is passed and arbitral bodies accept the 
relevance of human rights in some cases. It is at a second stage when most States fail: 
when it comes to demonstrate that the measures adopted were necessary (the impact in 
relation to the public good pursued), proportional (the least-inconsistent option 
reasonably available was chosen), and non-discriminatory (in comparison to other 
States, investors or internal legislation). It is therefore the responsibility of States to 
adequately make use of the existing possibilities, both institutional and substantive: to 
‘grease’ those open windows and adequately open them. 
 
8. The UN leadership and policy transfers.  
Whether positivists like it or not, soft law is not a new phenomenon within International 
Law. Nor is it strange to EU Law, in its interplay with proper norms in many law-fields. 
The UN, FAO, the WHO, the OECD, the ILO, the World Bank Group, and private 
organisations (like the ISO) have all worked on CSR and issued guidelines, 
recommendations, declarations, etc. Moreover, as time passed and the UN had released 
its main contributions (the three-level framework and the UNGPs), all the above-
mentioned organisations have expressly made an effort of coordination to gradually put 
their own standards in line with the UN ones, citing each other’s instruments. IOs at a 
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global level already acknowledge and even promote a high level of policy transfers 
between them in the area of CSR, which permeates States’ policies and some private-led 
initiatives. The proliferation of national action plans are a good example. 
 
II. Corporate Social Responsibility in the European Union 
 
9.  Particularities of CSR in the EU 
The above-mentioned International Organisations have determined the first European 
initiatives, but it is very important to recall the United States influence (the Alien Tort 
Statute, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act). In this context, it has been made 
clear the European Union’s receptivity to welcome the development of IL and CSR, 
perhaps a bit slowly at the beginning, but in the end including it among its working 
priorities for the new millennium, reinterpreting its contents with substantive 
improvements and, finally, re-upload CSR at a global level while exercising an 
important influence –having hardened some of its aspects. If International Organisations 
at a global level have worked from the general to the particular, the European Union has 
worked the other way round, from technicalities to more general principles. This 
explains why the European Union has had a ‘CSR before CSR’, unlabelled and implicit, 
especially to regulate consumer’s protection and environmental issues with an initial 
focus ad intra. The EU has needed some time to accept the emergence of CSR as such 
and to catch up; after 2009, it can be said that the EU became a key player. In this 
evolution, the EU quite rapidly understood the external dimension of CSR and the 
importance to resituate this concept within international human rights law, being also a 
human rights appeal ad extra. In general terms, we have deduced that CSR in the EU 
has set itself up as a mainstreaming governance tool or crosscutting transversal policy 
rather than a classic and separate policy per se. Finally, apart from alleviating the 
tensions caused by globalisation, CSR in the EU has an additional and utterly important 
role: it navigates between a market-oriented and a rights-based integration project, thus 
contributing to their precarious equilibrium. 
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10.  Grey zones 
However, it must be noted that the EU has not always been the torchbearer of CSR, as 
seen at an early stage: for example, in Commission v. France (Case C-225/98) the 
Commission contested a French public contract based on social requirements; or when 
the then European Communities threatened to bring a WTO-complaint against some US 
public-procurement restrictions affecting Myanmar’s repressive regime in 1997 
(WT/D88/3). The EU is not a monolithic reality and it has been checked that, at times, 
some States like France or the Netherlands, were ahead of EU institutions in the 
development of some CSR-aspects, when the ECJ has become a face-saving actor. Even 
later, with an apparently consolidated CSR agenda, we have found grey zones that show 
the institutional complexity of the EU: in several occasions, the Council has rejected the 
more daring aspects of some CSR regulatory proposals of the Commission and, at 
times, even the European Parliament slows down negotiations just to artificially boost 
its own importance without really making substantive corrections to proposals. For 
example, the regulation of supply chains in highly sensitive trade of minerals like tin, 
tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold; it is true that it took three years for the 
Commission to draft a proposal, but the Parliament unrealistically wants to exaggerate 
its contents (good enough), while it postpones delivering results and putting pressure on 
the Council, which is actually the less enthusiastic EU institution in this subject. 
 
11.  Legal spill-overs 
The 2008’ financial and economic crisis might have contributed to this evolution, 
encouraging the hardening of some aspects. Indeed, there are important CSR “legal 
spill-overs”. CSR has grown well beyond the initial borders of mere voluntariness, as it 
becomes evident in the following hard norms: Directive 2013/34/EU has established 
compulsory reporting for the extractive industry on payments to any government over € 
100,000 within a financial year, in money or in kind; Directive 2014/95/EU has made 
mandatory non-financial reporting for companies over 500 employees specifying 
concrete and explicit human rights concerns, including corporate governance reports 
and details on companies’ governing bodies; Directives 2014/24/EU and 214/25/EU 
have incorporated and consolidated obligatory CSR requirements into public 
procurement regulation in all sectors; and Regulation 1286/2014 has further increased 
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the protection of small shareholders and retail investors against aggressive practices in 
the financial sector. The recentness of these initiatives makes it impossible to analyse 
the level of national implementation, which is probably an interesting study to be made 
in the near future in continuation of this research. 
 
12.  Access to justice 
This research has analysed access to justice for human rights’ victims of TNCs with a 
view to liberating this debate from ideological overtones, even though we take a stance 
to conform to Dante’s famous warning: “the hottest place in hell will be reserved for 
those who, in times of great moral crisis, have chosen to stay neutral”. First of all, we 
advocate for civil proceedings instead of criminal law procedures, not only because of 
its pecuniary aspect (essential in the conflict between human rights’ protection and 
business interests), but also to avoid a highly risky overreliance and overdependence on 
public prosecutors’ role. In our view, the problem of access to justice should be 
reframed in terms of extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction and extra-contractual 
civil responsibilities. The EU rules on jurisdiction lack of an admissibility criterion on 
‘related actions’ of companies, built upon the contents of the litigious, to make EU-
based TNCs accountable for their activities in third countries (through subsidiaries or 
otherwise), as a sufficient jurisdictional link regardless of other factors (nationality of 
victims, etc.). Despite the absence of such admissibility criterion, the EU may take over 
precisely when the US Alien Tort Statute is at a low ebb. 
In practice, obviating idealistic stances that we have rejected due to the absence of 
political will to undertake revolutionary normative innovations, our functional approach 
has demonstrated for instance that complex corporate structures and veils can be pierced 
on the basis of experience gained so far in the area of competition law and taxation law, 
both at an international and a European level. The leading British and Dutch case-law 
has shown that, against the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a certain forum 
necessitatis can emerge in the EU to avoid intolerable denials of justice or eventually 
irreconcilable judgements, according to art. 47 of the European Charter of Human 
Rights and art. 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights. In this line, it seems 
more or less feasible to further explore art. 7 of Reg. 864/2007: it certainly refers to 
environmental damages (always in advance in comparison to other human rights), but it 
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could be extended to human rights violations in more general terms. Indeed, art. 7 of 
Rome II Regulation establishes a link with the ‘place giving rise to the damage’, which 
might open a window to vindicate the jurisdiction of a European court since concrete 
damages can occur outside the EU, but the decisions leading to them might have been 
made in European headquarters, if this can be proved. Besides, in the seminal Owusu v. 
Jackson (Case C-281-02), the ECJ has ruled that art. 2 of Reg. No. 44/2001 also 
regulates relationships with the Courts of non-Contracting States and that it can be read 
jointly with art. 6(1): EU national courts have some room for manoeuvre in determining 
under what circumstances ‘reasons of efficiency and justice’ would justify exercising its 
jurisdiction, thus validating joint hearings of cases affecting subsidiaries and parent 
companies and bypassing this way other jurisdictional obstacles. The European 
Parliament has proposed changes to improve these limited possibilities, while the 
Commission encourages the adoption 1980 Hague Convention. Importantly enough, the 
main European contribution in this subject has consisted of discreetly preserving the 
margin of appreciation of States when it comes to interpret and make use of the limited 
flexibility under the Brussels Convention (Reg. 44/2001) and Rome II (Regulation 
864/2007). It is up to European States to go down this road, timidly advanced by some 
EU national courts. 
 
13.  National policies in the EU 
EU member-States have worked reactively rather than proactively, many times making 
the mistake of designing crisis-motivated and internally-oriented CSR policies, instead 
of assuming its global dimension in terms of human rights and development, as 
promoted by IOs at a global level and by the EU at a regional level. For the moment 24 
European countries have adhered to the OECD Guidelines on MNEs, accordingly 
establishing their respective National Contact Points, of discussable benefits. Many EU 
member-States have approved National Action Plans on CSR, but only five States 
specifically address ‘business and human rights’, which is perhaps caused by some 
hesitancy to intensify the human rights language within CSR, despite the international 
agreement in tying CSR to human rights. In any case, the presence of NAPs is only a 
small part of the CSR-performance of States and we should also look at other 
regulations, starting with the prompt transposition of recent Directives in the area of 
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corporate governance, public procurement, environment and consumer’s protection. We 
concluded that the Commission should not promote two different national action plans 
(on CSR and a separate one on ‘business and human rights’), given that it generates an 
undesirable conceptual confusion: the best policy option is a single and precise action 
plan, if possible approved by the Parliament or at the level of the Council of Ministers, 
in which States should recognise the centrality of human rights within CSR, also 
coherently with the action plans promoted by the UN.  
Besides, instead of creating new institutions for the NCPs and other CSR-organs, we 
rather defend that national human rights institutions should have an utterly important 
role in developing and monitoring CSR. National human rights institutions, being 
official but to a certain point functionally independent from governments, are a good 
option to host non-judicial grievance and mediation mechanisms on business and human 
rights –without excluding proper access to justice. Finally, NHRIs could also foster 
social awareness and generate public CSR-certificates for products and companies, 
ideally in coordination with new CSR-certificates at the EU level, making sure that they 
remain as independent as possible from both governmental and corporate influences. It 
is unlikely to be a top-down process: CSR-certificates created in Brussels will be hardly 
acceptable for France, Germany or the United Kingdom, in relation to their respective 
multinational corporations. It is more likely to be a bottom-up process in which each 
State (ideally through its national human rights institution) generates a CSR certificate 
that somehow penetrates into EU law after some time. In any case, the most important 
point is to avoid the proliferation of for-sale private CSR-certificates. 
 
14.  Some easily improvable aspects 
CSR is developing at a good speed in the EU, but there are some improvable or, at 
times, forgotten aspects that it is worth recalling now because most of them might be 
easily corrected. The institutional promotion of CSR moves between punitive and 
persuasive initiatives, between hard and soft law, being all necessary. At times, a more 
punitive approach can be interesting: the Commission could put in place a blacklist of 
poor performing companies. A complementary and more persuasive way is to work on a 
public European CSR-certificate with a human rights-based approach, before the 
appearance of for-sale and private certification schemes. The Commission is wrong to 
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assert that two national action plans are necessary; a single NAP on CSR and human 
rights is enough, if adequately designed. At the same time, close attention should be 
paid to how States finally implement the incipient legal spill-overs of CSR –States may 
communicate policies and pieces of legislation that in reality do not correspond to the 
EU’s requirements, even though it is early to make an assessment on that. Finally, it 
must be noted that new bureaucratising bodies are probably a diversionary manoeuvre 
that hides concrete goals and deadlines; we already have in the EU national human 
rights institutions that can be tasked with CSR.  
On the international front, the EU sometimes lament over the fact that WTO dispute 
bodies rule against European standards on phytosanitary products, public procurement 
and a variety of safety requirements that third States contest as unlawful restrictions on 
trade. A comprehensive EU strategy on international standards is urgent. Especially in 
relation to the SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement and GATT itself, the WTO 
increasingly refers to guidelines and standards created by other international 
organisations; if the EU does not find safe certain hormones, for example, the EU must 
realise that it can indirectly influence trade rules on safety by putting more pressure on 
those other standard-setting organisations (mainly, the WHO, FAO and ISO) to align 
themselves with the EU’s views on certain products, provided that the EU is not acting 
in a protectionist manner or defending spurious interests, and bearing in mind that the 
EU is not “the navel of the earth”.  
The effectiveness of the European contribution to global CSR also depends on how the 
EU standardises human rights clauses in trade and investment agreements; the EU 
should adopt a general modus operandi rather than a case by case proceeding to 
negotiate these treaties –of course, leaving some room for certain cautions and 
particularities. There is a lot of pending work to put in order investment agreements, 
since the Treaty of Lisbon granted the EU exclusive trade competencies and over 
foreign direct investments (but not all investments). In sum, despite improvable aspects 
and the long way to go, it starts to be reckless and highly risky for companies to ignore 
or neglect this emerging normative scenario. 
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Fortune “500 List” 
http://fortune.com/fortune500 
Business and Human Rights Resource Center 
http://business-humanrights.org 
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